A minimal test for political theories

Philosophia (United States)

Volumn 28, Issue 1-4, 2001, Pages 283-296

  Mulgan, Tim ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND   (New Zealand)

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EID: 84897936251     PISSN: 00483893     EISSN: 15749274     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF02379781     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. Brian Barry, "Justice Between Generations", in P. M. S. Hacker and J. Raz (ed.), Law, Morality and Society: Essays in Honour of H. L. A. Hart, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977, pp. 268-284, at p. 268.
2. For a general discussion of traditional political philosophy and future generations, see Brian Barry "Circumstances of Justice and Future Generations", in R. Sikora and B. Barry (eds.), Obligations to Future Generations (Philadelphia: Temple University Press) 1978 pp. 204-248.
3. This view goes back to Plato. The most prominent modern exponent of this view is David Gauthier (see his Morals by Agreement, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986).
4. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 126.
5. This view goes back to Locke. The most prominent modern exponent of this view is Robert Nozick (see his Anarchy, State, and Utopia., Blackwells, 1974).
6. Though some reasons to be wary of this supposition are discussed briefly in Section IX below.
7. A Theory of Justice, pp. 17-22.
8. It is worth noting that many of the tales told by Egoists, Libertarians and Rawlsians also abstract away from the details of human reproduction. The standard model for human interactions is a group of grown-up adults. Complicated facts about where babies come from, and who is going to look after them, are generally ignored. Theorists who ignore such facts when it suits them can hardly appeal to them to discredit an inconvenient thought experiment.
9. Indeed, Dasgupta cites evidence which suggests that, even in the actual world, people's concern even for their own descendants definitely does not extend indefinitely into the future. It is quite strong for a generation or two, and then it peters out very sharply. See R Dasgupta, "Savings and Fertility: Ethical Issues", Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1994, volume 23, number 2, pp. 99-127.
10. R Dasgupta, An Inquiry into Well-being and Destitution, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, chapter twelve.
11. For Nozick's discussion of the proviso, see Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 175-182.
12. Derek Parfit Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1984, pp. 355-356.
13. The argument in the text assumes that a life not worth living is worse than nonexistence. If we deny this claim, and if the choice of acquisition policy is a Different People Choice, then every possible acquisition policy will satisfy Nozick's new proviso.
14. See A Theory of Justice, pp. 284-293.
15. In his original discussion, Rawls focuses on the just rate of savings between one generation and the next, not on longer term issues such as environmental pollution.
16. Many of the arguments presented below are adapted from those in Brian Barry Theories of Justice, Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1989, pp. 179-203.
17. These goods include "liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect", (A Theory of Justice, p. 303.)
18. This argument is analogous to Parfit's objection to Average Utilitarianism. (See Reasons and Persons, pp. 420-422.)
19. Also, as Brian Barry notes, "we are bound to worry about the good sense of choosing principles to advance the interests of potential people most of whom will never exist",. (Theories of Justice, p. 195.)
20. This puzzle is analogous to Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion. (See Reasons and Persons, pp. 387-390.)