No Pain, No Gain? Effecting Market Discipline via "Reverse Convertible Debentures"

Capital Adequacy beyond Basel: Banking, Securities, and Insurance

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages

  Flannery, Mark J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

Banks; Capital structure; Credit risk; Financial instruments; Financial risk; Recapitalization

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920076693     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195169713.003.0005     Document Type: Chapter

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