The Waters of Euphrates and Tigris: An International Law Perspective

Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law

Volumn 16, Issue , 2012, Pages 329-394

  Kirschner, Adele J ^b   Tiroch, Katrin ^a  

^a Water Conflicts in International Law

^b NONE

Author keywords

Equitable Utilization of Shared Resources; Euphrates and Tigris Rivers; International Water Law; International Watercourses

Indexed keywords

EID: 84919865353     PISSN: 13894633     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (366)

1. 1 A drainage basin (also called catchment; catchment area; drainage area; river basin; watershed) is regarded as the entire drainage area of a stream, a river or a lake;
2. UNESCO/ WMO, International Glossary of Hydrology, see under EN 0360, EN 0115.
3. 2 T. Naff/ R.C. Matson, Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation?, 1984, 83.
4. 3 See for example J.A. Allan, The Middle East Water Question: Hydropolitics and the Global Economy, 2008, 70 et seq.; Naff/ Matson, see note 2, 83.
5. 4 Reportedly Iran is, however, planning or has even already constructed several dams on tributaries of the Tigris and the Shatt al-Arab. Yet, current information regarding development plans in Iran is very hard to obtain; see I. Kaya, “The Euphrates-Tigris Basin: An Overview and Opportunities for Cooperation under International Law”, University of Arizona Arid Lands Newsletter 44 (1998), see under ;
6. S. Harms, Branchenreport Wasser, Wirtschaftsplattform Irak 2010, Chapter 3, see under .
7. 5 Some authors even claim that both rivers form a single hydrological unit; see A. Kibaroglu, Building a Regime for the Waters of the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin, 2002, 160;
8. N. Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East, 2005, 100;
9. H. Elver, Peaceful Uses of International Rivers: The Euphrates and Tigris Dispute, 2002, 346. On this issue see under VI.1.
10. 6 On this issue, see R. Moschtaghi, “Shatt al Arab”, in: R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2012;
11. D.A. Capon-era, “The Legal Status of the Shatt-al-Arab (Tigris and Euphrates) River Basin”, Austrian J. Publ. Int’l Law 45 (1993), 147 et seq.
12. 7 See for example: J.F. Kolars/ W.A. Mitchell, The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Development Project, 1991, 3; Allan, see note 3, 70; Kibaroglu, see note 5, 162.
13. 9 Naff/ Matson, see note 2, 83 et seq.
14. 11 Kolars/ Mitchell, see note 7, 6; Kibaroglu, see note 5, 162.
15. 12 Allan, see note 3, 70.
16. 13 F.M. Lorenz/ E.J. Erickson, The Euphrates Triangle: Security Implications of the Southeastern Anatolia Project, 1999, 3.
17. 16 The mean average temperature in Iraq during the summer is said to lie at 30 degree Celsius; Kliot, see note 5, 108.
18. 18 M.L. Kavvas et al., “A Study of Water Balances over the Euphrates-Tigris Watershed”, Physics and Chemistry of the Earth 36 (2011), 197 et seq. (198).
19. 19 A. Kibaroglu et al., Cooperation on Turkey’s Transboundary Waters, Status Report commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2005, 57;
20. FAO, “Irrigation of the Middle East Region in Figures”, Aquastat Water Reports 34 (2009), 359.
21. 20 Kliot, see note 5, 109 et seq.; Naff/ Matson, see note 2, 86.
22. 21 Kliot, see note 5, 108 et seq.
23. 22 Naff/ Matson, see note 2, 86 et seq.
24. 23 Y. Lupu, “International Law and the Waters of the Euphrates and Tigris”, Geo. Int’l Envtl L. Rev. 14 (2001-2002), 349 et seq. (350).
25. 25 Naff/ Matson, see note 2, 89; Kliot, see note 5, 117.
26. 27 For an overview of barrages, regulators and lakes on the Euphrates and the Tigris in Iraq, cf. Kliot, see note 5, 118 et seq.
27. 28 Ibid., 143 et seq.; generation of hydroelectric power currently accounts for about 17 per cent of electric energy production in Iraq, cf. FAO, see note 19, 205.
28. 29 M. Biedler, “Hydropolitics of the Tigris – Euphrates River Basin with Implications for the European Union”, Centre Européen de Recherche Internationale et Stratégique: Research Paper No. 1 (2004), 17 et seq.
29. 30 Kliot, see note 5, 120; Naff/ Matson, see note 2, 92.
30. 33 N. Al-Mamouri, in: Harms, see note 4, Chapter 6; large parts of the water infrastructure were also severely damaged or even destroyed by the wars in 1991 and 2003;
31. J.M. Trondalen, Water and Peace for the People: Possible Solutions to Water Disputes in the Middle East, 2008, 182.
32. 34 See for example, Kliot, see note 5, 146; FAO, see note 19, 212 et seq.
33. 35 M. Bazza/R. Najib, “Towards Improved Water Demand Management in Agriculture in the Syrian Arab Republic”, paper presented on the First National Symposium on Management and Rationalization of Water Resources Use in Agriculture organized by the University of Damascus, Damascus, Arab Republic of Syria, 28-29 April 2003, 5, see under .
34. 37 Cf. M. Salman, “Institutional Reform for Irrigation and Drainage in Syria: Diagnosis of Key Elements”, in: FAO, Syrian Expatriates Conference, 2004, 1, see under .
35. 2. It was constructed with financial and technical assistance of the Soviet Union and completed in 1973 (FAO, see note 19, 343).
36. 40 Naff/ Matson, see note 2, 90; see also under IV. 2.
37. 41 Trondalen, see note 33, 180.
38. 42 FAO, see note 19, 344.
39. 43 Salman, see note 37, 1.
40. 44 Biedler, see note 29, 15.
41. 51 J.F. Kolars, “Problems of International River Management: The Case of the Euphrates”, in: A.K. Biswas (ed.), International Waters of the Middle East: From Euphrates-Tigris to Nile, 1994, 44 et seq. (49); see also under IV. 2.
42. 52 Cf. Kibaroglu, see note 5, 223; according to Kibaroglu although the Keban Dam is not officially part of the South-East Anatolia Project it is an integral part of Turkey’s overall development scheme.
43. 53 Turkish for Southeast Anatolia Project.
44. 54 It consists of major irrigation and hydropower schemes encompassing 22 dams, 19 hydroelectric power plants and irrigation systems that shall bring 1.7 million hectares of land under irrigation (GAP Program for the Development of Land and Water Resources, see under ). The heart of the GAP and also the largest dam in Turkey is the Atatürk Dam on the Euphrates near Adiyaman (J.F. Kolars, “The Hydro-Imperative of Turkey’s Search for Energy”, Middle East Journal 40 (1986), 53 et seq. (63)). It has a storage capacity of 48.7 million cubic meters and is considered one of the largest dams in the world (Kolars/ Mitchell, see note 7, 38).
