Do firms always choose excess capacity?

Economics Bulletin

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2004, Pages

  Nishimori, Akira ^a   Ogawa, Hikaru ^b  

^a AICHI UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^b NAGOYA UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84892413007     PISSN: None     EISSN: 15452921     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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5. Haruna S. (1996) "A note on holding excess capacity to deter entry in a labourmanaged industry" Canadian Journal of Economics 29, 493-499
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12. Zhang J. (1993) "Holding excess capacity to deter entry in a labour-managed industry" Canadian Journal of Economics 26, 222-234