The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation

Dynamic Games and Applications

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 345-362

  Sasaki, Tatsuya ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^b INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS   (Austria)

Author keywords

Equilibrium selection; Evolutionary game theory; Public good games; Punishment; Rewards; Social dilemmas

Indexed keywords

EID: 84905700421     PISSN: 21530785     EISSN: 21530793     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13235-013-0094-7     Document Type: Article

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