The internet and state control in authoritarian regimes: China, cuba and the counterrevolution

First Monday

Volumn 8, Issue SPECIAL ISSUE, 2007, Pages

  Kalathil, Shanthi ^a   Boas, Taylor C ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84891683771     PISSN: 13960466     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Editorial

References (99)

1. Daniel C. Lynch, 1999. After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics and "Thought Work" in Reformed China. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, p. 227.
2. See Samuel P. Huntington, 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press
3. Larry Diamond, 1992. "The Globalization of Democracy: Trends, Types, Causes and Prospects," In: Robert O. Slater, Barry M. Schutz, and Steven R. Dorr (editors). Global Transformation and the Third World. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner
4. Philippe C. Schmitter, 1996. "the Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies," In: Laurence Whitehead (editor). The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas. New York: Oxford University Press
5. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
6. See Edward Schwartz, 1996. Netactivism: How Citizens Use the Internet. Sebastopol, Calif.: Songline Studios
7. Wayne Rash, Jr., 1997. Politics on the Nets: Wiring the Political Process. New York: W.H. Freeman
8. Rosa Tsagarouisanou, Damian Tambini, and Cathy Bryan, 1998. Cyberdemocracy. London: Routledge
9. Lawrence Grossman, 1995. The Electronic Commonwealth. New York: Penguin
10. Ian Budge, 1996. The New Challenge of Direct Democracy. Oxford, U.K.: Polity Press
11. Richard Davis, 1999. The Web of Politics. New York: Oxford University Press.
12. Christopher R. Kedzie, 1997. Communication and Democracy: Coincident Revolutions and the Emergent Dictator's Dilemma. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND.
13. Pippa Norris, forthcoming. Digital Divide? Civic Engagement, Information Poverty and the Internet Worldwide. New York: Cambridge University Press.
14. Kevin A. Hill and John E. Hughes, 1998. "Is the Internet an Instrument of Global Democratization?" In: Kevin A. Hill and John E. Hughes, Cyberpolitics: Citizen Activism in the Age of the Internet. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. Also published in Democratization, volume 6, number 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 99-127.
15. See Garry Rodan, 1998. "The Internet and Political Control in Singapore," Political Science Quarterly, volume 113, number 1 (Spring), pp. 63-89.
16. See also Peng Hwa Ang, "How Countries Are Regulating Internet Content," paper presented at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the Internet Society, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 25-27 June 1997.
17. Shanthi Kalathil, 2001. "The Internet in Asia: Broadband or Broad Bans?" Foreign Service Journal, volume 78, number 2 (February).
18. See Human Rights Watch, 1999. The Internet in the Middle East and North Africa: Free Expression and Censorship. New York: Human Rights Watch
19. Mosaic Group, 1998. "The Global Diffusion of the Internet Project: An Initial Inductive Study," at http://mosaic.unomaha.edu/GDI1998/GDI1998.html
20. Mosaic Group, 1999. "An Update: The Internet in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia," at http://mosaic.unomaha.edu/Pages/..SaudiArabia_1999.pdf
21. David T. Hill and Krishna Sen, 2000. "The Internet in Indonesia's New Democracy," Democratization, volume 7, number 1 (Spring), pp. 119-136.
22. See Huntington, The Third Wave; Diamond, "The Globalization of Democracy"; Schmitter, "The Influence of the International Context"; Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.
23. Lynch, After the Propaganda State; Geoffry Taubman, 1998. "A Not-So World Wide Web: The Internet, China, and the Challenges to Nondemocratic Rule," Political Communication, volume 15, pp. 255-272.
24. Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, 1991. "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe," International Social Science Journal, number 128 (May), pp. 269-284.
25. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
26. For discussions of the role of communications and/or economic development in spurring political change, see Lucian Pye (editor), 1963. Communications and Political Development. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press
27. Daniel Lerner, 1958. The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press
28. Seymour Martin Lipset, 1960. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
29. Schmitter, "The Influence of the International Context"
30. Laurence Whitehead, 1996. "Three International Dimensions of Democratization," In: Laurence Whitehead (editor). The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas. New York: Oxford University Press
31. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 1998. Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press
32. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 1996. The Advent of Netwar. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND.
33. "A Real Puzzler: Are there 15.2M, 16.9M, or 22.5M China netizens?" China Online, 7 February 2001, at http://www.chinaonline.com/issues/internet_policy/NewsArchive/Secure/2001/February/B101020601.asp
34. "China to Rival Japan in Internet Users by 2004," Reuters, 7 February 2001.
