The reverse majority voting under the 'Six Pack': A bad turn for the union?

European Law Journal

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 186-203

  Palmstorfer, Rainer ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SALZBURG   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84896891776     PISSN: 13515993     EISSN: 14680386     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/eulj.12034     Document Type: Article

References (98)

1. For a detailed overview of the innovations introduced by the 'six pack,' please consult H.-J. Blanke, 'The European Economic and Monetary Union-Between Vulnerability and Reform', (2011) 1 International Journal of Public Law and Policy 402-409
2. W. Obwexer, 'Das System der "EuropäischenWirtschaftsregierung" und die RechtsnaturihrerTeile: Sixpack-Euro-Plus-Pakt-Europäisches Semester-Rettungsschirm', (2012) 67 Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht 209, 211-227
3. Regulation (EU) 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the Euro area (Euro Area Budgetary Surveillance Regulation) [2011] OJ L306/1
4. Regulation (EU) 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the Euro area (Euro Area Excessive Macroeconomic Imbalances Regulation) [2011] OJ L306/8
5. Regulation (EU) 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) no. 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (MSP Amending Regulation) [2011] OJ L306/12
6. Regulation (EU) 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances (Macroeconomic Imbalances Regulation) [2011] OJ L306/25; Council Regulation (EU) 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) no. 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP Amending Regulation) [2011] OJ L306/33.
7. Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States [2011] OJ L306/41.
8. Reg 1175/2011, Reg 1176/2011.
9. Reg 1173/2011, Reg 1174/2011.
10. Reg 1177/2011, Dir 2011/85.
11. Council Regulation (EU) 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism [2010] OJ L118/1.
12. These are the Greek loan facility, the EFSM, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Except for the EFSM, these instruments have not been taken under EU law. See A. De Gregorio Merino, 'Legal Developments in the Economic and Monetary Union during the Debt Crisis: The Mechanisms of Financial Assistance', (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 1613, 1614 et seq.
13. Article 136(3) TFEU-which is still not in force-will read as follows: 'The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality.' The purpose of this article is to expressly state that the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is permissible and, thus, compatible with Article 125(1) TFEU ('no-bail-out clause').
14. U. Häde, 'The Treaty of Lisbon and the Economic and Monetary Union', in H.-J. Blanke and S. Mangiameli (eds), The European Union after Lisbon: Constitutional Basis, Economic Order and External Action (Springer, 2012), at 423
15. 'The best that could be agreed to in the Treaty of Maastricht was the coordination of economic policies and Community supervision over national debt policies. Future changes to the Treaty were nothing more than cosmetic ones. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Treaty was going to adopt these provisions without any further adjustments. (. . .) The Lisbon Treaty follows along those lines; however, there are minor changes towards applicable law that can make quite a difference in individual cases.'
16. J. Bast and F. Rödl, 'Jenseits der Koordinierung? Zu den Grenzen der EU-Verträge für eine Europäische. Wirtschaftsregierung', (2012) 39 Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 269
17. A. Fischer-Lescano, 'EU in der Finanzkrise: Zur Leistungsfähigkeit der Verfahrens der verstärkten Zusammenarbeit für eine Intensivierung der Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik', (2011) 44 Kritische Justiz 412
18. U. Häde, 'Rechtsfragen der EU-Rettungsschirme', (2011) 26 Zeitschrift für Gesetzgebung 1, 22-26
19. N. Ohler, 'Die zweite Reform des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspaktes', (2010) 25 Zeitschrift für Gesetzgebung 330
20. M. Ruffert, 'The European Debt Crisis and European Union Law', (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1777-1800
21. A. Weber, 'Die Reform der Wirtschafts- und Währungs union in der Finanzkrise', (2011) 22 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 935-936
22. In the following, the term 'decision' does not necessarily refer to the legal act listed in Art 288(4) TFEU. Thus, 'decision' is not used in a strict legal sense.
23. P.-C. Müller-Graff, 'Euroraum- BudgethilfepolitikimrechtlichenNeuland', (2011) 34 Integration 289-305
24. Also see U. Häde, 'Kommissionsentwürfe für offensichtliche Ultra-vires-Akte', (2010) 21 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 921-921
