Elliptic curve cryptography in practice

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 8437, Issue , 2014, Pages 157-175

  Bos, Joppe W ^d   Halderman, J Alex ^b   Heninger, Nadia ^c   Moore, Jonathan ^e   Naehrig, Michael ^a   Wustrow, Eric ^b  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^d NXP SEMICONDUCTORS   (Netherlands)

^e NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GEOMETRY; PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY;

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS; ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY; ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY(ECC); ID CARDS; SECURE SHELL; SSH PROTOCOL; SYSTEMS SUPPORT; TRANSPORT LAYER SECURITY;

SECURITY OF DATA;

EID: 84916608100     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-45472-5_11     Document Type: Conference Paper

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