Provision of public goods: Fully implementing the core through private contributions

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 56, Issue 4, 1989, Pages 583-601

  Bagnoli, Mark ^a   Lipman, Barton L ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84892153753     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2297502     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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