Formal methods in international relations

Evaluating Methodology in International Studies

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 23-42

  Nicholson, Michael ^a  

^a NONE

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Indexed keywords

EID: 84906631060     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (28)

1. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
2. Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).
3. Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games, and Debates (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965).
4. Thomas Schelling, Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).
5. Nigel Howard, Paradoxes of Rationality (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971).
6. Nigel Howard, “Drama Theory and Its Relationship to the Theory of Games,” Group Decision and Negotiation 3, no. 2 (1994): 187-206.
7. Steven J. Brams, Theory of Moves (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
8. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “The Contribution of Expected-Utility Theory to the Study of International Conflict,” in Handbook of War Studies, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989): 143-69.
9. Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, Politics and Uncertainty: Theory, Models, and Applications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
10. George Ainslie, Picoeconomics: The Strategic Interaction of Successive Motivational States within the Person (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
11. Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
12. A. K. Sen, “Rational Fools: A Cri tique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 16, no. 4 (1977): 317-44.
13. Dina Zinnes, Conflict Processes and the Breakdown of International Systems, Merriam Seminar Series on Research Frontiers (Denver: University of Denver Press, 1983).
14. Dina Zinnes and Robert Mulcaster, “Hostile Activity and the Prediction of War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 28, no. 2 (1984).
15. Philip Schrodt, “Richardson’s N-Nation Model and the Balance of Power,” American Journal of Political Science 22, no. 2 (1978).
16. R. B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955).
17. Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Basic Books, 1959).
18. Michael Nicholson, Causes and Consequences in International Relations: A Conceptual Study (New York: Pinter, 1996).
19. Lewis F. Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press, 1960).
20. D’Arcy Thompson, Growth and Form (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1917).
21. Harrison Wagner, “The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power,” World Politics 38, no. 4 (1986): 546-76.
22. Joseph Frankel, International Relations in a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
23. Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation: And Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Free Press, 1965).
24. Daniel S. Geller and J. David Singer, Nations at War: Scientific Study of International Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
25. “What’s the Use of International Relations,” Review of International Studies 26, no. 2 (2000).
26. Alexander Wendt argues this in The Social Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
27. K. M. Fierke’s Changing Games, Changing Strategies (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1998).
28. Anatol Rapoport, “Lewis Fry Richardson’s Mathematical Theory of War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 1, no. 1 (1957): 249-99.