Realism, beyond miracles

Hilary Putnam

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 83-124

  Mueller, Axel ^a   Fine, Arthur ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84904714847     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511614187.004     Document Type: Chapter

References (61)

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