Epistemology: An introduction to the theory of knowledge

Epistemology: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-406

  Rescher, Nicholas ^a  

^a NONE

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References (185)

1. William James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York and London: Longmans Green & Co., 1897), pp. 78-79.
2. This view harks back to the Theaetetus of Plato's dialogue of that name, who held that knowledge is a matter of true belief equipped with a suitable rationale (logos), Plato Theaetetus 201C-210D. For modern discussions see Edmund Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis, vol. 24 (1963), pp. 121-23.
3. The problem at issue has generated a very substantial literature. The following publications give a good indication of its scope and nature: William P. Alston, Epistemic Justification (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989);
4. Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966; 2nd ed. 1977; 3rd ed. 1989);
5. Edward Craig, Knowledge and the State of Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990);
6. Alvin Goldman, "A Causal Theory of Knowing," Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967), pp. 357-72;
7. Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986);
8. Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (Boulder, CO:Westview Press, 1990);
9. Paul K. Moser, Knowledge and Evidence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989);
10. Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993);
11. John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Totowa, NJ:Rowman and Littlefield, 1986);
12. M.D. Roth and L. Galis (eds), Knowing: Essays in the Analysis of Knowledge (New York: Random House, 1970);
13. Robert K. Shope, The Analysis of Knowing (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983);
14. Ernest Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Part 1;
15. Linda Trinkhaus Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996).
16. For example, D. M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge (Cambridge, 1973), p. 189.
17. G. E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy (London: Allen and Unwyn, 1953).
18. On these and related issues see Roy A. Sorensen, Blindspots (Oxford, 1988).
19. For substantiation see R. G.Winkler and S. Makridakis, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 146 (1983): 150-57.
20. On the Preface Paradox see A. N. Prior, "On a Family of Paradoxes," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 2 (1961): 26-32;
21. D. C. Makinson, "The Paradox of the Preface," Analysis, 25 (1965): 205-7.
22. For example in the work of Richard Sylvan. And see also Nicholas Rescher and Robert Brandom, The Logic of Inconsistency (Oxford, 1979).
23. See, for example, N. Rescher and R. Brandom The Logic of Inconsistency (Oxford, 1979).
24. A. Conan Doyle, "The Sign of Four" (1890).
25. Larry Laudan, as cited in Ilkka Niiniluoto, "Scientific Progress," Synthese, vol. 45 (1980), p. 446. Rejection of the idea that science gets at the truth of things goes back to Karl Popper.
26. Michael E. Levin, "On Theory Change and Meaning Change," Philosophy of Science, vol. 46 (1979), p. 418.
27. Bertrand Russell, Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1912), p. 35.
28. For skepticism and its critique see Robert Audi, Belief, Justification, and Knowledge (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1988);
29. A. I., Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986);
30. Peter Klein, Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1081);
31. Keith Lehrer, Knowledge (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1974);
32. Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981);
33. Peter Unger, Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) as well as the author's Scepticism (Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1980), which gives extensive references to the literature.
34. Keith Lehrer, Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 239.
35. Fridtjof Nansen as quoted in Roland Huntford, The Last Place on Earth (New York: Atheneum, 1985), p. 200.
36. William James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York/London and Bombay, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897), pp. 78-9.
37. C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers, vol. II (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1931), sect. 2.112.
38. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A532-B560.
39. Donald Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," in Ernest La Pore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 313-14.
40. See, for example, P. M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984)
41. P. S. Churchland, Neurophysiology:Towards a Unified Science for the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986).
42. C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers, vol. V (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), sect. 5.366.
43. Sir Courtenay Ilbert, "Evidence," Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., vol. 10, pp. 11-21 (see p. 15).
44. Richard A. Epstein, "Pleadings and Presumptions," The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 40 (1973/4), pp. 556-82 (see pp. 558-59).
45. Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric (London and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1828), pt. I, ch. III, sect. 2.
46. Cf. also I. Levi, Gambling with Truth (New York: Knopf, 1967), chaps. 2 and 6.
47. See Rudolf Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1950; 2d ed., 1960), sec. 50
48. P. A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1963): pp. 972-73.
49. Carnap's position is followed by Richard Jeffrey. See his "Valuation and Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses," Philosophy of Science, vol. 23 (1956), pp. 237-46.
50. On priority conflicts, see R. K. Merton, "Priorities in Scientific Discovery," American Sociological Review, vol. 22 (1957), pp. 635-59.
