Revisiting the "error" in studies of cognitive errors

Errors in Organizations

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 97-112

  Mousavi, Shabnam ^a   Gigerenzer, Gerd ^b  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT   (Germany)

Author keywords

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EID: 84901220503     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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