Agenda-setting, amendments, information and optimal level of integration

Institutional Challenges in the European Union

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 113-133

  Widgrén, Mika ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TURKU   (Finland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84916969000     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203164952     Document Type: Chapter

References (5)

1. Dewatripont, M. et al. (1995) Flexible Integration, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
2. Fudenberg, David and Tirole, Jean (1991) Game Theory, MIT Press.
3. Laruelle, Annick (2002) ‘The EU decision making procedures: some insight from non-cooperative Game Theory’, this volume.
4. Laruelle, Annick and Widgrén, Mika (2001) ‘Voting power in a sequence of cooperative games: the case of EU procedures’, forthcoming in M. Holler and G. Owen (eds) Power Indices and Coalition Formation (previously circulated as CEPR Discussion Paper 1600).
5. Widgrén, Mika (1999) ‘Flexible integration as an efficient majority rule’, CEPR Discussion Papers 2207.