51. See John Hardwig, "The Role of Trust in Knowledge," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 88 (1991), pp. 693-708.
52. For a penetrating study of these and similar issues, see John Sabini and Maury Silver, Moralities of Everyday Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), especially chap. 4.
53. John Sabini and Maury Silver, Moralities of Everyday Life, pp. 84-85.
54. Harry Kalven, Jr., and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).
55. J. H. Lambert, Fragment einer Systematologie in J. Bernouilli (ed.), Johann Heinrich Lambert: Heinrich: Philosophische Schriften (2 vols; reprinted Hildesheim, 1967).
56. R. M. Chisholm, The Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1977).
57. See especially Hugo Dingler, Das System (Munich: E. Reinhardt, 1930), pp. 19-20.
58. C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (Lasalle, IL: Open Court Press, 1946), p. 186.
59. See Franz Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz (ed. O. Kraus, Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1930).
60. Compare Herbert Simon, "The Architecture of Complexity," General Systems, vol. 10 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965), pp. 63-76.
61. Compare R. M. Chisholm, The Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1977).
62. Some of this chapter's themes are also touched on in the author's "Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Idea of Cognitive Systematization," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 71 (1974), pp. 695-708.
63. On coherentism see R. Audi, Belief Justification and Knowledge (Belmont:Wadsworth, 1988);
64. J. Bender (ed.), The Current State of the Coherence Theory (Dordrecht:Kluwer, 1989);
65. L. BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 1985);
66. R. M. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1989);
67. A. Goldman, Empirical Knowledge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988);
68. G. Harman, Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973);
69. K. Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (Boulder:Westview, 1990)
70. W. G. Lycan, Judgement and Justification (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988);
71. J. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986)
72. W. V. O. Quine and Joseph Ullian, The Web of Belief (McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 1979);
73. N. Rescher, The Coherence Theory of Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973);
74. J. Rosenberg, One World and Our Knowledge of It (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980).
75. On this term compare Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge; Towards a Postcritical Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).
76. Arthur Pap, Elements of Analytic Philosophy (New York: Macmillan Co., 1949), p. 356.
77. Compare H. H. Joachim, Logical Studies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948).
78. The many good anthologies on the subject of relativism include: Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds.), Rationality and Relativism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982);
79. Michael Krausz and Jack W. Meiland (eds.), Relativism: Cognitive and Moral (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982);
80. J. Margolis, M. Krausz, and R. M. Burian (eds.), Rationality, Relativism, and the Human Sciences (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1986);
81. Michael Krausz (ed.) Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989);
82. Geoffrey Sayre McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Relativism (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1994).
83. See also: Herbert Speigelberg, Antirelativismus (Zürich, Leipzig: M. Niehans, 1935);
84. Johannes Thyssen, Der philosophische Relativismus (Bonn: L. Röhrscheid, 1941);
85. Nancy L. Gifford, When in Rome: And Introduction to Relativism and Knowledge (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983);
86. Peter Unger, Philosophical Relativity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984);
87. Joseph Margolis, The Truth About Relativism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991);
88. H. Siegel, Relativism Refuted (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1987);
89. Larry Laudan, Science and Relativism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990);
90. Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991);
91. J. F. Harris, Against Relativism (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1992).
92. William James, Pragmatism (New York: Appleton, 1907), p. 171.
93. The basic line of thought goes back to the ancient skeptics. Compare Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, 54, 59-60, 97, et passim.
94. William James, Talks to Teachers on Psychology (New York: Henry Holt, 1899), p. 4.
95. On "alternative standards of rationality" see Peter Winch, "Understanding a Primitive Society," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 1 (1964), pp. 307-24.
96. For an interesting critique of cognitive relativism that is akin in spirit though different in orientation from that of the present section see Lenn E. Goodman, "Six Dogmas of Relativism," in Marcello Dascal (ed.), Cultural Relativism and Philosophy (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), pp. 77-102.
97. William James, "Pragmatism and Humanism," in F. H. Burkhardt et al. (eds.), Pragmatism (Lecture VIII), The Works ofWilliam James (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 115.
