Self-fulfillment

Self-Fulfillment

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-235

  Gewirth, Alan ^a  

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References (289)

1. See Daniel Yankelovich, NewRules: Searching for Self-Fulfillment in a World Turned Upside Down (New York: Random House, 1981).
2. See Henry Sidgwick, The Ethics of T. H. Green, Herbert Spencer, and J. Martineau (London: Macmillan, 1902), p. 64
3. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (London:Macmillan, 1907), pp. 91-95.
4. For an excellent historical analysis, which focuses mainly on varying conceptions of the self rather than on self-fulfillment, see Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989).
5. See, e.g., Yankelovich, NewRules.
6. The characterizations of self-realization that I present here are based in part on writings of such British Idealist philosophers as T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and Bernard Bosanquet.
7. See David L. Norton, Personal Destinies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 15.
8. See Jon Elster, "Self-Realization in Work and Politics: The Marxist Conception of the Good Life," Social Philosophy and Policy 3, no. 2 (spring 1986), pp. 99-100.
9. The characterizations of self-actualization that I present here are based largely on the writings of such humanistic psychologists as Abraham H. Maslow, Carl Rogers, and Erich Fromm.
10. See Elster, "Self-Realization," who attributes to "the Marxist tradition" the formula that "self-realization is the full and free actualization and externalization of the powers and the attributes of the individual." 10 Karl Marx, "Results of the Immediate Process of Production," in Marx, Capital, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), p. 1044.
11. Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, 2nd ed. (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1962), pp. 138-145.
12. Carl R. Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), p. 488.
13. See also Rogers, On Becoming a Person (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), p. 35.
14. Jerry Greenwald, Be the Person You Were Meant to Be (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1973), p. 12.
15. See also Erich Fromm, Man for Himself (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1947), p. 20: "All organisms have an inherent tendency to actualize their specific potentialities. The aim of man's life, therefore, 15 Physics 3. 1. 201a10. See also Metaphysics 11. 9. 1065b16.
16. See Metaphysics 6. 1; 9. 1-9; Nicomachean Ethics 6. 3-7.
17. In view of the immense technological constructs that are applied in modern scientific research it is necessary to note here the distinction between the artificial means used, for example, to bombard electrons and the objective physical realities that such technological contrivances are designed to disclose or discover.
18. Nicomachean Ethics, 2. 1. 1103a20.
19. This distinction is overlooked in Thomas Hurka's discussion of Aristotle; see Hurka, Perfectionism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 19-20.
20. See Joel Feinberg, Freedom and Fulfillment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 318-19.
21. Politics, 1. 2. 1253a2.
22. For a related but not identical distinction, see Richard Kraut, "Two Conceptions of Happiness," Philosophical Review 88 (April 1979), pp. 167-97
23. John Kekes, The Examined Life (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1988), chs. 10-11.
24. On Liberty, ch. 3, para. 1.
25. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Boston: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1969), p. 78.
26. For the distinction of orders of desire, see especially Harry G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," Journal of Philosophy 68 (January 1971): 5-20. For critical discussion of the distinction, see the essays collected in Gary Watson, ed., Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). My discussion in the text is indebted to Watson's introduction to this anthology.
27. The paraphrase of Green is from J. B. Schneewind, Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 406.
28. See also F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, 2nd edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927), pp. 65-66.
29. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 407-16.
30. Cf. Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (London:Macmillan, 1952), pp. 15, 30.
31. Gustave Flaubert, Madame Bovary, trans. Gerard Hopkins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 94, 142, 154.
32. Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, trans. Joel Carmichael (New York: Bantam Books, 1981), pp. 134, 308, 312.
33. Theodore Dreiser, Sister Carrie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 119, 121, 136-37.
34. See Jon Elster, Sour Grapes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), chap. 3, including p. 109.
35. See Everett Waters et al., eds., Caregiving, Cultural and Cognitive Perspectives on Secure-Base Behavior and Working Models: NewGrow ing Points of Attachment Theory and Research, in Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 60, nos. 2-3 (1995).
