Existence and computation of equilibria of first-price auctions with integral valuations and bids

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Volumn 2, Issue , 2009, Pages 1080-1081

  Escamocher, Guillaume ^a   Miltersen, Peter Bro ^b   Rocio Santillan, R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS SACLAY   (France)

^b AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Aamas proceedings; Economics; Interactions::auctions and related structures; Theoretical

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; ECONOMICS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

AAMAS PROCEEDINGS; NP-HARD; PURE STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUMS; THEORETICAL; TIE-BREAKING; TWO WAYS;

COMMERCE;

EID: 84899848409     PISSN: 15488403     EISSN: 15582914     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (3)

1. A. Blume and P. Heidhues. All equilibria of the Vickrey auction. Journal of Economic Theory, 114(1):170-177: January 2004.
2. G. Escamocher. P. B. Miltersen, and R. Santillan R. Existence and computation of equilibria of first price auctions with integral valuations and bids. Available at www.daimi.au.dk/bromille/Papers/first.pdf.2009.
3. E. Maskin and J. Riley. Equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions. Review of Econ. Studies, 67(3):439-54. 2000.