45. 55 Latest Point Reached in GAP, see under .
46. 56 Southeastern Anatolia Project Action Plan (2008-2012), May 2008, see under . According to a report on the latest situation of GAP activities at least the project in large shall be completed by 2012, Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi son Durum (2010), 7.
47. 60 G. Pring/ B. Salman Banaei, “Tigris and Euphrates Rivers”, in: Wolfrum, see note 6, para. 11.
48. 61 S.C. McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses, 2007, 59-60.
49. 62 R.A. Lien, “Still Thirsting: Prospects for a Multilateral Treaty on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers Following the Adoption of the United Nations Convention on International Watercourses”, B. U. Int’l L. J. 16 (1998), 273 et seq. (278-279);
50. J.W. Dellapenna, “The Two Rivers and the Lands Between: Mesopotamia and the International Law of Transboundary Waters”, Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law 10 (1996), 213 et seq. (236).
51. 63 Covenant of the League of Nations 225 CTS 195; for further information on the topic, see: R. Gordon, “Mandates”, in: Wolfrum, see note 6.
52. 64 For more detailed information on the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, please see e.g. H.N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History 1913-1923, 1931.
53. 65 Franco-British Convention on Certain Points Connected with the Mandates for Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine and Mesopotamia (signed 23 December 1920), LNTS Vol. 22 No. 564.
54. 66 Article 3 Franco-British Convention on Certain Points Connected with the Mandates for Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine and Mesopotamia (see note 65) reads as follows: “The British and French Governments shall come to an agreement regarding the nomination of a commission, whose duty it will be to make a preliminary examination of any plan of irrigation formed by the Government of the French mandatory territory, the execution of which would be of a nature to diminish in any considerable degree the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates at the point where they enter the area of the British mandate in Mesopotamia.”
55. 67 Treaty of Peace with Turkey, with related Documents (signed 24 July 1923), LNTS Vol. 28 No. 701.
56. 68 Article 109 Treaty of Peace with Turkey, ibid.
57. 69 Some authors also mention an agreement between Iraq and Turkey from 1930. Reportedly the two states pledged not to alter the course of the Euphrates river without each others’ consent. Unfortunately the authors of this study were unable to obtain the mentioned document; Lupu, see note 23, 354-355, who, however, again refers to the article of Dellapenna, see note 62, 238.
58. 70 Agreement with a View to Promoting Peace, with Protocol relating thereto, Protocol concerning its coming into force, and Exchange of Notes (signed 20 October 1921, entered into force 28 October 1921), LNTS Vol. 54 No. 1284.
59. 71 Ankara was previously called Angora.
60. 72 Article I Agreement with a View to Promoting Peace, see note 70.
61. 73 The Kuveik river flows from Turkey to northwestern Syria.
62. 74 Agreement with a View to Promoting Peace, see note 70, Exchange of Notes VIII.
63. 75 Convention of Friendship and Good-Neighbourly Relations between France and Turkey (signed 30 May 1926), LNTS Vol. 54 No. 1285.
64. 76 Article XIII Convention of Friendship and Good-Neighbourly Relations, see note 75.
65. 77 Protocole final d’abornement de la commission d’abornement de la frontière turco-syrienne agissant conformément au traité d’Angora du 20 octobre 1921, à la convention d’amitié et de bon voisinage du 30 Mai 1926 et au Protocole d’abornement du 22 Juin 1929 (signed 3 May 1930), Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12, 290.
66. 78 Article II Protocole final d’abornement, see note 77.
67. 79 See Part III.; see also Dellapenna, see note 62, 237.
68. 80 Lien, see note 62, 285; see article 12 Agreement with a View to Promoting Peace, see note 70;
69. article II Protocole final d’abornement, see note 77; on the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, see under V. 1. b.
70. 81 Treaty of Friendship and Neighbourly Relations between Iraq and Turkey (signed 29 March 1946, it came into force 10 May 1948), UNTS Vol. 37 No. 580.
71. 83 A. Kibaroglu, “Socioeconomic Development and Benefit Sharing in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin”, in: H. Shuval/ H. Dweik (eds), Water Resources in the Middle East: Israeli-Palestinian Water Issues – From Conflict to Cooperation, 2007, 185 et seq. (185).
72. 84 Dellapenna, see note 62, 238.
73. 85 R.M. Slim, “Turkey, Syria, Iraq: The Euphrates”, in: G.O. Faure/ J.Z. Rubin (eds), Culture and Negotiation, 1993, 135 et seq. (139).
74. 88 J. Waterbury, “Transboundary Water and the Challenge of Cooperation in the Middle East”, in: P. Roger/ P. Lydon (eds), Water in the Arab World: Perspectives and Prognoses, 1994, 39 et seq. (56).
75. 89 Cf. Kibaroglu, see note 5, 223-225; Elver, see note 5, 405.
76. 90 Kibaroglu et al., see note 19, 61.
77. 91 Kibaroglu, see note 5, 224; Elver, see note 5, 406.
78. 93 Waterbury, see note 88, 56-57.
79. 94 Kibaroglu, see note 5, 225.
80. 95 Kliot, see note 5, 161.
81. 96 Elver, see note 5, 374; since 1968 there have been two distinct Ba’th parties in Syria and Iraq, see: E. Kienle, Ba’th v. Ba’th: The Conflict between Syria and Iraq 1968-1989, 1993, 3.
82. 97 Naff/ Matson, see note 2, 93; Kliot, see note 5, 161-162.
83. 98 Cf. Naff/ Matson, see note 2, 93-94, who cites private statements by Iraqi officials; see also Elver, see note 5, 375, who, however, does not cite a source.
84. 99 Some authors mention a Protocol of the Joint Economic Committee between Turkey and Iraq from 1980, which the authors of this study were, however, unable to obtain; see e.g. A.T. Wolf/ J.T. Newton, Case Study Transboundary Dispute Resolution: the Tigris-Euphrates Basin, 3;
85. Elver, see note 5, 421, referring to a “Protocol for Techno-Economic Cooperation”.
86. 102 Para. 6 Protocol on Matters Pertaining to Economic Cooperation between Turkey and the Syrian Arab Republic (signed and entered into force 17 July 1987) UNTS Vol. 1724 No. 30069;
87. for a detailed discussion of the protocol see under V. 2. a. bb.