98. Two recent anthologies offer informative discussions of objectivity. S. C. Brown (ed.), Objectivity and Cultural Divergence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984)
99. Alan McGill, Rethinking Objectivity (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1994).
100. Recent books on the subject include Richard J. Benstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983);
101. Hilary Putnam, Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990)
102. Nicholas Rescher, Objectivity (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997);
103. Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
104. See Robert Brandom, "Knowledge and the Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 55 (1995), pp. 895-908.
105. For an elaborate development of this position see the author's Rationality: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and the Rationale of Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
106. See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, tr. by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 481.
107. Some recent anthologies on rationality are: Stanley I. Benn and G.W. Mortimore, Rationality and the Social Sciences (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976);
108. K. I. Manktelow and D. E. Over, Rationality (London: Routledge, 1993);
109. Paul K. Moser, Rationality in Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
110. Recent book on the topic include: Jonathan Bennett, Rationality: An Essay Toward Analysis (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1964);
111. Christopher Cherniak, Minimal Rationality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986);
112. Stephen L. Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983);
113. Stephan Nathanson, The Ideal of Rationality (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1985);
114. David Pears, Motivated Individuality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984);
115. Frederick Schick, Having Reasons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984);
116. Herbert Simon, Reason in Human Affairs (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983).
117. Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View (New York: Random House, 1965; abr. edn.) 160-1.
118. Peter Winch, "Understanding a Primitive Society," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 1 (1964), pp. 307-24; reprinted in B.R.Wilson (ed.),Rationality (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1970).
119. Lévy-Bruhl, Primitive Mentality (London, 1923; first pub. in French, Paris, 1921).
120. Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azandi (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937);
121. Nuer Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956).
122. D. A. Bromley et al. Physics in Perspective, Student Edition (Washington, DC:National Academy of Sciences, 1973); pp. 13, 16.
123. See also Gerald Holton, "Models for Understanding the Growth and Excellence of Scientific Research," in Stephen R. Graubard and Gerald Holton, eds., Excellence and Leadership in the Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1962), p. 115.
124. D. A. Bromley et al., Physics in Perspective, Student Edition (Washington DC:National Academy of Sciences, 1973), p. 23.
125. Gerald Holton, "Models for Understanding the Growth and Excellence of Scientific Research," in Stephen R. Graubard and Gerald Holton (editors), Excellence and Leadership in a Democracy (op. cit.), p. 115.
126. W. Stanley Jevons, The Principles of Science, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1877), pp. 752-53.
127. Derek J. Price, Science Since Babylon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 137.
128. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
129. See also I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
130. The prime exponent of this position is Paul Feyerabend. See his essays "Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism," in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell, eds., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. III (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962);
131. "Problems of Empiricism," in R. G. Colodny, ed., Beyond the Edge of Certainty (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1965), pp. 145-260
132. "On the 'Meaning' of Scientific Terms," Journal of Philosophy, vol. 62 (1965), pp. 266-74.
133. For Hobbes's ideas in this region, see Hans Fiebig, Erkenntnis und technische Erzeugung: Hobbes' operationale Philosophie der Wissenschaft (Meisenheim am Glan:Forscher, 1973).
134. Hans Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 376.
135. Science and Hypothesis (New York: Dover Press, 1914), pp. 145-46.
136. Herbert Spencer, First Principles, 7th ed. (London: Appleton's, 1889);
137. On the issues of this paragraph compare Stuart Kaufmann, At Home in the Universe: To Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
138. See B. W. Petley, The Fundamental Physical Constants and the Frontiers of Measurement (Bristol: Hilger, 1985).
139. See John Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
140. See Steven Weinberg, Dreams of a Formal Theory (New York: Pantheon, 1992).
141. See also Edoardo Amaldi, "The Unity of Physics," Physics Today, vol. 261 (September, 1973), pp. 23-29.
142. Compare also C. F. von Weizsäcker, "The Unity of Physics," in Ted Bastin (ed.) Quantum Theory and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
143. The older figures are given in S. S. Visher, "Starred Scientists, 1903-1943," in American Men of Science (Baltimore, 1947). For many further details regarding the development of American science see the author's Scientific Progress (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978).
144. See, for example, Derek J. Price, Little Science, Big Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 11.
145. Raymond Ewell, "The Role of Research in Economic Growth," Chemical and Engineering News, vol. 33 (1955), pp. 2980-85.