25. F. Amtenbrink and J. De Haan, 'Economic Governance in the European Union: Fiscal Policy Discipline versus Flexibility', (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 1075-1078
26. J.-V. Louis, 'The Economic and Monetary Union: Law and Institutions', (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 575-575
27. D. Servais and R. Ruggeri, 'The EU Constitution: Its Impact on Economic and Monetary Union and Economic Governance', in European Central Bank (ed.), Legal Aspects of the European System of Central Banks: Liber Amicorum Paolo Zamboni Garavelli (European Central Bank, 2005), at 44
28. Arts 2(1) and 3(1)© TFEU (exclusive competences).
29. P. van den Noord, 'Fiscal Policies in EMU at the Crossroads', in F. Breuss (ed.), The Stability and Growth Pact: Experiences and Future Aspects (Springer, 2007), at 36.
30. Arts 2(3) and 5(1) TFEU.
31. I. Harden, 'The Fiscal Constitution of EMU', in P. Beaumont and N. Walker (eds), Legal Framework of the Single European Currency (Hart Publishing, 1999), at 77
32. D. Gros, 'Towards a Credible Excessive Deficit Procedure', in M. Andenas et al. (eds), European Economic and Monetary Union: The Institutional Framework (Kluwer Law International, 1997), at 242-244
33. Art 121(2) TFEU.
34. Art 121(4) TFEU.
35. Art 126(7) TFEU.
36. Art 126(8) TFEU.
37. Art 126(9) TFEU.
38. Art 126(11) TFEU.
39. J.-V. Louis, 'The Legal Foundations of the SGP in Primary and Secondary EC Law', in F. Breuss (ed), The Stability and Growth Pact: Experiences and Future Aspects (Springer, 2007
40. U. Palm, 'Der Bruch des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakts', (2004) 14 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 71-71
41. Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [1997] OJ L209/1 (Surveillance Regulation).
42. Regulation 1467/97 (EC) on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP Regulation) [1997] OJ L209/6.
43. Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact [1997] OJ C236/1.
44. Art 2 Reg 1173/2011.
45. Art 121(4) TFEU.
46. Art 126 (7) TFEU.
47. These are the measures under Arts 121(6), (7), (8) and (9) TFEU.
48. Art 126(10) TFEU referring to the measures enshrined in Art 126(1)-(9) TFEU.
49. Decision 2003/89/EC on the existence of an excessive deficit in Germany-Application of Article 104(6) of the Treaty establishing the European Community [2003] OJ L34/16
50. Decision 2003/487/EC on the existence of an excessive deficit in France-Application of Article 104(6) of the Treaty establishing the European Community [2003] OJ L165/29.
51. These were based on Art 104(7) TEC (now Art 126(7) TFEU).
52. Cf Press Releases, IP/03/1420 and IP/03/1560.
53. Council Conclusions of 25 November 2003, 14492/1/03 REV 1 (en) (Presse 320).
54. Editorial Comments, 'Whither the Stability and Growth Pact?', (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 1193-1194
55. R.M. Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability (OUP, 2006), at 270
56. H.-W. Sinn, Kasino-Kapitalismus (Ullstein, 2010), at 321
57. D. Vines, 'Recasting the Macroeconomic Policy-Making System in Europe', (2011) 9 Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften 310-314
58. H.J. Blanke, 'The Economic Constitution of the European Union', in H.J. Blanke and S. Mangiameli (eds), The European Union after Lisbon: Constitutional Basis, Economic Order and External Action (Springer, 2012), at 399
59. Cf the newly introduced Commission warning under Article 126(5) TFEU. Previously the Commission could not directly address the Member State but had to turn to the Council (Article 104(5) TEC).
60. S. Pilz and H. Dittmann, 'Perspektiven des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakts: Rechtliche und ökonomische Implikationen des Reformpakets "EconomicGovernance" ', (2012) 15 Zeitschrift für europarechtliche Studien 53-69
61. However, some authors claim that the EMU is flawed at its foundations. In other words, on this view, it is not the flaws of the procedures that lie at the heart of the current problems. Instead, cornerstone elements such as single interest rates for heterogeneous economies are perceived as the main causes for the euro crisis
62. F.W. Scharpf, 'Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Pre-emption of Democracy', (2011) 9 Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften 163
63. Arts 6(2) and 10(2)Reg 1466/1997 as amended by Reg 1175/2011.
64. Art 4(2) Reg 1173/2011.
65. Art 5(2) Reg 1173/2011.
66. Art 6(2) Reg 1173/2011.
67. Art 10(4)(2) Reg 1176/2011.
68. Art 3(1)-(3) Reg 1174/2011.
69. Also see A. Weber, 'Die Europäische Union auf dem Wege zur Fiskalunion?' (2012) 127 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 801-803
