Information Equilibrium: Punctual Structures of Information Distribution

Automation and Remote Control

Volumn 64, Issue 10, 2003, Pages 1609-1619

  Novikov, D A ^a   Chkhartishvili, A G ^b  

^a TRAPEZNIKOV INSTITUTE OF CONTROL SCIENCES   (Russian Federation)

^b MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY   (Russian Federation)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; GAME THEORY; HIERARCHICAL SYSTEMS; INTEGER PROGRAMMING; INVERSE PROBLEMS; PARAMETER ESTIMATION; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS; SET THEORY; THEOREM PROVING;

INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION;

INFORMATION ANALYSIS;

EID: 84904240183     PISSN: 00051179     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1026017624308     Document Type: Article

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