The Legal Frame work of Peace Operations by Regional Organisations

Journal of International Peacekeeping

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 111-141

  Orakhelashvili, Alexander ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 84899639525     PISSN: 18754104     EISSN: 18754112     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/187541107X00079     Document Type: Article

References (106)

1. The UN Security Council has authorised on different occasions the forcible action led by the individual Member-State or the group of States. The authorisation of the Operation Desert Storm under Resolution 678 (1990) against Iraq and of the US-led force under Resolution 794 (1992) in Somalia could evidence this.
2. The Security Council has, under paragraph I of the Resolution 1386 (2001), authorised the deployment in Afghanistan of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to assist the Interim Government formed after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, to keep the country under control.
3. The Security Council has also, under paragraphs 7 and 10 of Resolution 1511 (2003) authorised a multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to support the process of Government-formation and the adoption of the Iraqi Constitution, in the aftermath of the US-led invasion of the country in 2003.
4. Statement of the Heads of States and Governments of Members of the Security Council, 31January 1992: "The absence of wars and military conflicts among States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields havebecome threats topeace and security. The United Nations membership as a whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters". UN doc S/PV.3046.
5. Under Article 25 of the UN Charter, the members of the UN are obliged to accept and carry out the decisions of the UN Security Council.
6. See Report of the Panel on rhe United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), A/55/305S/2000/809.
7. This contribution aims to examine the most mainline issues related to the legal framework of regional peace operations and hence some interesting issues such as territorial administration by international organisations and cooperation with international criminal tribunals is beyond the scope of the present analysis.
8. On the criteria that govern the distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations see A Orakhelashvili, Legal Basis of the United Nations peacekeeping Operations, 43 Virginia Journal of International Law (2003), 485-524.
9. C Walter, Security Council Control over Regional Action, 1Max Planck YBUNG (1997), 129 at 171-173.
10. On the definition and type so fregional organisations see Klein & Sands, Bowettś Law of International Institutions (2001), 149-155.
11. On the organisations that qualify and are considered as regional arrangements under Chapter VIII see R. Wolfrum, Der Beitrag regionaler Abmachungen zur Friedenssicherung: Moglichkeiten und Grenzen, 53(3) Zeitschrift Fur Ausändisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1990), 576-602; Gray (2004), 287-289;
12. H. Kelsen, Is the North Atlantic Treaty a Regional Arrangement? 45 AJlL (1951), 162-166;
13. E. De Wet, The Relationship between the Security Council and Regional Organisations under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, 71 Nordic JlL (2002), 1 at 8-10.
14. For overview see M. Akehurst, Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies, with Special Reference to the Organisation of American States, 45 BYIL (1967), 175;
15. Anthony Clark Arend, The United Nations, Regional Organisations, and Military Operations: The Past and the Present, 7 Duke JCIL (1996-1997), 3-18.
16. Arend (1996-1997), 3 at 18.
17. C Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (2004), 292-294.
18. See, most importantly, the express statements of 132 States that rejects the so-called right to humanitarian intervention, in Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (2003), 712.
19. As affirmed by the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua, ICJ Report 1986, 14. The UK House of Lords has also affirmed the peremptory status of the prohibition of the use of force following Nicaragua, see R. vJones, [2006]UKHL 16, 29 March 2006, para.I 8(perLord Bingham). On the effect of peremptory norms on conflicting treaties, see Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
20. UN General Assembly Resolution 49/57, 9December 1994.
21. See paragraphs 1(d), 9 and 10 of the Declaration.
22. See ILC Articles 49-54 on State Responsibility, ILC Report 2001, A/56/10;
23. on erga omnes obligations see Barcelona Traction (Second Phase), ICJ Reports 1970, 33-34.
24. Further renumbered as Article 5 in the 1975 Protocol amending the Rio Treaty.
25. For an overview see Akehurst (1967), 192ff.
26. The doctrine of implied powers of international organisations is widely accepted in jurisprudence. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 ICJ Reports 174, 182, 184 (Advisory Opinion of April 11);
27. Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1954 ICJ Reports 47, 57 (Advisory Opinion of July 13);
28. Certain Expenses, 1962 ICJ Reports at 167-68;
29. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 ICJ Reports 226, 240 (Advisory Opinion of July 8);
30. Difference Relating to Immunity From Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 1999 ICJ Reports 62, 82 (Advisory Opinion of April 29).
31. NATO Strategic Concept (1999), para. 31.
32. Final Communique, Brussels Ministerial Meeting, 17 December 1992, paras 4-5;
33. Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, para. 7.
34. Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, 27 May 1997, Section III.
35. SC Resolution 787, para. 12.
36. Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, para. 25.
37. SC Resolution 836, para. 5.
38. SC Resolution 836, para. 9.
39. Arend (1996-1997), 21.
40. N Figa-Talamanca, The Role of NATO in the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7 EJIL (1996), 164 at 170.
41. Annex IA, Article I, paras Ia-c.
42. Annex lA, Articles II-IV.
43. Annex lA, Article I, paras 2b and 3.
44. SC Resolution 1031, paras 13-14.
45. SC Resolution 1031, para. 15.
46. Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999.
47. SC Resolution 1244, paras 2, 4 and Annex II.
48. Agreed Points on Russian Participation in KFOR, US-Russian Federation, Helsinki, 18 June 1999
49. Russian contingent of KFOR served until July 2003 when it was withdrawn.
50. Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, Bonn, 5 December 2001.
51. SC Resolution 1386, para. 1;
52. the Force has been established for an initial 6 months and its mandate is periodically extended, see e.g. SC Resolution 1563 (2004), para. 1, and SC Resolution 1623 (2005), para. 1.
53. SC Resolution 1510, para. 1.
54. Statement of the EU Presidency to the UN Special Committee on peacekeeping, 29 March 2004.
55. Generally on EUFOR structure and activities see www.eurobih.org.
56. SCResolution 1551, para. 10.
57. SC Resolution 1575, paras. 7, 10-11;
58. the mandate ofEUFOR has been extended in a subsequent resolution by further 12 months.
59. SC Resolution 1639, para. 7.
60. SC Resolution 1671, paras. l-2, 4.
61. SC Resolution 1671, para. 8.
62. SC Resolution 1671, para. 15.
63. SC Resolution 1565, para. 2;
64. SC Resolution 1635, para. 2.
65. SC Resolution 1649, preamble and para. 11.
66. SC Resolution 1669 (2006), para. 1.
67. Bowett (2001), 252-254;
68. G Nolte, Restoring Peace by Regional Action: International Legal Aspects of the Liberian Conflict, 53(3) Zeitschrift Fur Ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1993), 603 at 612-613.
69. On the background of the conflict in Liberia see Nolte, (1993), 605-612;
70. Gray (2004), 302-307;
71. D. Wippman, Military Intervention, Regional Organisations and Host-State Consent, 7 Duke JCIL (1996-1997), 209 at 225-226.
72. Arend (1996-1997), 25;
73. Wippman (1996-1997), 225.
74. This was also the UN Secretary-Generalś view, Nolte (1993), 626.
75. Gray (2004), 296-297, 302, 306-307;
76. Nolte (1993), 633.
77. SC Resolution 788, para. 1.
78. Nolte (1993), 625, further affirming that Doe's position was comparable to that of the Congolese Government when ONUC was deployed in the Congo, or the Lebanese Government in relation to the Arab Deterrent Force.
79. SC Resolution 866, para. 3.
80. SC Resolution 1132, paras. 2 and 6.
81. SC Resolution 1132, para. 8.
82. T Franck, Recourse to Force (2002), 156, 159;
83. see also Wippman (1996-1997), 228;
84. Walter (1997), 180-181;
85. for a more balanced view see Arend (1996-1997), 25-26.
86. SC Resolution 1289, para. 10.
87. SC Resolution 1464, para. 9.
88. SC Resolution 1528 (2004), preamble and paras. I and 6.
89. SC Resolution 1528, paras. 16-17.
90. SC Resolution 1572, para. 7.
91. SC Resolution 1584, paras. I and 2(a).
92. SC Resolution 1657 (2006), para. 1.
93. Entered into force on 7 November 2003.
94. Entered into force on 15 March 2006.
95. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports 1962.
96. G.J. Naldi, Peace-keeping Attempts by the Organisation of African Unity, 34ILCQ (1985), 593 at 594-595.
97. Under paragraph 4 of the Resolution the composition of the operation was increased to 5650.
98. SC Resolution 1590, para. 4;
99. according to paragraph 10 of the same Resolution, UNMIS takes over the United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) that has been established by the Security Council in 2004, by Resolution 1547.
100. SC Resolution 1663, preamble and para. 4.
101. SC Resolution 1679, preamble and paras. 2-3; this has been the position at the time of this writing.
102. See in general Orakhelashvili (2003), 518-523.
103. On consent to peace operations generally see C Gray, Host-State Consent and United Nations peace keeping in Yugoslavia, 7 Duke JCIL (1996-1997), 241;
104. Wippman (1996-1997), 209.
105. SC Resolution 1267 (1999).
106. See also paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 12 of the Resolution 1546 (2004).