70. Who-referring to the last sentence of Art 2 TSCG ('The existence of an excessive deficit due to the breach of the debt criterion will be decided in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.')-claims that RMV is not applicable to the finding of an excessive deficit. In reply to this view, it should be underlined that such a reading runs counter to the clear wording of Article 7 TSCG by which the Member States have abandoned their discretion. Article 7 TSCG does not state that the decision under Article 126(6) TFEU as such has to be taken under RMV, but it states that the Euro area Member States are obliged to vote in favour of a Commission proposal aiming at a decision under Article 126(6) TFEU. Therefore, it is still possible that Member States violate their obligation under Article 7 TSCG and do not vote in favour of a Commission proposal (although this obligation was not rejected by a qualified majority), with the result that the qualified majority necessary for Article 126(6) TFEU is not reached.
71. P. Craig, 'The Fiscal Pact' (ECSA discussion, Vienna, 27 February 2012
72. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability in the Euro area, COM (2011) 819 final; Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the Euro area, COM(2011) 821 final.
73. As Reg 1177/2011, which was adopted pursuant to Art 126(14) TFEU, does not contain any RMV provisions, the analysis will not include the latter Article.
74. See Arts 6(2) and 10(2) Reg 1466/1997 as amended by Reg 1175/2011. On top of that, 240(3) TFEU empowers the Council and not the Council and the EP to act as was the case with Reg 1173/2011, Reg 1174/2011, Reg 1175/2011 and Reg 1176/2011
75. Arts 121(4)(3), 126(13)(3) TFEU.
76. This fact explains the adoption of Article 7 TSCG, see above at III B.
77. Also the 'two pack' is based on Article 121(6) in conjunction with Article 136 TFEU; see III C.
78. U. Häde, 'Art. 136 AEUV-eine neue Generalklausel für die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion?' (2011) 66 Juristenzeitung 333-334
79. W. Frenz and C. Ehlenz, 'Schuldenpolitik und Grenzen der europäischen Wirtschaftspolitik', (2010) 21 Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht 211-212
80. Also see Article 3(4) of Protocol (No 36) on Transitional Provisions.
81. see, however, the Commission warnings under Art 121(4) TFEU.
82. A. Kumin, 'Neue Verfahren I: Reverse Majority Voting- Auf dem Weg zur Herrschaft der Exekutive über die Legislative?' (Europäische Wirtschaftsregierung Conference, Salzburg, 20 October 2011
83. Art 43(2)(3) TEC (Pre-Amsterdam numbering): 'The Council shall, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, acting unanimously during the first two stages and by a qualified majority thereafter, make regulations, issue directives, or take decisions, without prejudice to any recommendations it may also make.'
84. Council Directive 94/43/EC establishing Annex VI to Directive 91/414/EEC concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market [1994] L227/31.
85. Council Directive 91/414/EEC concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market [1991] OJ L230/1.
86. Art 18(1) Dir 91/414/EEC: 'The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt the "uniform principles" referred to in Annex VI.' Thus both the basic directive and the implementing directive were adopted by qualified majority voting in the Council.
87. Case C-76/01 P, Eurocoton v Council [2003] ECR 2003 I-10091.
88. Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community [1996] L56/1.
89. See the analysis above, especially at IV B and C. The implementing powers under Article 291(2) TFEU cannot change the Treaties.
90. The Member States could, for example, adopt domestic legislation in order to fulfil their reporting requirements under the MSP.
91. J.-P. Jacqué, 'The Principle of Institutional Balance', (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 383-384
92. MSP and EDP are construed as two distinct procedures (ie preventive part and corrective part of the SGP)
93. Regarding Art 104 EC (now Art 126 TFEU) J.-V. Louis, 'A Legal and Institutional Approach for Building a Monetary Union', (1998) 35 Common Market Law Review 33, 72.
94. Should the 'two pack' contain RMV measures, Article 263 TFEU may become relevant.
95. See the pending preliminary reference concerning the legality of the ESM in Case C-370/12: Reference for a preliminary ruling from Supreme Court (Ireland) made on 3 August 2012-Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney General [2012] OJ C303/18.
96. Not only have the dynamics of the crisis led to the swift adoption of counter measures. Also the institutions competent to review the legality of these measures-such as the German constitutional court-were required to work with great urgency
97. W. Hassemer, 'Dalli, dalli, das Hausbrennt!' FranfurterAllgemeineZeitung (Frankfurt, 28 June 2012http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/ europas-zukunft/das-verfassungsgericht-in-zeitnot-dalli-dallidas-haus-brennt-11801245.html
98. E.-W. Böckenförde, 'Kennt die Not kein Gebot?' Neue Zuricher Zeitung (Zurich, 21 June 2010http://www.nzz.ch/aktuell/startseite/kennt_die_europaeische_not_kein_gebot-1.6182412