36. See Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 20.
37. See also John Christman, ed., The Inner Citadel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 6, 13.
38. See Nicomachean Ethics, 1. 4. 1095b4; 3. 5. 1113b3 ff.
39. See Jon Elster, "Self-Realization in Work and Politics: The Marxist Conception of the Good Life," Social Philosophy and Policy 3, no. 2 (spring 1986): 101 (emphasis in original).
40. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 375-76.
41. See also S. I. Benn, A Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 199.
42. For graphic portrayals of this phenomenon, based partly on Freudian sources, see Samuel J. Warner, Self-Realization and Self-Defeat (New York: Grove Press, 1966).
43. See William James, Principles of Psychology (New York: Dover Publications, 1950), vol. 1, p. 309.
44. See, e.g., U. S. Office of Technology Assessment (Washington, D.C., 1988), Mapping Our Genes: The Genome Projects: HowBig, HowFast?
45. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 11: "the Felicity of this life consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. . . . Felicity is a continuall progresse of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the later." 21 See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 304-6.
46. The problem I consider here is not the same as Joel Feinberg's "paradox of self-fulfillment" (Freedom and Fulfillment [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992], pp. 94-97), which bears on parents' assisting in their children's self-fulfillment, as against a person's own successive aspirations.
47. See John Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding II. 23. 2 ff
48. G. W. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding II. 23 (trans. P. Remnant and J. Bennett [Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1981], pp. 217-26).
49. For other modes of multiple selves, see Jon Elster, ed., The Multiple Self (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1986); and, for more extreme (including schizoid) divisions, R. D. Laing, The Divided Self (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965).
50. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1.4.
51. See Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992). On the relevance to Nietzsche, see Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), chap. 6: "How One Becomes What One Is" (pp. 170-99).
52. For Charles Taylor's attempt to solve this problem, see The Ethics of Authenticity, chaps. 4-5. I think his attempt, though suggestive, is unsuccessful in its final leap to moral egalitarianism.
53. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 499.
54. See Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), chap. 10;
55. Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), chaps. 11-13
56. Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 37
57. James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 127, 128, 133.
58. See Alan Gewirth, The Community of Rights (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 91-96.
59. For good recent discussions of particularist and personalist conceptions of morality, see Lawrence A. Blum, Friendship, Altruism, and Morality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980)
60. Robert B. Louden, Morality and Moral Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
61. Republic, iv. 444.
62. Leviathan, chap. 15, paras. 4 ff.
63. Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Selby-Bigge, sec. 9, part 2 (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1962), pp. 283, 284.
64. A Theory of Justice, chaps. 2, 3.
65. For agood recent discussion of this point, see L. W. Sumner, "Two Theories of the Good," Social Philosophy and Policy 9, no. 2 (summer 1992): 1-14.
66. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 426.
67. Plato, Sophist, 247.
68. William James, "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life," in James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Dover 1956), p. 195.
69. John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948), p. 176.
70. James, Will to Believe, p. 209.
71. Dewey, Reconstruction, pp. 177, 184.
72. Aristotle, Politics, 4.1.
73. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 10. 5-9.
74. Politics, books 4 and 6.
75. This point is not the same as the one criticized by John Broome, "A Cause of Preference Is Not an Object of Preference," Social Choice and Welfare 10 (1993): 57-68. Among the differences are: (a) Broome proceeds entirely in terms of "preferences," whereas my "best" is more objective; (b) I view reason not as causing preferences but as providing grounds for ranking capacities with regard to value.
76. For good recent discussions, see James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chaps. 5-7
77. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chap. 13
78. John Broome, Weighing Goods (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991);
79. Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), chaps. 7-10
80. S. L. Hurley, Natural Reasons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), chap. 13.
81. See Aristotle, Politics, 3. 9. 1281a3
82. Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Program," in Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), p. 530.
83. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 9. 8. 1169a1-3; 10. 7. 1177a1-3.