35. See Simon Cartledge and Peter Lovelock, 1999. "Special Subject: E-China," China Economic Quarterly, volume 3, number 1, pp. 19-35. See also Thomas Lum, "China's Internet Industry," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, August 14, 2000, for projected user and Web site growth in 2000.
36. There is a substantial body of literature on media, telecommunications reform, and ICT development in China. Although we cannot address the bulk of it in this paper, we will note a few points as a backdrop to the present discussion.
37. Chin-Chuan Lee (editor), 1990. Voices of China: The Interplay of Politics and Journalism. New York: Guilford Press, p. 5.
38. Lynch, After the Propaganda State.
39. Lee, Voices of China.
40. Cartledge and Lovelock, "Special Subject: E-China."
41. William Foster and Seymour E. Goodman, 2000. The Diffusion of the Internet in China. Stanford, Calif.: Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, (November).
42. The regulatory problems faced by many countries when dealing with the "convergence" of many forms of ICT were amplified in China, where the necessity of inculcating revolutionary values meant that propaganda or "thought work" was allotted its own specific, and powerful, ministry. While the media, including radio, television, and newspapers, were all traditionally seen as propaganda tools, telecommunications was classified bureaucratically under the division of finance and economy, and policing of telecom networks was the responsibility of the public security apparatus. For more on this, see Lynch, After the Propaganda State.
43. In 1995, for example, China sent a top minister to Singapore - which has over the years developed sophisticated measures to contain political expression and communication - to study exactly how it was dealing with the potential for political expression on the Internet. Two months later, the Chinese government began to use telecommunications technology to prevent access to external Web sites, mimicking Singapore's measures. For details, see Lynch, After the Propaganda State.
44. See Taubman, "A Not-So World Wide Web."
45. Following the Jiangxi schoolhouse blast in February, Chinese Internet users contradicted the government explanation that a sole madman was responsible for the explosion, suggesting instead that schoolchildren had been forced illegally to construct firecrackers. The groundswell of public outrage eventually precipitated an unprecedented apology from Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, marking the first time that the government was forced to respond to what was in part an Internet-facilitated outpouring of public opinion. For more details, see Philip P. Pan, 2001. "Chinese Officials Blame Suicidal Man for School Explosion," Washington Post (9 March)
46. Craig S. Smith, 2001. "Chinese Premier Apologizes for Schoolhouse Explosion," New York Times (15 March). During the U.S. spy plane incident, Chinese Internet users expressed strong sentiments of nationalism and anti-Americanism that ultimately challenged the Chinese leadership. For further discussion, see note 50.
47. In contrast, Lynch argues that, far from creating an independent sphere of ideas and activity, the Internet and other ICTs are helping create a chaotic space filled with apolitical content and atomized individuals - a space that ultimately will not help contribute to the formation of an independent civil society. See Lynch, After the Propaganda State.
48. See Joanne Lee-Young, 2001. "Beijing Cracks Down on Firecracker Scandal," Industry Standard (15 March); and "Top Chinese Website Shuts Chatroom over School Blast Anger," Agence France-Presse (9 March).
49. Liu Yuan, 2001. "Café Crackdown: China Enlists the Public in Its Ongoing Campaign to Censor the Internet," Asiaweek (2 February).
50. It must also be remembered that Internet dial-up costs are for the most part still prohibitively high for the average Chinese citizen. Despite China's sanctioning of competition in the sector, the country's privately owned Internet service providers must lease telephone lines at high cost from China Telecom, although this situation is changing.
51. There is considerable debate about whether such organizations as the Falun Gong spiritual movement or the semi-autonomous All China Women's Federation constitute the foundation for a truly independent civil society, but we will refer to them as such for the purposes of this paper.
52. Maggie Farley, 1999. "Hactivists Besiege China," Los Angeles Times (4 January)
53. Jasper Becker, 1999. "Review of Dissidents, Human Rights Issues," South China Morning Post (12 January).
54. Shanthi Kalathil, 2001. "Between the Lines: China's Dot-Communism," Foreign Policy, number 122 (January-February), pp. 74-75; and interviews with Falun Gong spokespeople, Washington, D.C., 7 February 2001.
55. Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya, and D. M. Jones, 1995. Toward Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia. New York: St. Martin's Press.