88. 103 Para. 1 Joint Minutes Concerning the Provisional Division of the Waters of the Euphrates River (Iraq-Syria) (signed 17 April 1989), see under .
89. 104 Allan, see note 3, 73; Elver, see note 5, 376;
90. see also Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Water Issues between Turkey, Syria and Iraq”, Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs 1 (1996), Chapter I.C.4.A.
91. 105 It should be noted that the information and literature on the events occurring after 1990 is even scarcer and harder to obtain than before.
92. 106 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see note 104, Chapter I.C.5.
93. 107 Joint Communiqué on Cooperation between the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey (signed and came into force 20 January 1993), UNTS Vol. 1724 No. 30070.
94. 108 Kibaroglu, see note 5, 229-230; A. Kibaroglu/ W. Scheumann, “Euphrates-Tigris River System: Political Rapprochement and Transboundary Water Cooperation”, in: A. Kibaroglu/ W. Scheumann/ A. Kramer (eds), Turkey’s Water Policy: National Framework and International Cooperation, 2011, 277 et seq. (282).
95. 109 Wolf/ Newton, see note 99, 4.
96. 110 Joint Communiqué between the Republic of Turkey/ Prime Ministry/ Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration (GAP) and the Arab Republic of Syria/ Ministry of Irrigation/ General Organization for Land Development (GOLD) (signed 23 August 2001), see under .
97. 111 Implementation Document of Joint Communiqué (Programme for 2003) (25 July 2003), on file with the authors (unofficial transaltion); see also Kibaroglu, see note 83, 189.
98. 112 Strategic Foresight Group, The Blue Peace: Rethinking Middle East Water, 2011, 30-31, see under ; see also: Kibaroglu/ Scheumann, see note 108, 293.
99. 113 The MoU between the Ministry of Environment and Forestry of the Republic of Turkey and the Ministry of Water Resources of the Republic of Iraq on Water (15 October 2009), on file with the authors (unofficial translation).
100. 114 Strategic Foresight Group, see note 112, 30-31; see also: Kibaroglu/ Scheumann, see note 108, 293-294;
101. out of the four MoUs mentioned the following three MoUs concern the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and are on file with the authors: MoU between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic on Establishment of a Pumping Station in the Territories of the Syrian Arab Republic for Water Withdrawal from the Tigris River (23 September 2009);
102. MoU in the Field of Remediation of Water Quality between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic (23 September 2009);
103. MoU between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in the Field of Efficient Utilization of Water Resources and Combating Drought (23 September 2009) (unofficial translations).
104. 115 Strategic Foresight Group, see note 112, 31;
105. see also: Eviewweek, Turkey, Syria, Iraq Sign MoU for Use of Water Resource (9 May 2009), 2009.
106. 116 In fact, after 1946 agreements mainly focused on the Euphrates river.
107. 117 The Institut de Droit International (IDI) was founded in 1873 in Belgium as an “exclusively learned society” composed of the world’s leading international public lawyers. It is devoted to promoting the progress of international law [arts 1 and 3 Statute of the Institut de Droit International (10 September 1873, as amended), see under ].
108. 118 The ILA was founded in Brussels in 1873 as an international nongovernmental organization with the objective to promote the study, clarification and development of international law and to further international understanding and respect for international law [article 3 (1) Constitution of the International Law Association (adopted August 2004), in: ILA, Report of the Seventy-First Conference, Berlin 2004, 2004, 42.];
109. see also T. Stein, “International Law Association (ILA)”, in: Wolfrum, see note 6; for further information on the development of the legal rules and principles of international water law, see e.g., A. Teclaff, “Fiat or Custom: The Checkered Development of International Water Law”, Natural Resources Journal 31 (1991), 45 et seq.
110. 119 The ILC was established by the General Assembly in 1947 for the promotion of the progressive development of international law and its codification [article 1 Statute of the International Law Commission, A/RES/174 (II) of 21 November 1947], see also P.S. Rao, “International Law Commission (ILC)”, in: Wolfrum, see note 6.
111. 120 Committee on Water Resources, “Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers”, in: ILA, Report of the Fifty-Second Conference (Helsinki 1966), 1967, 484 (ILA Helsinki Rules);
112. Committee on Water Resources, “Water Resources Law – Fourth Report”, in: ILA, Report of the Seventy-First Conference, see note 118, 334 (ILA Berlin Rules). It should be noted that these instruments do not constitute binding legal instruments.
113. 121 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (adopted and opened for signature 21 May 1997, not yet entered into force) ILM 36 (1997), 700 et seq.;
114. the UN Watercourses Convention was based on a draft prepared by the ILC, see Draft Articles on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses and Commentaries Thereto, 1994, GAOR 49th Sess., Suppl. 10, 195.
115. 122 Article 2 (1) Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (with Annexes), UNTS Vol. 1936 No. 33207.
116. 123 See for example Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, ILM 34 (1995), 864 et seq.;
117. Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River, OJ L 342 (12 December 1997), 19 et seq.;
118. Convention on the Protection of the Rhine, OJ L 289/31;
119. Indus Waters Treaty 1960, UNTS Vol. 419 No. 6032;
120. Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), ILM 40 (2001), 321 et seq.
121. 124 Iraq accepted on 9 July 2001 and Syria ratified on 2 April 1998;
122. according to article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UNTS Vol. 1155 No. 18232, the two states are to refrain from acts that might defeat the purpose of the UN Watercourses Convention, see note 121, before it enters into force.
123. 125 Cf. O. McIntyre, “The Role of Customary Rules and Principles of International Environmental Law in the Protection of Shared International Freshwater Resources”, Natural Resources Journal 46 (2006), 157 et seq.;
124. P.M. Dupuy, “Formation of Customary Law and General Principles”, in: D. Bodansky/ J. Brunnée/ E. Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, 2007, 449 et seq. (450 et seq.).
125. 126 Although this view cannot be supported by an in-depth analysis, since this would go far beyond the scope of the study, separate references for each norm which underscore their customary legal status are provided.
126. 127 Cf. D. Bodansky, “Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law)”, Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 3 (1995-1996), 105 et seq. (119), who also correctly states that “the international community should spend less time debating a norm’s legal status and more time translating general norms into enforceable treaties”, (105).
