Corruption drives the emergence of civil society

Journal of the Royal Society Interface

Volumn 11, Issue 93, 2014, Pages

  Abdallah, Sherief ^a,b,c   Sayed, Rasha ^a   Rahwan, Iyad ^b,d   LeVeck, Brad L ^e   Cebrian, Manuel ^f,g   Rutherford, Alex ^d,h   Fowler, James H ^e  

^a THE BRITISH UNIVERSITY IN DUBAI   (United Arab Emirates)

^b UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

^c Cairo University   (Egypt)

^d KHALIFA UNIVERSITY   (United Arab Emirates)

^e UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^f CSIRO   (Australia)

^g UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

^h United Nations Global Pulse   (Australia)

Author keywords

Evolutionary dynamics; Politics; Social learning

Indexed keywords

BIOPHYSICS; BIOTECHNOLOGY;

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION; CIVIL SOCIETY; EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION; EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS; POLITICS; PUBLIC GOOD PROVISIONS; PUBLIC GOODS; SOCIAL LEARNING;

CRIME;

ARTICLE; AUTHORITY; COOPERATION; GOVERNMENT; LAW ENFORCEMENT; PUNISHMENT; SOCIAL EVOLUTION; SOCIETY; CRIME; EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS; HUMAN; POLITICS; SOCIAL LEARNING; THEORETICAL MODEL;

EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS; POLITICS; SOCIAL LEARNING;

CRIME; HUMANS; MODELS, THEORETICAL; PUNISHMENT;

EID: 84896960421     PISSN: 17425689     EISSN: 17425662     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2013.1044     Document Type: Article

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