56. Although proponents of foreign investment suggest that the influence of overseas capital will help reduce domestic "crony capitalist" practices, the development of a cozy relationship between Internet entrepreneurs and the government may actually encourage rather than reduce reliance on "guanxi" (informal personal connections), which can often shade over into graft or other corrupt practices.
57. The newest regulations stipulate that Internet companies must maintain records of all information posted on their Web sites and all users who have connected with their servers within 60 days. In addition, they bluntly state that news carried on domestic Web sites must be from official sources. Despite causing an outcry among human rights and press freedom activists overseas, the regulations have been accepted by domestic and foreign investors, who have shown a propensity to self-regulate and self-censor. The regulations may also serve to discourage newcomers who seek to provide objective news and information in the sector. See Craig S. Smith, 2000. "Little Anxiety over China Web Rules," New York Times (3 October); and, Kalathil, "Between the Lines."
58. Bell et al., Toward Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia. For examples of investor unwillingness to cross the government, see "Top Chinese Website Shuts Chatroom over School Blast Anger," Agence France-Presse (9 March); and Lee-Young, "Beijing Cracks Down."
59. Tom Malinowski, 2001. "China's Willing Censors," Washington Post (20 April)
60. Shanthi Kalathil, 2000. "The C-Word," Dangerous Assignments (Summer), pp. 10-13.
61. After businessman Huang Qi was recently tried for posting articles about the Tiananmen massacre on his Web site, New York-based Human Rights Watch posted a statement on its Web site urging Western governments and Internet corporations to come to Huang's defense. U.S. Internet corporations were silent when Human Rights Watch raised the same plea shortly after Huang's arrest. See "Subversion Trial Set for Web Site Creator," South China Morning Post (10 February 2001)
62. Michael Dorgan, 2000. "U.S. Firms Silent over Chinese Net Arrest," San Jose Mercury News (6 July).
63. Although some international groups do rely on e-mail to contact supporters in China, this is perhaps less widespread than popularly perceived. The China Labour Bulletin, a newsletter run out of Hong Kong by exiled labor activist and dissident Han Dongfang, is dependent on e-mail to keep in touch with external supporters, but contacts within China are primarily done by telephone and through a regular radio program (e-mail correspondence with China Labour Bulletin Webmaster, 5 May 2000).
64. For example, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien voiced concern about the crackdown on Falun Gong in recent talks with China's Premier Zhu Rongji. See "China Vows War against Falun Gong," South China Morning Post (12 February 2001).
65. Interviews with Falun Gong spokespeople, Washington, D.C., 7 February 2001.
66. For instance, both the Ministry of Information Industry and the State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television see the development of broadband capabilities as their domain. For more, see Foster and Goodman, The Diffusion of the Internet.
67. For instance, in August of last year, the Shanghai Foreign Investment Committee licensed a wholly foreign-owned company to operate as an Internet Content Provider (ICP), an act expressly forbidden by national rules. See Karen Mazurkewich, 2000. "Making a Play: Global Portals Prepare to Move into China as Beijing Appears to Relax its Internet Rules," Far Eastern Economic Review (31 August).
68. Ironically, although the government did foment nationalism following the U.S. spy plane incident, this nationalism threatened to overwhelm state control. The Chinese government is still trying to finesse the delicate division between a state-massaged nationalism and a groundswell of militant public opinion that may turn against the regime. In 2001, this groundswell proved particularly potent, in part because of Internet-enabled discussions and information exchange.
69. Michael Ma, 2001. "China Wants Net to Spread Propaganda," South China Morning Post (10 February).
70. Tyler Marshall and Anthony Kuhn, 2000. "China Goes One-on-One with the Net," Los Angeles Times (29 January).
71. "China to Build Own 'Superhighway'," Associated Press, 8 January 2001.
72. Yi Feng, 1997. "Democracy, Political Stability and Economic Growth," British Journal of Political Science, volume 27, pp. 391-418
73. See Bell et al., Toward Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia, for further discussion of preemptive liberalization in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes.
74. John Markoff, 2000. "Silicon Valley's Primal Spirit Lives, in a Part of Beijing," New York Times (4 August).
75. Ming Zhang, "War without Rules," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, volume 55, number 6 (November-December), pp. 16-18.