146. Data from William George, The Scientist in Action (New York: Arno Press, 1938).
147. See Stanislaw M. Ulam, Adventures of a Mathematician (New York: Scribner, 1976).
148. Henry Brooks Adams, The Education of Henry Adams (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1918).
149. Edward Gibbon, Memoirs of My Life (Harmondworth: Penguin Books, 1984), p. 63.
150. Derek J. de Solla Price, Little Science, Big Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 6-8.
151. D. A. Bromley et al. Physics in Perspective (Washington,DC:National Academy of Science, 1973); pp. 16, 23.
152. See also Gerald Holton, "Models for Understanding the Growth and Excellence of Scientific Research," in Stephen R. Graubard and Gerald Holton, eds., Excellence and Leadership in a Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 115.
153. See Henry Brooks Adams, The Education of Henry Adams: An Autobiography (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1918).
154. S.W. Hawking, "Is the End in Sight for Theoretical Physics?" Physics Bulletin, vol. 32 (1981), pp. 15-17.
155. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 122 [Akad.].
156. Erwin Schroedinger, What Is Life? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945), p. 31.
157. Eugene P.Wigner, "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences," Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics, vol. 13 (1960), pp. 1-14 (see p. 2).
158. Albert Einstein, Lettres à Maurice Solovine (Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1956), pp. 114-15.
159. K. R. Popper, Objective Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 28.
160. Mary Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1980), p. 154.
161. E. Purcell in A. G.W. Cameron (ed.), Interstellar Communication: A Collection of Reprints and Original Contributions (New York and Amsterdam: W. A. Benjamin, 1963), p. 142.
162. See Stephen H. Dole, Habitable Planets for Man (New York: Blaisdell, 1964; 2nd ed., New York: American Elsevier, 1970)
163. also Carl Sagan, Cosmos (New York:Random House, 1980).
164. See Su-Shu Huang "Life Outside the Solar System," Scientific American 202, vol. 4 (April 1960), p. 55.
165. See Sir Arthur Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World (New York:Macmillan; Cambridge, Eng.: The University Press, 1928), p. 177.
166. See I. S. Shklovskii and Carl Sagan, Intelligent Life in the Universe (San Francisco, London, Amsterdam: Holden-Day, 1966), p. 411.
167. See A. G. W. Cameron (ed.), Interstellar Communication: A Collection of Reprints and Original Contributions (New York and Amsterdam: W. A. Benjamin, 1963), p. 190.
168. On this issue see George Gaylord Simpson, "The Nonprevalence of Humanoids," Science, vol. 143 (1964), pp. 769-775, chapter 13 of This View of Life: The World of an Evolutionist (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1964).
169. See A. G.W. Cameron (ed.), Interstellar Communication: A Collection of Reprints and Original Contributions (New York and Amsterdam:W. A. Benjamin, 1963), p. 75.
170. Compare A. G.W. Cameron (ed.), Interstellar Communication, p. 312.
171. Christiaan Huygens, Cosmotheoros: The Celestial Worlds Discovered-New Conjectures Concerning the Planetary Worlds, Their Inhabitants and Productions (London, 1698; reprinted London: F. Cass & Co., 1968), p. 359.
172. This chapter draws upon the author's essay "Extraterrestrial Science," Philosophia Naturalis, vol. 21 (1984), pp. 400-24.
173. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic (1783), sect. 57; Akad., p. 352.
174. Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers, ed. by C. Hartshorne et al., vol. VI (Cambridge, MA, 1929), sect. 6.556.
175. Michael Dummett, "Truth," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 59 (1958-59), p. 160.
176. C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers, ed. by C. Hartshorne and P.Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), vol. V, sect. 5.64-67.
177. Mediations, No. VI: Philosophical Works, edited by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, vol. I (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1911), pp. 187-89.
178. An informative of philosophical issues located in this general area, see Vincent Julian Fecher, Error, Deception, and Incomplete Truth (Rome: Officium Libri Catholici, 1975).
179. See C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1962), pp. 180-81.
180. Compare Philip Hugly and Charles Sayward, "Can a Language Have Indenumerably Many Expressions?" History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 4 (1983), pp. 73-82.
181. For some recent discussions of scientific realism, see Wilfred Sellars, Science Perception and Reality (London: Humanities Press, 1963);
182. E. McKinnon, ed., The Problem of Scientific Realism (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972);
183. Rom Harré, Principles of Scientific Thinking (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970);
184. Frederick Suppe, ed., The Structure of Scientific Theories, 2nd ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977).
185. Keith Lehrer, "Review of Science, Perception, and Reality by Wilfred Sellars," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 63 (1966), p. 269.