Economic Approaches to Regulation

The Oxford Handbook of Regulation

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages

  Veljanovski, Cento ^a,b  

^a Case Associates   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Competition law; Deregulation; Economics; Legal system; Privatisations; Regulatory reform

Indexed keywords

EID: 84905232755     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199560219.003.0002     Document Type: Chapter

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