127. 128 For a discussion of the distinction between policies, legal rules and legal principles, see U. Beyerlin, “‘Prinzipien’ im Umweltvölkerrecht – ein pathologisches Phänomen?”, in: H.J. Cremer et al. (eds), Tradition und Weltoffenheit des Rechts: Festschrift für Helmut Steinberger, 2002, 31 et seq.;
128. id., “Different Types of Norms in International Environmental Law: Policies, Principles and Rules”, in: Bodansky/ Brunnée/ Hey, see note 125, 425 et seq.;
129. for the purposes of this study, the substantive norms of international water law (equitable and reasonable utilization and the obligation not to cause harm) will be referred by the terms “principle” of equitable and reasonable utilization and no harm “rule” since this is what they are generally called. This terminology, however, is used without prejudice whether either norm is considered a “principle” or “rule” of international law.
130. 129 S.C. McCaffrey, “International Watercourses”, in: Wolfrum, see note 6, para. 11.
131. 130 For a survey of state practice, see ILC, Special Rapporteur McCaffrey, Second Report on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Doc. A/CN.4/399 of 21 May 1986;
132. this is supported by the consistent inclusions of the norm in treaties and other documents, cf. article 5 UN Watercourses Convention, see note 121;
133. article IV ILA Helsinki Rules, see note 120;
134. article 12 ILA Berlin Rules, see note 120;
135. article 5 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, see note 123;
136. article 5 ILC Draft Articles on the Law
137. of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, see note 121;
138. see also L. del Castillo-Laborde, “Equitable Utilization of Shared Resources”, in: Wolfrum, see note 6, para. 16;
139. McCaffrey, see note 61, 376 and references cited at 384 et seq.;
140. see also references cited by C. Behrmann, Das Prinzip der angemessenen und vernünftigen Nutzung und Teilhabe nach der VN-Wasserlaufkonvention, 2008, 63-64 (fn 5).
141. 131 Cf. Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), ICJ Reports 1997, 7 et seq. (paras 78, 85, 147);
142. Affaire du Lac Lanoux (1957), 12 RIAA 281 (315);
143. Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder (United Kingdom v. Poland) (10 September 1929), PCIJ Series A No. 23, 27.
144. 132 See e.g. Kansas v. Colorado, US Supreme Court [1907] 206 US 46;
145. New Jer-
146. sey v. New York, US Supreme Court [1931] 283 US
147. 336; Colorado v. New Mexico, US Supreme Court [1984] 467 US 310;
148. cf. also Land Württemberg und Land Preußen gegen das Land Baden betreffend die Donauversinkung before the German Staatsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court of the German Reich) (18 June 1927) (1927), 116 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen Anhang 18.
149. 133 Therefore, it is also irrelevant where the source of an international watercourse lies; see, Behrmann, see note 130, 65.
150. 135 Draft Articles on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, see note 121, commentaries to article 5, paras (3), (8).
151. 136 McCaffrey, see note 129, para. 11.
152. 137 Cf. article 6 UN Watercourses Convention, see note 121;
153. article IV ILA Helsinki Rules, see note 120; article 13 ILA Berlin Rules, see note 120.
154. 138 M.S. Helal, “Sharing Blue Gold: The 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses Ten Years On”, Colo. J. Int’l Envtl L. & Pol’y 18 (2007), 337 et seq. (345).
155. 139 The customary status of this norm enjoys widespread support, see e.g.: article 7 UN Watercourses Convention, see note 121;
156. article 2 (1) UNECE Helsinki Convention, see note 122;
157. article X ILA Helsinki Rules, see note 120; article 16 ILA Berlin Rules, see note 120;
158. Principle 21 UN Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment (16 June 1972), Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1, 3;
159. Principle 2 UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (14 June 1992), Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/Rev. 1 Vol. I, 3;
160. Affaire du Lac Lanoux, see note 131, 308;
161. in support of the no harm rule but not on international water law itself: Trail Smelter (United States of America v. Canada) (1938/41), 3 RIAA 1905, 1965;
162. Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania) (Merits), ICJ Reports 1949, 4 et seq. (22);
163. see also: McCaffrey, see note 61, 406 et seq.;
164. O. McIntyre, Environmental Protection of International Watercourses under International Law, 2007, 87 et seq.;
165. G. Handl, “Transboundary Impacts”, in: Bodansky/ Brunnée/ Hey, see note 125, 531 et seq. (534).
166. 140 McCaffrey, see note 61, 409.
167. 141 Handl, see note 139, 533; McIntyre, see note 139, 89-90; McCaffrey, see note 61, 415-419.
168. 142 McCaffrey, see note 61, 417.
169. 143 This principle was most famously expressed in the Trail Smelter Case of 1949, see note 139, 1965: “[U]nder the principles of international law, as well as of the law of the United States, no State has the right to use or to permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties of persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury established by clear and convincing evidence”.
170. 144 Helal, see note 138, 361, 364; McCaffrey, see note 61, 408.
171. 145 McIntyre, see note 139, 93; see also: T. Bruha/ C.A. Maaß, “Schutz der Süßwasserressourcen im Völkerrecht – Prinzipien, Instrumente und neuere Entwicklungen”, in: T. Bruha/ H.J. Koch (eds), Integrierte Gewässerpolitik: Gewässerschutz, Wassernutzung, Lebensraumschutz, 2001, 69 et seq. (79-83);
172. the term “significant” is used by the ILC and in article 7 UN Watercourses Convention, see note 121.
173. 146 McIntyre, see note 139, 102.
174. 147 McCaffrey, see note 61, 410-415.
175. 148 B. Baker Röben, “International Freshwaters”, in: F.L. Morrison/ R. Wolfrum (eds), International, Regional and National Environmental Law, 2000, 285 et seq. (303-304).
176. 149 Conventions and other instruments that contain similar obligations: see e.g. Principle 19 UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, see note 139;
177. article 14 Convention on Biological Diversity, UNTS Vol. 1760 No. 30619;
178. arts 3 and 10 Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, ILM 31 (1992), 1333 et seq.;
179. see Part III UN Watercourses Convention, see note 121;
180. article 6 UNECE Helsinki Convention, see note 122;
181. article 4 Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the Southern African Development Community, see note 123;
182. for further references see ILC, Special Rapporteur McCaffrey, Third Report on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Doc. A/CN.4/406 of 11 December 1981, paras
183. et seq.; McCaffrey, see note 61, 473.
184. 150 Article 12 UN Watercourses Convention, see note 121; for further information see McIntyre, see note 139, 324-333.
185. 151 Helal, see note 138, 346; A. Grzybowski/ S.C. McCaffrey/ R.K. Paisley, “Beyond International Water Law: Successfully Negotiating Mutual Gains Agreements for International Watercourses”, Pacific McGeorge Global Business and Development Law Journal 22 (2010), 139 et seq. (142).
