Value-based network externalities and optimal auction design

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 8877, Issue , 2014, Pages 147-160

  Munagala, Kamesh ^a   Xu, Xiaoming ^a  

^a Duke University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

CONSTANT FACTOR APPROXIMATION; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; NETWORK EXTERNALITY; OPTIMAL AUCTION; OPTIMAL MECHANISM; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; REVENUE MAXIMIZATION; VALUE-BASED;

ECONOMICS;

EID: 84914168052     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_11     Document Type: Article

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