How the bank of France changed U.S. equity expectations and ended the panic of 1907

Journal of Economic History

Volumn 74, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 420-448

  Rodgers, Mary Tone ^a   Payne, James E ^b  

^a STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT OSWEGO   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEW ORLEANS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84901041356     PISSN: 00220507     EISSN: 14716372     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S002205071400031X     Document Type: Review

References (40)

1. Archives of the Bank of France, 1907 File and Minutes from November 21 and 28,1907, Paris.August Belmont Family Papers, Columbia University, New York, 1799-1930
2. Andrew, A. P. "Substitutes for Cash in the Panic of 1907." The Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, August 1908, as reprinted in History of Crises Under the NationalBanking System.National Monetary Commission Publications, 61st Congress. Washington DC: GPO1910.
3. Palgrave, Sir R. H. I., from the Economist, Statistics of Great Britain, France andGermany, 1910.
4. Patron, M. The Bank of France in Its Relation to National and International Credit.Washington, DC: GPO, 1910.
5. Response of the Secretary of the Treasury to Senate Resolution No. 33 of December12, 1907 Calling for Certain Information in Regard to Treasury Operations,United States Depositories, the condition of National Banks, Etc." 60th CongressFist Session, Document No. 208.
6. Sprague, O. M. W. History of Crises Under the National Banking System. Washington,DC: GPO, 1910.
7. Bollerslev, T. "Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity." Journalof Econometrics 31, no. 3 (1986): 307-27.
8. Bruner, R., and S. Carr. The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market'sPerfect Storm. New York: Wiley, 2007.
9. Calomiris, C., and G. Gorton. "The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, andBank Regulation." In Financial Markets and Financial Crises, edited by R.Glenn Hubbard, 109-73. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
10. Carosso, V. P. The Morgan's: Private International Bankers, 1854-1913. Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.
11. Cosimano, T. F., and D. W. Jensen. "Estimates of the Variance of U.S. Inflation Basedupon the ARCH Model: Comment." Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 20,no. 3 (1988): 409-21.
12. Engle, R. F. "Estimates of the Variance of U.S. Inflation Based on the ARCH Model."Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 15, no. 3 (1983): 286-301.
13. Flandreau, M. "The French Crime of 1873: An Essay on the Emergence of theInternational Gold Standard." The Journal of Economic History 56, no. 4 (1996):862-97.
14. Forrester, R. B. The Cotton Industry in France. Longmans Green & Co. London/NewYork/Bombay: Manchester University Press, 1921.
15. Friedman, M., and A. Schwartz. A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963.
16. Frydman, C., E. Hilt, and L. Zhou. "Economic Effects of Runs on Early ShadowBanks: Trust Companies and the Impact of the Panic of 1907." NBER WorkingPaper No. 18264, Cambridge, MA, July 2012.
17. Guyot, Y. "La Crise Americaine, ses effets et ses causes." La revue du commerce del'Industrie et de la Banque, 31 December, Felix Alcan Editor, 1907.
18. Hanes, C., and P. Rhode. "Harvests and Financial Crises in Gold Standard America."The Journal of Economic History 73, no. 1 (2013): 201-46.
19. Hansen, B. "Financial Regulation and the Panic of 1907." Unpublished Manuscript,University of Mary Washington, 2013.
20. Hautecoeur, P-C., and E. N. White. "Bagehot on the Continent? How the Banquede France Managed the Crisis of 1889." Document de travail, 2011.
21. Irwin, D. "Did France Cause the Great Depression?" NBER Working Paper No.16350, Cambridge, MA, September 2010.
22. James, J., J. McAndrews, and D. Weiman. "Wall Street and Main Street: TheMacroeconomic Consequences of New York Bank Suspensions 1866 to 1914."Cliometrica 7, no. 2 (2013): 99-130.
23. Keynes, J. M. "Recent Economic Events in India." Economic Journal 19, no. 73(1909): 51-67.
24. Mitchell, W. "Review: The Publications of the National Monetary Commission."Quarterly Journal of Economics 25, no. 3 (1911): 563-93.
25. Moen, J. R., and E. W. Tallman "Clearinghouse Membership and Deposit ContractionDuring the Panic of 1907." The Journal of Economic History 60, no. 1 (2000):145-63.
26. Muhleman, M. "Egypt's Economic Position and Gold Hoarding." North AmericanReview 186 (December 1907): 594.
27. Myers, M. G. The New York Money Market. New York: Columbia University Press,1931.
28. Noyes, A. "A Year after the Panic of 1907." Quarterly Journal of Economics 23, no. 2(1909): 185-212.
29. Odell, K., and M. Weidenmier. "Real Shock, Monetary Aftershock: The 1906 SanFrancisco Earthquake and the Panic of 1907." The Journal of Economic History64, no. 4 (2004): 1002-27.
30. Onyeiwu, S. "Deceived by African Cotton: The British Cotton Growing Associationand the Demise of the Lancashire Textile Industry." African Economic History 28(2000): 90.
31. Perron, P. "Further Evidence on Breaking Trend Functions in MacroeconomicVariables." Journal of Econometrics 80, no. 2 (1997): 355-85.
32. Pierce, P. The Dow Jones Averages, 1885-1985. Homewood, IL: Dow Jones-Irwin,1986.
33. Rodgers, M. T., and B. Wilson. "Systemic Risk, Missing Gold Flows, and the Panic of1907." Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 14, no. 2 (2011): 25-54.
34. Tallman, E. W. Private Sector Responses to the Panic of 1907, from Meltzer,A History of the Federal Reserve Volume 1, 1913-1951, 1995, accessed Aug 25,2013 from FRASER, http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/meltzer/record.php?id=4040.
35. Westerfield, R. B. Banking Principles and Practice, Foreign Division, Volume V.New York: Ronald Press Company, 1921.
36. Wicker, E. Banking Panics of the Gilded Age. New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2000.
37. -. The Great Debate on Banking Reform, Nelson Aldrich, and the Origins of theFed. Columbus: Ohio State University Press 2005.
38. Wilkins, M. The History of Foreign Investment in the United States to 1914. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.
39. Wilson, J., R. Sylla, and C. Jones. "Financial Market Panics and Volatility in the LongRun, 1830-1988." In Crashes and Panics: The Lessons from History, edited byEugene White, 85-125. Homewood, IL: Dow Jones-Irwin, 1990.
40. Zivot, E., and D. W. K. Andrews. "Further Evidence on the Great Crash, the Oil-PriceShock, and the Unit-Root Hypothesis." Journal of Business and EconomicStatistics 20, no. 1 (2002): 25-44.