186. 152 This obligation has been recognized in a variety of instruments, such as article 8 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, UNTS Vol. 1302 No. 21623;
187. article 5 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, UNTS Vol. 1513 No. 26164;
188. arts 6 and 13 UNECE Helsinki Convention, see note 122;
189. article 9 UN Watercourses Convention, see note 121; article 6 Indus Waters Treaty 1960, see note 123;
190. for further references see McIntyre, see note 139, 333-337.
191. 153 McCaffrey, see note 61, 478-479.
192. 154 A great variety of treaty instruments require states to enter into consultations; cf. e.g., article 5 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (done 25 February 1991, entered into force 10 September 1997), ILM 30 (1991), 802 (Espoo Convention); article 4 Con-
193. vention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, see note 149; article 5 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, see note 152; for further references see McIntyre, see note 139, 337-344.
194. 155 See also arts 3 (5), 4, 7 (2), 11, 17, 18 (2) and (3), 19 (3), 21 (3), 24 (1), 26 (2), 30 UN Watercourses Convention, see note 121.
195. 156 McIntyre, see note 139, 337.
196. 157 Cf. McCaffrey, see note 61, 477.
197. 158 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) (Judgment) (20
198. April 2010), ICJ Doc. 2010 General List No. 135, para. 204;
199. see also Principle 17 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, see note 139; article 206 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNTS Vol. 1833 No. 31363;
200. article 4 (1) (f) UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (with Annexes), UNTS Vol. 1771 No. 30822;
201. article 8 and Annex I Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, ILM 30 (1991), 1455 et seq.; in general Espoo Convention, see note 154;
202. article 11 (3) UNECE Helsinki Convention, see note 122;
203. Chapter IV ILA Berlin Rules 2004, see note 120;
204. see also P. Birnie/ A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2009, 164; McIntyre, see note 139, 229-239;
205. A. Epiney, “Environmental Impact Assessment”, in: Wolfrum, see note 6, para. 63;
206. U. Beyerlin, International Environmental Law, 2011, 233 et seq.
207. 159 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, see note 158, para. 204.
208. 160 Epiney, see note 158, para. 1.
209. 161 Non-binding principles may be taken as guidelines; see e.g. UNEP, Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment, or see also, Espoo Convention, see note 154.
210. 162 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, see note 158, para. 205;
211. for more information on EIA, see also UNEP, Environmental Impact Assessment and Strategic Environmental Assessment: Towards an Integrated Approach, 2004.
212. 163 The importance of cooperation concerning the utilization of international watercourses has been emphasized repeatedly;
213. cf. Principle 7 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, see note 139;
214. article 8 ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, see note 121;
215. article 8 UN Watercourses Convention, see note 121; Affaire du Lac Lanoux, see note 131, 308;
216. Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, see note 131, para. 17;
217. for further references, see, ILC, Special Rapporteur McCaffrey, see note 149, paras 43 et seq.
218. 164 R. Wolfrum, “Cooperation, International Law of”, in: id., see note 6, para. 2.
219. 165 U. Beyerlin, Umweltvölkerrecht, 2000, 85; for treaties specifically concerning the protection of an international watercourse, see e.g. Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River, see note 123;
220. Convention on the Protection of the Rhine, see note 123.
221. 166 U. Beyerlin/ J. Grote Stoutenburg, “Environment, International Protection”, in: Wolfrum, see note 6, para. 59.
222. 167 McIntyre, see note 139, 191 et seq.;
223. see also, A. Nollkaemper, The Legal Regime for Transboundary Water Pollution: Between Discretion and Constraint, 1993;
224. generally on principles of environmental law see R. Wolfrum, “International Environmental Law: Purposes, Principles and Means of Ensuring Compliance”, in: F.L. Morrison/ R. Wolfrum (eds), International, Regional and National Environmental Law, 2000, 3;
225. P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, 2003.
226. 168 Cf. D. Grey/ D. Blackmore, Iraq – A Strategy to Negotiate with Co-Riparian States Responding to a “Note Verbale” to RBAS-UNDP (April 2011), on file with the authors, 8.
227. 170 Aquifer systems constitute a strategic and also reliable freshwater reserve that can be drawn upon in cases of drought;
228. see K. Mechlem, “Groundwater Protection”, in: Wolfrum, see note 6, para. 5.
229. 171 According to Mechlem the reasons for this neglect lie inter alia in the complex nature of aquifers and longtime lack of available data on their behavior; see K. Mechlem, “International Groundwater Law: Towards Closing the Gaps?”, Yearbook of International Environmental Law 14 (2003), 47 et seq. (53).
230. 173 See article 2 UN Watercourses Convention, see note 121.
231. 174 Mechlem, see note 171, 54 et seq.
232. 175 It should be noted that not all international water law instruments suffer from this limitation. For example, the ILA Berlin Rules (2004), see note 120, stipulate rules for both surface and groundwater and on a regional level the UNECE Helsinki Convention, see note 122, also applies to surface as well as groundwater. The same goes for the Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of Water Policy [2000] OJ L327/1;
233. cf. Mechlem, see note 171, 57 et seq.
234. 176 The Law of Transboundary Aquifers, A/RES/63/124 of 11 December 2008.
235. 177 The ILC is tasked with the progressive development of international law and its codification [article 1 (1) Statute of the International Law Commission, see note 119]. Its members prepare draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been regulated, sufficiently developed or require more precise formulation and systematization in international law (article 15).
236. 178 Works of the ILC have the nature of recommendations and are thus, with the exception of codified rules of customary international law, not binding on states; Rao, see note 119, para. 5. The General Assembly has decided to examine the final form that may be given to the ILC, “Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers adopted by the Commission on First Reading”, in: ILC, Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of its 58th Sess. (1 May–9 June and 3 July–11 August 2006), GAOR 61 Sess., Suppl. 10, 192;
237. 179 For the history of the development cf. Mechlem, see note 170. In this context the following non-governmental instruments of the ILA are also noteworthy: ILA Seoul Rules on International Groundwaters (Committee on Water Resources, “Rules on International Groundwaters”, in: ILA, Report of the Sixty-Second Conference (Seoul 1986), 1987, 251);
238. ILA Berlin Rules, see note 120.
239. 180 Mechlem, see note 170, para. 20.
240. 181 Cf. article 10 (1) UN Watercourses Convention, see note 121.
241. 182 S.C. McCaffrey, “The Human Right to Water”, in: E. Brown-Weiss/ L. Boisson de Chazournes/ N. Bernasconi-Ostewalder (eds), Fresh Water and International Economic Law, 2005, 94 et seq. (100).
242. 183 Article 10 (2) UN Watercourses Convention, see note 121.