84. See William H. Gass, "The Case of the Obliging Stranger," Philosophical Review 66 (1957): 193ff.
85. J. R. Lucas, "Ethical Intuitionism II," Philosophy 46 (1971): 9-10
86. Renford Bambrough, "A Proof of the Objectivity ofMorals," American Journal of Jurisprudence 14 (1969): 37ff.
87. R. F. Holland, "Moral Skepticism," Aristotelian Supplementary Vol. 41 (1967): 185ff.
88. G. J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London:Methuen, 1971), pp. 122-25
89. Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 15-16. I have previously discussed this intuitionist position in Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 7-12.
90. For the attack on "human rights foundationalism," see Richard Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality," in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley, eds., On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York: Basic Books, 1993), pp. 116, 117.
91. See Douglas M. Kelley, 22 Cells in Nuremberg: A Psychiatrist Examines the Nazi Criminals (New York: Greenberg Publisher, 1947).
92. See also Maria Jahoda, Current Concepts of Positive Mental Health (New York: Basic Books, 1958), especially pp. 77-80.
93. Cf. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York:Viking Press, 1963).
94. See Susan Wolf, "Moral Saints," Journal of Philosophy 79 (August 1982): 419-39.
95. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, chap. 2 (Akad. ed., p. 429; trans. L. W. Beck [Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959], p. 47; emphasis added).
96. I have discussed this criterion in some detail in The Community of Rights (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 45-54.
97. This overridingness thesis has been contested, among others, by Philippa Foot, "Are Moral Considerations Overriding?," in her collection Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), and Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, chap. 10.
98. See The Community of Rights, chaps. 4-8.
99. See Charles A. McCoy and John Playford, Apolitical Politics: A Critique of Behavioralism (New York: Crowell, 1967);
100. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).
101. See The Community of Rights, chap. 4.
102. "Critique of the GothaProgram," in Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd ed., p. 530.
103. Karl Marx, Grundrisse, trans. M. Nicolaus (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1973), pp. 610-16;
104. "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," in Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 74.
105. See also Gregory Pence, "Towards a Theory of Work," Philosophical Forum 1, nos. 2-4 (1978-79): 307
106. Robert Blauner, Alienation and Freedom: The Factory Worker and His Industry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964);
107. Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).
108. See, e.g., Work in America: Report of a Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973), pp. 30ff., chaps. 2-3.
109. See also Studs Terkel, Working (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972).
110. Cf. Jon Elster, "Self-Realization in Work and Politics: The Marxist Conception of the Good Life," Social Philosophy and Policy 3, no. 2 (spring 1986): 110-15.
111. Dreiser, Sister Carrie, p. 113.
112. For possible mitigations of this judgment, see Richard Wasserstrom, "Is Adultery Immoral?," in Wasserstrom, ed., Today's Moral Problems, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 288-30.
113. For a valuable critique, see Jacob Joshua Ross, The Virtues of the Family (New York: Free Press, 1994), pp. 172-75.
114. Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. H. M. Parshley (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), p. 548.
115. See Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 22-26.
116. See also Michael Slote, Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), chap. 4
117. Owen Flanagan, "Admirable Immorality and Admirable Imperfection," Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 41-60.
118. See Rush Rhees, "Some Developments in Wittgenstein's View of Ethics," Philosophical Review 74 (January 1965): 22.
119. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, sec. 260 (trans. Walter Kaufmann [New York: Vintage Books, 1966], p. 205; emphases in original).
120. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 4. 3. 1123b30-35.
121. See Lawrence C. Becker, "Good Lives: Prolegomena," Social Philosophy and Policy 9, no. 2 (summer 1992): 15-37.
122. See John Kleinig, Valuing Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), esp. chap. 3.
123. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 3. 5.
124. Cf. the extensive emphasis on "control" of one's actions and "psychic energy" as an essential part of "optimal experience," in Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), chap. 1.
125. See also Samuel Z. Klausner, ed., The Quest for Self-Control (New York: Free Press, 1965).
126. See James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 54, 58, 70.
127. For older versions of this point, see Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Rinehart, 1941)
128. E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), chap. 8.
129. There is an etymological connection between autonomy and identity: auto in Greek is anea r synonym of idem in Latin.
130. Thus Spake Zarathustra, Fourth Part (in Walter Kaufmann, ed. and trans., The Portable Nietzsche [New York: Viking Press, 1960], p. 351).
131. On this , see also Alexander Nehamas, Nietzshe: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), chap. 6:"How One Becomes What One Is" (pp. 170-99).
132. See Carl C. Rogers, On Becoming A Person (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), pp. 108-11
133. A. H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, 2nd ed. (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1962), p. 141.
134. See especially Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crisis, and Childhood and Society, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963), chap. 7. For an ancient empirical parallel, see Aristotle, Rhetoric 2. 12-14.
135. Karen Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), p. 157.
136. See also Otto Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis (New York:W. W. Norton, 1945), pp. 18-22, 129-40.
137. Nicomachean Ethics, 2. 6. 1106b23, 1107a9.
138. Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 6.
139. On the transition from the "humanist" to the "anthropological" conception of culture, see George W. Stocking, Jr., "Matthew Arnold and the Uses of Invention," American Anthropologist 65, no. 4 (August 1963): 783-99.
140. See also Raymond Williams, Culture and Society 1780-1950 (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1959), pp. xiv-xv
141. Ralph Linton, The Cultural Basis of Personality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1947), pp. 19-25.
142. See, e.g., Bronislaw Malinowski, A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), chaps. 4, 8-10
143. Clyde Kluckhohn, "Universal Categories of Culture," in Anthropology Today, ed. A. L. Kroeber (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 516.
144. See Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 37-43
145. A. L. Kroeber, Anthropology: Culture Patterns and Processes (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1963), p. 120.
146. See James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York: Basic Books, 1991).
147. F. R. Leavis, Mass Civilization and Minority Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930), pp. 3-5 (quoted in Raymond Williams, Culture and Society 1780-1950, p. 271). For the wider diffusion of critical appreciation referred to below, see Williams, Culture and Society, p. 344.
148. Cf. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Creativity (New York: Harper Collins, 1996);
149. Howard Gardner, Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences (New York: Basic Books, 1993).
150. For part of this argument, see Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View (Ithaca, N.Y.:Cornell University Press, 1958), chap. 9.
151. See Marcus G. Singer, Generalization in Ethics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), pp. 311ff.
152. Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 5. 11. 1138a17-20.
153. See Leonard Nelson, System of Ethics, trans. N. Guterman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), pp. 134-35
154. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, Doctrine of Virtue (Akad ed., pp. 384-85 [trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 189]), although Kant uses the argument not against duties to oneself but against a duty to pursue one's own happiness.
155. Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 134-36; but see also p. 62.
156. For this objection, see Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 18
157. Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyalties," Journal of Philosophy 79 (April 1982): 186-87.
158. See Plato, Republic, 5. 462Aff.;
159. Rousseau, Emile, Book 5; Social Contract, Book 3, chap. 15. For a good discussion of this and related points, see Susan Moller Okin, Women and Western Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), chaps. 2, 8. See also the discussion of "amoral familism" in Edward G. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York: Free Press, 1958), chap. 5.
160. For extensive discussion of this issue, see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 9. 4-8.
161. Gregory Vlastos, Platonic Studies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 28.
162. For a critique of unconditional love from a feminist standpoint, see Sarah Lucia Hoagland, "Some Thoughts About Caring," in Claudia Card, ed., Feminist Ethics (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1991), pp. 257-59.
163. See Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. James Strachey (London:Hogarth Press, 1950), pp. 19-26. See also Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, pp. 120-21, 541-46.
164. For this objection, see Jon Elster, "Is There (or Should There Be) aRight to Work?," in Amy Gutmann, ed., Democracy and the Welfare State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 62, 74;
165. David Braybrooke, Meeting Needs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 48, 135.
166. See the discussion of the "particularist requirement" in A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 31ff.
167. I have discussed such requirements in Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 248-50.
168. See The Community of Rights, chaps. 4-7.
169. See Vernon Van Dyke, "The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory," in Human Rights and American Foreign Policy, ed. D. P. Kommers and G. D. Loescher (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), pp. 36-62
170. Jeremy Waldron, "Can Communal Goods be Human Rights?," in Waldron, Liberal Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 339-69
171. Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), chap 8.
172. See also Joseph Raz, "Right-Based Moralities," in Theories of Rights, ed. Jeremy Waldron (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 182-200
173. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995);
174. I. Shapiro and W. Kymlicka, eds., Nomos XXXIX: Ethnicity and Group Rights (New York: New York University Press, 1997).
175. The question of the reducibility of "group" rights to individual rights also reflects the debate over "methodological individualism": whether and in what way the facts about social wholes can be reduced to facts about their individual members. On this issue, see the essays collected in Modes of Individualism and Collectivism, ed. John O'Neill (London: Heinemann, 1973), parts 3 and 4.
176. I have discussed some of these issues in "Human Rights and Academic Freedom," in Morality, Responsibility, and the University: Studies in Academic Ethics, ed. Steven M. Cahn (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), pp. 8-31.
177. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 22, 23 (in Brownlie, ed., Basic Documents, p. 25).
178. Immanuel Kant, Doctrine of Virtue (part 2 of The Metaphysics of Morals), part 2, chap. 1, sec. 2, para. 38 [Akad. ed., p. 461]; trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 255.
179. Joel Feinberg, "The Nature and Value of Rights," reprinted in his Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 151.
180. David Hume, "Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature," in his Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary (Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Classics, 1985), pp. 80-86.
181. For an interesting discussion of some important variants in the relation between what I have called "empirical dignity" and the claiming of rights, see Michael J. Meyer, "Dignity, Rights, and Self-Control," Ethics 99 (April 1989): 520-34.
182. Reprinted in Brownlie, Basic Documents, p. 21.
183. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, sec. 2 (Akad ed., pp. 434-35), trans. L. W. Beck (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 53.
184. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 10.
185. Jacques Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, trans. D. Anson (New York:Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), p. 65.
186. Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 94, 93.
187. Doctrine of Virtue, part 1, book 1, chap. 2, para. 11 (Akad. ed., p. 434-35; Gregor ed., p. 230).
188. Two Treatises of Government, II, secs. 4, 6.
189. See Feinberg, Social Philosophy, p. 90.
190. See R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), pp. 80-89.
191. See Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 120-28.
192. For further replies to objections about the equal distribution of human rights, see Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 76-78;
193. also my essays, "On Rational Agency as the Basis of Moral Equality: Reply to Ben-Zeev," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1982): 667-72;
194. "Replies to My Critics," in Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism, ed. Edward Regis, Jr. (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 225-27;
195. "Why There Are Human Rights," Social Theory and Practice 11 (1985): 234-48.
196. For fuller discussion of this point, see Reason and Morality, pp. 31-42, 48-63.
197. See my essay "The 'Is-Ought' Problem Resolved," in Human Rights, pp. 100-127.
198. George Santayana, "Reason in Religion," in The Life of Reason, one-volume edition (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954), p. 181.
199. See also the insightful essay by Martha C. Nussbaum, "Transcending Humanity," in her book Love's Knowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), chap. 15.
200. See Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man (London: Nisbet and Co., 1941, 1943), vol. 1, pp. 2-4, 14-18; vol. 2, pp. 3-6.
201. See Charles Hartshorne, "Transcendence and Immanence," in Mircea Eliade, ed., Encyclopedia of Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1987), vol. 15, pp. 16-21.
202. Cf. Spinoza, Ethics, 3, Prop. 6: "Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being" (trans. Edwin Curley, The Collected Works of Spinoza [Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1985], vol. 1, p. 498.)
203. See Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, pp. 3-6.
204. See the judicious discussion of this issue in Philip L. Quinn, "Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 69, no. 2 (November 1995): 35-56.
205. Cf. Thomas Nagel, The Viewfrom Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 74-77.
206. See Philip Hallie, Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed (New York: Harper and Row, 1980);
207. Samuel P. Oliner, The Altruistic Personality: The Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe (New York: Free Press, 1988);
208. Lawrence A. Blum, "Moral Exemplars: Reflections on Schindler, the Trocmes, and Others," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13 (1988): 196-221.
209. Cf. Joel Feinberg, "Supererogation and Rules," in Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970)
210. J. O. Urmson, "Saints and Heroes," in A. I. Melden, ed., Essays in Moral Philosophy (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), pp. 198-216.
211. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 9. 8. 1169a18-27; also 3. 1. 1110a26-28; 4. 3. 1124b7-9.
212. See Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, Doctrine of Virtue, Introduction, secs. 4-8 (Akad. ed., 385-94; trans. Gregor, pp. 190-97).
213. See also David Heyd, Supererogation (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1982).
214. See above, n. 33.
215. See Kristen R. Monroe, Michael C. Barton, and Ute Klingmann, "Altruism and the Theory of Rational Action: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe," Ethics 101 (October 1990):103-22
216. Kristen R. Monroe, The Heart of Altruism: Perceptions of a Common Humanity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
217. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1. 2. 1094a17-21.
218. See Charles W. Morris, Foundations of the Theory of Signs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), pp. 3-6.
219. Cf. the discussion of "modes of meaning" in relation to the meaning of life, in Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 574-79.
220. Nicomachean Ethics, 1. 5, 7.
221. See Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, trans. Justin O'Brien (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1955), esp. pp. 96-99
222. Richard Taylor, Good and Evil (London: Macmillan, 1970), chap. 18
223. Joel Feinberg, Freedom and Fulfillment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), chap. 13.
224. Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 13.
225. Cf. R. M. Hare, "Nothing Matters," in E. D. Klemke, ed., The Meaning of Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 241-47.
226. See Bruno Bettelheim, Surviving and Other Essays (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), pp. 53, 65, 69.
227. Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, Preface to the 1st ed., trans. Ben Fowkes (New York:Vintage Books, 1977), p. 92.
228. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 74, 104.
229. See Rex Martin, Rawls on Rights (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985), pp. 164-65
230. Derek L. Phillips, Toward a Just Social Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 359-60.
231. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 72, 74, 104, 312.
232. See Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, part 2, sec. 37.
233. See Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, pp. 56-58, 82
234. George Sher, Desert (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1987), chaps. 4, 6.
235. A Theory of Justice, p. 74.
236. See Roderick Chisholm, "Freedom and Action," in Keith Lehrer, ed., Freedom and Determinism (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 11-44
237. Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966);
238. Alan Donagan, Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), chaps. 9, 10.
239. For a representative sample of difficulties, see Irving Thalberg, "How Does Agent Causality Work?" in Myles Brand and Douglas Walton, eds., Action Theory (Dordrecht, Holland:D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1976), pp. 213-34.
240. Nicomachean Ethics, 8. 1. 1155a25.
241. For fuller discussion of this point, see Alan Gewirth, The Community of Rights (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 88-90.
242. See Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 150 ff., 161
243. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 204-9
244. Charles Taylor, "Atomism," in his Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), vol. 2, pp. 187-210.
245. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and Its Critics (New York: New York University Press, 1984), p. 5, emphasis added.
246. See, e.g., Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives (New York: Praeger, 1979), chap. 1: "Human Rights: A Western Construct with Limited Applicability," pp. 1 ff.;
247. A.J.M. Milne, Human Rights and Human Diversity (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1968), pp. 2-4.
248. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
249. See Paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1986);
250. John Kleinig, Valuing Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
251. Richard A. Shweder, Thinking Through Cultures (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 16.
252. I have developed this point more fully in "Is Cultural Pluralism Relevant to Moral Knowledge?," Social Philosophy and Policy 11, no. 1 (winter 1994): 22-43.
253. For this criticism, see above, n. 61.
254. See Vernon Van Dyke, "The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory," in Human Rights and American Foreign Policy, ed. D. P. Kommers and G. D. Loescher (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), pp. 36-62
255. