Truth and advertising: The Lanham Act and commercial speech doctrine

Trademark Law and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary Research

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 294-323

  Tushnet, Rebecca ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER   (United States)

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EID: 84891004113     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9781848441316.00019     Document Type: Chapter

References (50)

1. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
2. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1687-8, 1693-7, 1710-15 (1999).
3. For an interesting exception, see Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095 (2003) (arguing that current protections for descriptive marks with secondary meaning conflict with First Amendment rights).
4. Sections A & B are adapted from Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S. CAR. L. REV. 737 (2007). 7 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
5. Edenfield v Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993).
6. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-2.
7. Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464 (1978). 18 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
8. Bates v State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. at 376.
9. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
10. Friedman v Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979); see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449, 466 (in-person solicitation for profit "under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the State has the right to prevent" could be banned without showing actual harm to a particular client; a broad rule was acceptable because the dangers would materialize often, perhaps more often than not). 23 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
11. See, e.g., McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v Heartland Sweeteners LLC, 2007 WL 1520101 (E.D. Pa. May 21, 2007) (involving a defendant that made identical housebranded artificial sweeteners for Giant, Stop & Shop, Tops, Food Lion, and Safeway, among others).
12. See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621 (2004).
13. See, e.g., Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987).
14. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979).
15. In addition, the functionality doctrine performs the same competition-reinforcing function for trade dress as genericity does for terms, and the defenses of nominative and descriptive fair use often appeal to expressive or competitive efficiency. See Rebecca Tushnet, Why the Customer Isn't Always Right: Producer-Based Limits on Rights Accretion in Trademark, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 352 (2007).
16. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1839 (2007).
17. See, e.g., Robert N. Kravitz, Trademarks, Speech, and the Gay Olympics Case, 69 B.U. L. REV. 131 (1989). 40 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
18. See, e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery v Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1297 (9th Cir. 1992).
19. Transgo, Inc. v Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1022 (9th Cir. 1985)
20. Kelley Blue Book v Car-Smarts, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 278, 291 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
21. see also, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of the Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 165-6, 169.
22. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 221 (1998).
23. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002); Rogers v Grimaldi, 875 F2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g. Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989).
24. 448 F.3d 744 (5th Cir. 2006).
25. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3:4617(D).
26. An actual deception requirement would be difficult to administer, especially in the context of intent-to-use applications. Even with marks used in commerce, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) lacks the resources to conduct a survey on consumer perceptions of a mark.
27. See College Savings Bank v Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (protection against false advertising is not a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause). 55 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 56 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
28. See, e.g., Kasky v Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 280 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., dissenting).
29. See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525 (2004).
30. Pearson v Shalala, 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
31. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 659.
32. See, e.g., David W. Stewart & Ingrid M. Martin, Intended and Unintended Consequences of Warning Messages: A Review and Synthesis of Empirical Research, 13 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 15 (1994) (even when consumers notice disclaimers, they are unlikely to use them).
33. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)).
34. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031 (the noncommercial use exception "adequately addresses legitimate First Amendment concerns espoused by the broadcasting industry and the media").
35. See Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55, 120 nn. 442-4 (1999).
36. See Dr. ING H.C.F. Porsche AG v Daimlerchrysler AG, No. 1:02-cv-00483-JTC (N.D. Ga. filed 2/20/2002).
37. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (joined by Kennedy, J., and Ginsburg, J.).
38. The following sections are adapted from Parts III and V of Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 507 (2008).
39. 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002).
40. See, e.g., JOHN R. ANDERSON, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 148 (2d ed. 1985) (spreading activation causes "a good many associated concepts [to] become active" whenever an individual concept is explicitly invoked).
41. See Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical Measures for an Elusive Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 265-267 (2000).
42. Ty, 306 F.3d at 511.
43. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SIEGEL, THE DEVELOPING MIND: HOW RELATIONSHIPS AND THE BRAIN INTERACT TO SHAPE WHO WE ARE 159 (1999).
44. See Ty, 306 F.3d at 512.
45. See Mattel, Inc. v MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[D]ilution law protects only the distinctiveness of the mark, which is inherently less weighty than the dual interest of protecting trademark owners and avoiding harm to consumers that is at the heart of every trademark claim.").
46. See Moseley v V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003) ("Unlike traditional infringement law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution are not the product of common-law development, and are not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers.").
47. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 127-8(arguing that the Supreme Court's recent commercial speech jurisprudence distinguishes between regulations based on an ad's communicative message and regulations based on an ad's associated material harms, invalidating only the former).
48. Laura A. Heymann, Metabranding and Intermediation: A Response to Prof. Fleischer, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 218 (2007).
49. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 286 tbl. 8.1 (2006).
50. See ROGER SHUY, LINGUISTIC BATTLES IN TRADEMARK DISPUTES 4-5 (2002).