A new multi-objectives approach to implement preventive and protective barriers in bow tie diagram

Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

Volumn 32, Issue , 2014, Pages 238-253

  Badreddine, Ahmed ^a   Romdhane, Taieb Ben ^b   HajKacem, Mohamed Aymen Ben ^a   Amor, Nahla Ben ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TUNIS   (Tunisia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CARTHAGE   (Tunisia)

Author keywords

Bow tie diagram; Multi objectives influence diagrams; Preventive barriers; Propagation algorithms; Protective barriers

Indexed keywords

BOW-TIE DIAGRAMS; INFLUENCE DIAGRAM; PREVENTIVE BARRIERS; PROPAGATION ALGORITHM; PROTECTIVE BARRIER;

EID: 84908136717     PISSN: 09504230     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jlp.2014.09.012     Document Type: Review

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