243. 184 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Report of the Sixth Committee convening as the Working Group of the Whole, Doc. A/51/869 of 11 April 1997, 5.
244. 185 C. Leb, “Dig Deep: Conflict Prevention through Protection of Basic Water Rights: The Role of International Water Law in Conflict Prevention”, Paper presented at the International Conference “Transboundary Aquifers: Challenges and New Directions” (ISARM), UNESCO Paris, 6-8 December 2010, 4.
245. 186 Article 5 (2) ILC Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, see note 178.
246. 187 Leb, see note 185, 5; several water sharing agreements refer to the human right to water or vital human needs, see e.g., Charte des Eaux du Fleuve Sénégal (Senegal River Charter) of 18 May 2002;
247. see under ;
248. La Charte de L’eau du Basin Niger (Niger River Charter) signed 30 April 2008, see under .
249. 188 On the human right to water see, e.g., E. Riedel/ P. Rothen (eds), The Human Right to Water, 2006;
250. A. Kirschner, “The Human Right to Water and Sanitation”, in: A. von Bogdandy/ R. Wolfrum (eds), Max Planck UNYB 15 (2011), 445 et seq. With particular focus on the Middle East see A.K. Biswas/ E. Rached/ C. Tortajada, Water as a Human Right for the Middle East and North Africa, 2008.
251. 189 McCaffrey, see note 182, 100 et seq.
252. 190 K. Bourquain, Freshwater Access from a Human Rights Perspective: A Challenge to International Water and Human Rights Law, 2008, 43;
253. who criticizes that law does not make clear what the necessary minimum standard is which, in practice, makes the fulfillment of this aim doubtful.
254. 191 See for instance J.E. Cohen, “International Law and the Water Politics of the Euphrates”, N.Y.U.J.Int’L.&Pol. 24 (1992), 503 et seq. (538). McCaffrey also points out that at the time Islamic water law was developed, people were not thinking about manipulating big rivers such as the Euphrates but rather concentrated on point sources and very small streams. Remarks of S.C. McCaffrey, “Water Resources in the Middle East”, ASIL Proceedings of the 80th Annual Meeting, 1986, 249 et seq. (269).
255. 192 The new Iraqi Constitution is not secular. Although Islamic law is named as a source of legislation (article 2 Constitution of Iraq adopted 15 October 2005), in practice it is, however, not applied directly. On this issue see e.g. S. Hanish, “The Role of Islam in the Making of the New Iraqi Constitution”, Domes 16 (2007), 30 et seq.;
256. I. Coleman, “Women, Islam and the New Iraq”, Foreign Aff. 85 (2006), 24 et seq. For an overview on the relationship between sharia and the Iraqi Constitution see T.J. Roeder/ T. Azizy, Max Planck Materials on the Relation between Islamic Law and Constitutional Law in Selected Countries, 2010, 12.
257. 193 Sharia is the name given by Muslims to the rules and regulations that govern the life of Muslims. Sharia is derived from several sources including the koran, the hadith (the practice of the Prophet Muhammed), the ijma (consensus of Islamic legal scholars) and qiyas (legal analogy); F. Griffel, “Introduction”, in: A. Amanat/ F. Griffel (eds), Sharia: Islamic Law in the Contemporary Context, 2007, 3.
258. 194 T. Naff, “Conflict and Water Use in the Middle East”, in: P. Rogers/ P. Lydon (eds), Water in the Arab World, 1994, 253 et seq. (268).
259. 195 Ibid.; Mallat even goes as far as calling it the “law of water”, C. Mallat, “The Quest for Water Use Principles: Reflections on Sharia and Custom in the Middle East”, in: J.A. Allan/ C. Mallat (eds), Water in the Middle East: Legal, Political and Commercial Implication, 1995, 127 et seq. (128).
260. 197 Ibid., 270; J.C. Wilkinson, “Muslim Land and Water Law”, Journal of Islamic Studies 1 (1990), 54 et seq. (60).
261. 198 Next to the koran the hadith or “traditions” of the Prophet are considered as a source of Islamic law. They are said to be a record of Prophet Mohammed’s behavior and words; A. Hourani, History of the Arab People, 2005, 66 and 69.
262. 200 Ibid. Wilkinson, see note 197, 60;
263. both noting that products resulting from the use of water may, however, be levied.
264. 202 On this issue see for example C. Mallat, “Law and the Nile River: Emerging International Rules and the Sharia”, in: P.P. Howell/ J.A. Allan (eds), The Nile: Sharing a Scarce Resource, 1994, 365 et seq. (372 et seq.).
265. 203 M.A. Civic, “A Comparative Analysis of the Israeli and Arab Water Law Traditions and Insights for Modern Water Sharing Agreements”, Den. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 26 (1998), 437 et seq.(443).
266. 206 Naff, see note 194, 270 et seq., who also remarks that conversely this is not reflected in history since great civilizations like the Egyptians or Babylonians have proceeded upward in their settlement, i.e. starting at the lower end of the basin.
267. 210 Treaty of Friendship and Neighbourly Relations between Iraq and Turkey, see note 81.
268. 211 Protocol No. 1 – Relative to the Regulation of the Waters of the Tigris and Euphrates and of their Tributaries; Protocol No. 2 – Relative to Mutual Assistance in Security Questions; Protocol No. 3 – Relative to Co-operation in Educational, Instructional and Cultural Matters; Protocol No. 4 – Relative to Postal, Telegraphic and Telephonic Communications; Protocol No. 5 – Relative to Economic Questions; Protocol No. 6 – Relative to the Frontier.
269. 212 Preamble Protocol No. 1, see note 211.
270. 218 Protocol on Matters Pertaining to Economic Cooperation between Turkey and the Syrian Arab Republic, see note 102.
271. 222 For more details on the Peace Pipeline Project proposed by Turkey, see under VII. 2. b.
272. 223 Para. 10 Protocol on Matters Pertaining to Economic Cooperation between Turkey and the Syrian Arab Republic, see note 102.
273. 224 Joint Minutes Concerning the Provisional Division of the Waters of the Euphrates River (Iraq-Syria), see note 103.
274. 227 Para. 2 Joint Minutes Concerning the Provisional Division of the Waters of the Euphrates River (Iraq-Syria), see note 103.
275. 228 Joint Communiqué on Cooperation between the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey (signed and came into force 20 January 1993), see note 107.
276. 229 Joint Communiqué between the Republic of Turkey/ Prime Ministry/ Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration (GAP) and the Arab Republic of Syria/ Ministry of Irrigation/ General Organization for Land Development (GOLD), see note 110.
