Labor union members play an OLG repeated game

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Volumn 111, Issue SUPPL.3, 2014, Pages 10802-10809

  Kandori, Michihiro ^a   Obayashi, Shinya ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

^b TOHOKU UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Imperfect monitoring; Proximate cause of behavior; Reciprocal altruism

Indexed keywords

ALTRUISM; ARTICLE; COOPERATION; ECONOMICS; GAME; HUMAN; LAW SUIT; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PUNISHMENT; REWARD; TRADE UNION;

IMPERFECT MONITORING; PROXIMATE CAUSE OF BEHAVIOR; RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM;

ALTRUISM; BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; LABOR UNIONS; MODELS, THEORETICAL; PUNISHMENT; REWARD;

EID: 84904688227     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: 10916490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1400827111     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. Mailath G, Samuelson L (2006) Repeated Games and Reputations (Oxford Univ Press, New York).
2. Kandori M (2008) Repeated games. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, eds Durlauf S, Blume L (Macmillan, New York), 2nd Ed.
3. Weibull J (1995) Evolutionary Game Theory (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).
4. Kalai E, Lehrer E (1993) Rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium. Econometrica 61:1019-1045.
5. Nowak M, May R (1992) Evolutionary games and special chaos. Nature 359(6397): 826-829.
6. Axelrod R (1982) The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books, New York).
7. Ostrom E (1990) Governing the Commons (Cambridge Univ Press, New York).
8. Cremer J (1986) Cooperation in ongoing organizations. Q J Econ 101(1):33-49.
9. Kandori M (1992) Repeated games played by overlapping generations of players. Rev Econ Stud 59(1):81-92.
10. Smith L (1992) Folk theorems in overlapping generations games. Games Econ Behav 4(3):426-449.
11. Obayashi S (2013) The mechanism of maintaining a reciprocal system in a group with flexible membership: an empirical and mathematical approach. Shakaigaku Hyoron 64(2):240-256.
12. Suzuki R (2010) [The Report on a Questionnaire Survey on Individual-Affiliate Labor Unions] (The Ohara Institute for Social Research, Hosei University, Tokyo), Working Paper No. 41. Japanese.
13. KandoriM(1992) Social norms and community enforcement. Rev Econ Stud 59(1):61-80.
14. Nowak MA, Sigmund K (1998) Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring. Nature 393(6685):573-577. (Pubitemid 28319245)
15. Greif A (2006) Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy (Cambridge Univ Press, New York).
16. Ostrom E (2010) Beyond markets and states: polycentric governance of complex economic systems. Am Econ Rev 100(3):641-672.