Deterrence, Escalation, and Negotiation

Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 53-80

  Morgan, Patrick M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84892255133     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511550584.003     Document Type: Chapter

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