277. 230 Implementation Document of Joint Communiqué (Programme for 2003), see note 111.
278. 231 Agreement on Setting up a Syrian Pumping Station on the River Tigris between Syria and Iraq (done 9 April 2002), on file with authors (unofficial translation).
279. 232 MoU between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic on Establishment of a Pumping Station in the Territories of the Syrian Arab Republic for Water Withdrawal from the Tigris River, see note 114.
280. 233 MoU between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in the Field of Efficient Utilization of Water Resources and Combating of Drought, see note 114.
281. 234 MoU in the Field of Remediation of Water Quality between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, see note 114.
282. 235 MoU between the Ministry of Environment and Forestry of the Republic of Turkey and the Ministry of Water Resources of the Republic of Iraq on Water, see note 114.
283. 236 This conclusion is made on the basis of observations made by the authors at the International Conference “Advancing Cooperation in the Euphrates and Tigris Region: Institutional Development and Multidisciplinary Perspectives”, 2-4 May 2012 Istanbul, see .
284. 237 They claim that both rivers flow separately for most of their way and are clearly separated by hydrological boundaries. The confluence of both rivers to form the Shatt-al-Arab is considered negligible; Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources, Facts on the Joint Waters with Turkey, 1999, 29, 35 (on file with the authors).
285. 239 Ibid.; this is due to the possibility of feeding irrigation areas not only with water from the Euphrates but also from the Tigris.
286. 240 Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources, see note 237, 35.
287. 241 Art. 2 (a) UN Watercourses Convention, see note 121, speaks of a “watercourse system”, as opposed to a “drainage basin”. The latter term is followed by other legal instruments such as the ILA Helsinki Rules (1966), (see note 120) and the ILA Berlin Rules (article 3 ILA Berlin Rules (2004), (see note 120). It is based on a geographical concept and is broader than the term “watercourse system”. The term comprises an entire system of interconnected waters, including principal and secondary tributaries as well as groundwaters which are not connected to surface water. It is often criticized for over-restricting the sovereignty of states, since it can extend the scope of application of international law also to small tributaries lying entirely within a national territory;
288. cf. ILC, Special Rapporteur Kearny, First Report of the Law on Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (7 May 1976), Doc. A/CN.4/295 of 7 May 1976, 184 et seq.;
289. see also, Commentary to article 3 Berlin Rules (2004), see note 120.
290. 242 Article 3 No. 5 ILA Berlin Rules, see note 120.
291. 243 Article 2 (a) UN Watercourses Convention, see note 121.
292. 244 Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources, see note 237, 29, 35;
293. M. Jouejati, “Water Politics as High Politics: The Case of Turkey and Syria”, in: H.J. Barkey (ed.), Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey’s Role in the Middle East, 1996, 131 (136 et seq.). For a detailed analysis of this issue see N. Bremer, Non-Navigational Use of the Euphrates and Tigris River System. The Regulation of the Distribution and Utilisation of the Water of Euphrates and Tigris through International Law illustrated at the example of the Ataturk Dam and the Ilisu Dam, forthcoming, Part 1, E.II.2.
294. 245 Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources, see note 237, 29.
295. 246 Kibaroglu et al., see note 19, 20.
296. 247 Republic of Turkey, “Turkey Water Report 2009”, Report of the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works, 2009, 48 et seq.
297. 249 H. Chalabi/ T. Majzoub, “Turkey, the Waters of the Euphrates and Public International Law”, in: J.A. Allan/ C. Mallat (eds), Water in the Middle East: Legal, Political and Commercial Implications, 1995, 211.
298. 250 Republic of Turkey Report, see note 247, 48; Kibaroglu et al., see note 19, 20.
299. 251 UN Watercourses Convention, see note 121.
300. 252 As stated above the use of the term “watercourse” does not affect the application of international law to a river, but rather extends the scope of this body of law to an entire watercourse system, see note 241.
301. 253 See article 20 UN Watercourses Convention, see note 121.
302. 254 This distinction was primarily made in the law of navigational uses of watercourses. On this issue see McCaffrey, see note 61, 41 et seq.
303. 256 Cf. article 2 (a) ILC Draft Articles on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, see note 121, defining international as “situated in different states” and article 2 (c) ILC Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers adopted by the Commission on First Reading, see note 178, also defining transboundary as “situated in different states.”
304. 257 E.g. equitably “sharing“or “allocating” waters.
305. 258 Chalabi/ Majzoub, see note 249, 220.
306. 259 W. Scheumann, “Conflicts on the Euphrates: an Analysis of Water and Non-water Issues”, in: W. Scheumann/ M. Schiffler (eds), Water in the Middle East: Potential for Conflicts and Prospects for Cooperation, 1998, 113 et seq. (128).
307. 260 Kibaroglu, see note 5, 244; Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources, see note 237, 29.
308. 262 For criteria, see under V. 1. b.
309. 263 Three Stages Plan for Optimum, Equitable and Reasonable Utilization of the Transboundary Watercourse of the Euphrates Basin (Three Stages Plan), see Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see note 104, Chapter IV; for full particulars see under VII. 2. a.
310. 264 Kibaroglu, see note 5, 244; Scheumann, see note 259, 128.
311. 265 Republic of Turkey Report, see note 247, 48.
312. 266 Scheumann, see note 259, 128.
313. 267 As explained above (see under V.1.b.), the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization does neither mean an equal apportionment in a mathematical sense nor does it favor the most efficient utilization of a water resource.
314. 268 Cohen, see note 191, 526; for example article 6 (3) of the UN Watercourses Convention, (see note 121), stipulates that “the weight […] given to each factor [shall] […] be determined by its importance in comparison with other relevant factors”, thus clearly leaving this decision to the State Parties. Only in article 10 (2) there is a reference stipulating a certain priority of uses or certain criteria, where it reads that “in the event of a conflict between uses […] special regard shall be given to the requirements of vital human needs.”
315. 269 See for example Kibaroglu, see note 5, 257 et seq.
316. 270 Which is in part also reflected by the UN Watercourses Convention, see note 121, see under V. 1.
317. 271 O. Elias, “Persistent Objector”, in: Wolfrum, see note 6, para. 1.
318. 272 Turkey has inter alia raised the following points during the negotiations of the UN Watercourses Convention: (1) in general it criticized that the Convention went far beyond the scope of a framework document, which should be limited to enacting basic principles;
319. it proposed to omit article 7 completely since according to its view the obligation to prevent harm is subsidiary to that of equitable and reasonable utilization;
320. the dispute settlement clause in article 33 should be omitted and it should be up to the states concerned to determine the rules of procedure since compulsory rules do not fit into a framework convention. See Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses and Resolution on Confined Transboundary Groundwater, Report of the Secretary-General, Doc. A/51/275 of 6 August 1996, 12, 35, 53.
