Supervisors as trust brokers in social-work bureaucracies

Trust and Distrust in Organizations : Dilemmas and Approaches

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 41-64

  Brehm, John ^a   Gates, Scott ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b NORWEGIAN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84903360283     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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