76. Timothy L. Thomas, "Like Adding Wings to the Tiger: Chinese Information War Theory and Practice," Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., at http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/china/iw/chinaiw.htm
77. Reliable figures on the Internet in Cuba are hard to come by, and no outside estimates are available to compare with government statistics. The numbers above are based upon the following sources: Jesus Martinez Alfonzo, 1999. "The Net in Cuba," Matrix News, volume 1, number 9 (January), at http://www.matrix.net/publications/mn/mn0901.pdf; Patricia Grogg, "Communcations - Cuba: Government to Set Up Public Internet Terminals," Inter Press Service, 18 October 2000; and figures released at a March 2001 press conference, most reliably reported in "Limitaciones técnicas y no políticas impiden acceso masivo de cubanos a Internet," Agence France-Presse, 3 March 2001.
78. As for the numbers with full access to the World Wide Web, a government official clearly stated that as of June 2000 there were 3,625 computers connected to the Internet. At the March 2001 press conference, a second official suggested that 12,000 of the 60,000 e-mail accounts include the capacity to browse the Internet, although it is unclear whether he meant full access to the Internet or access to Cuba's limited Intranet.
79. See John Spicer Nichols and Alicia M. Torres, 1998. "Cuba," In: Eli M. Noam (editor). Telecommunications in Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press
80. John Spicer Nichols, 1982. "Cuban Mass Media: Organization, Control, and Functions," Journalism Monographs, number 78 (November), pp. 1-35
81. Carlos Ripoll, 1987. "The Press in Cuba, 1952-1960: Autocratic and Totalitarian Censorship," In: William E. Ratliff (editor). The Selling of Fidel Castro: The Media and the Cuban Revolution. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers.
82. In the mid-1990s, the state-owned telephone company was partially privatized, but the Cuban government still retains effective control. Modernization of telephone equipment and access to advanced services have proceeded according to government priorities, and dissidents and independent journalists routinely have their calls monitored and cut off by state security.
83. Nichols, "Cuban Mass Media."
84. "International Community Reacts to Cuban Crackdown," CubaInfo, volume 11, number 4 (15 March 1999), pp. 7-8.
85. See Nelson Valdés, 1997. "Cuba, the Internet, and U.S. Policy," Cuba Briefing Paper Series no. 13 (March), Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Caribbean Project
86. Bill Hinchberger, 2000. "Netting Fidel," Industry Standard (10 April); "InCUBAdora," Punto-Com, February 2001, pp. 26-33.
87. Even Cuba's Internet café may fit with the government's pattern of granting Internet access to Cubans only through the workplace. Several reports suggest that to gain access to the Capitolio cybercafé, Cubans require a letter of permission from an employer stating that their need to use the Internet is work-related. A second cybercafé, El Aleph, opened in Havana in November 2000, but it is restricted to members of the official Writers' and Artists' Union and does not provide direct access to the Internet.
88. For a discussion of the importance of political trustworthiness in the granting of Internet access, see Ann C. Seror and Juan Miguel Fach Arteaga, 2000. "Telecommunications Technology Transfer and the Development of Institutional Infrastructure: The Case of Cuba," Telecommunications Policy, volume 24, pp. 203-221.
89. Grogg, "Communications - Cuba."
90. Indeed, the head of Cuba's e-commerce commission has suggested that selecting appropriate Internet sites for inclusion on the Cuban Intranet might be a good business opportunity for foreign investors. See Bill Hinchberger, 2000. "The New E-Man," Industry Standard (10 April).
91. See Taubman, "A Not-So World Wide Web."
92. See Gillian Gunn, 1995. "Cuba's NGOs: Government Puppets or Seeds of Civil Society?" Cuba Briefing Paper Series number 7 (February). Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Caribbean Project.
93. Taylor C. Boas, 2000. "The Dictator's Dilemma? The Internet and U.S. Policy toward Cuba," Washington Quarterly, volume 23, number 3 (Summer), pp. 57-67, at http://www.twq.com/summer00/boas.pdf
94. See "InCUBAdora."
95. "Granma International Online Sets New 'Hit' Record," Granma International (1 April 2000).
96. Links to a variety of tourism sites are available through several Cuban portals such as http://www.cubaweb.cu
97. See http://www.cubatips.com and http://www.camaracuba.com
98. See Hinchberger, "Netting Fidel"; "InCUBAdora"; Brett Sokol, "e-Cuba: One Guess Who'll Control Access to the Internet," Miami New Times (27 July 2000).
99. See "InCUBAdora." ; "InCUBAdora"; Brett Sokol, "e-Cuba: One Guess Who'll Control Access to the Internet," Miami New Times (27 July 2000).