321. 273 See for example, Turkey’s written comment on the Draft Articles on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, see note 121, in Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Draft Articles, see note 272, 28 and Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see note 104, Chapter III.
322. 274 Ibid., Chapter II.A; or Kibaroglu, see note 5, 252, who cites the final Communiqués of the 16 Joint Technical Committee meetings (1980-1992) as source. It should, however, be mentioned that other authors describe the Syrian position somewhat differently; cf. Jouejati, see note 244, 144; Elver, see note 5, 415. The Syrian proposal is described as follows: 1. The JTC calculates the flow of the Euphrates and Tigris;
323. The JTC roughly estimates the quantity of water needed by each riparian for its projects (current and future)
324. ; 3. Finally, the JTC establishes the share each riparian state is entitled to. The states have the right to utilize their share according to their own needs.
325. 275 Kibaroglu et al., see note 19, 63;
326. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see note 104, Chapter II.A.
327. 276 Jouejati, see note 244, 144.
328. 277 Elver, see note 5, 415.
329. 278 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see note 104, Chapter IV.
330. 279 Kibaroglu/ Scheumann, see note 108, 277 et seq. (284);
331. Kibaroglu, see note 5, 254.
332. 280 Chalabi/ Majzoub, see note 249, 213-214.
333. 281 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see note 106, Chapter IV.
334. 285 Kibaroglu, see note 5, 256-257.
335. 286 Grey/ Blackmore, see note 168, 7 (Report on file with the authors).
336. 287 It is interesting to note that the pipeline(s) could have had a positive side-effect for Syria. From the fall of the pipeline when entering Syrian territory, Syria could generate electric power;
337. see B. Wachtel, “The Peace Canal Project: A Multiple Conflict Resolution Perspective for the Middle East”, in: J. Isaac/ H. Shuval (eds), Water and Peace in the Middle East, 1994, 363 et seq. (368).
338. 288 Dellapenna, see note 62, 233-235.
339. 289 Jouejati, see note 244, 143.
340. 290 Dellapenna, see note 62, 233-235; 253-255.
341. 291 C.W. Sadoff/ D. Grey, “Beyond the River: the Benefits of Cooperation on
342. International Rivers”, Water Policy 4 (2002), 389 et seq. (393 et seq.);
343. who
344. distinguish between benefits “to”, “from”, “because” and “beyond” the river.
345. 292 Grzybowski/ McCaffrey/ Paisley, see note 151, 143.
346. 293 K. Mechlem, “Water as Vehicle for Inter-state Cooperation: A Legal Perspective”, FAO Legal Paper Online 32 (2003), 6.
347. 294 It should be noted that an agreement can also pave the way for greater cooperation resulting in benefits beyond the river such as regional security, see Sadoff/ Grey, see note 291, 393.
348. 295 A. Houdret/ A. Kramer/ A. Carius, “The Water Security Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities for Development Cooperation”, GTZ Concept Paper International Water Policy and Infrastructure Programme, 2010, 18. Such a mechanism could for example require a lower riparian to contribute or even co-finance an upstream investment that shall reduce negative pollution effects downstream.
349. 297 S. Vinogradov/ P. Wouters/ P. Jones, Transforming Potential Conflict into Cooperation Potential: The Role of International Law, 2003, 66 et seq., who name typical elements of compliance control mechanisms to consist of inter alia reporting, review and evaluation procedures.
350. 298 The overview is largely based on a checklist developed by Vinogradov, Wouters and Jones who have identified the most important elements of the majority of watercourse agreements; Vinogradov/ Wouters/ Jones, see note 297.
351. 299 Vinogradov/ Wouters/ Jones, see note 297, 45.
352. 300 Agreements with a wording that is too flexible run the risk of being contested easily. Nevertheless agreements should provide for a certain degree of flexibility so that they can be adapted when new issues emerge or situations change.
353. 301 Houdret/ Kramer/ Carius, see note 295, 19.
354. 302 Based on the checklist developed by Vinogradov, Wouters and Jones who have identified the most important elements of the majority of watercourse agreements, Vinogradov/ Wouters/ Jones, see note 297. The checklist has partially been adapted to the specificities of the Euphrates and Tigris region.
355. 304 Trondalen, see note 33, 196.
356. 305 Vinogradov/ Wouters/ Jones, see note 297, 53.
357. 307 The following issues were identified as key components when determining an equitable and reasonable utilization, see ibid., 74.
358. 309 Vinogradov/ Wouters/ Jones, see note 297, 74.
359. 313 The UNECE has distinguished three major types of institutional arrangements in international watercourse agreements: “(a) without designation of an institution to implement the agreement; (b) the appointment of plenipotentiaries (governmental representatives);
360. and (c) the establishment of a joint commission”; see UNECE, “River Basin Commissions and other Institutions for Transboundary Water Cooperation: Capacity for Water Cooperation in Eastern Europe”, Caucasus and Central Asia 1 (2009), 10.
361. 315 Trondalen proposes the establishment of a new overarching international initiative he dubs the Euphrates and Tigris Basin Initiative (ETI), which is basically modeled on the Nile Basin Initiative launched by the riparians of the Nile River in 1999. According to his proposal this initiative shall be “a partnership initiated and led by the riparian States of the two rivers through a Council of Ministers with the full support of the international community, through an international organization such as [for example] the Arab development banks and institutions.” He suggests that for the first phase the ETI shall start with a participatory process of dialogue and trust building which shall then ideally result in the formulation of a shared vision for the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. In a second phase this vision could then be translated into a more concrete program of action; for details see Trondalen, see note 33, 203 et seq.
362. 316 Vinogradov/ Wouters/ Jones, see note 297, 62.
363. 317 Ibid., 65 et seq.; for an overview of dispute settlement and prevention mechanisms in international water law, see McCaffrey, see note 61, 506 et seq.
364. 318 For an overview of the EU Water Aquis and Turkey’s progress up to date see A. Kibaroglu, “Legislative framework for Water Management in Turkey”, see under .
365. 319 A. Kibaroglu/ A. Kramer, “Turkey’s Position toward International Water Law”, in: Kibaroglu/ Scheumann/ Kramer, see note 108, 215 et seq. (227);
366. A. Kibaroglu/ V. Sumer, “Diverging Water Management Paradigms between Turkey and the European Union”, Water International 32 (2007), 739 et seq. (746).