Non-Cooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 54, Issue 2, 1987, Pages 301-310

  Waldman, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84916152688     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2297519     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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