Precedent-Based Constitutional Adjudication, Acceptance, and the Rule of Recognition

The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages

  Fallon, Richard H ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

Acceptance; Constitutional adjudication; H. L. A. Hart; Rules of recognition; Supreme court; U.S. law

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920752340     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195343298.003.0002     Document Type: Chapter

References (14)

1. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 155-59 (1990);
2. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 138-40 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
3. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 291 (2005).
4. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 887 (1996).
5. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 582-83 (2001).
6. See, e.g., Dennis Patterson, The Poverty of Interpretive Universalism:Toward the Reconstruction of Legal Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1993).
7. See Brian Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
8. See Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018, 1021 (1996).
9. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 1031-38 (2003).
10. See Randy E. Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint-Hearted" Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 13-15 (2006).
11. For a full statement of his views, see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004).
12. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1809-13 (2005).
13. See generally David A. Strauss, Originalism, Precedent, and Candor, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 299 (2005) (arguing in favor of interpretive methodologies that encourage candor);
14. David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987) (asserting a judicial obligation of candid legal analysis).