Event Concepts

Understanding Events: From Perception to Action

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages

  Casati, Roberto ^a   Varzi, Achille C ^b  

^a CNRS   (France)

^b Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

Common sense; Event notion; Event perception; Event representation; Internalist psychological; Scientific; Theoretically revised

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920177042     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195188370.003.0002     Document Type: Chapter

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