Modular minds, multiple motives

Evolution and Social Psychology

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 39-54

  Aktipis, C Athena ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84918877617     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203782965     Document Type: Chapter

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