Legal positions and institutional complementarities

Legal Orderings and Economic Institutions

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 54-83

  Pagano, Ugo ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SIENA   (Italy)

^b CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY   (Hungary)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84906199988     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203391327     Document Type: Chapter

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