Delusion and motivationally biased belief: Self-deception in the two-factor framework

Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 71-86

  Davies, Martin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920759650     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203838044     Document Type: Chapter

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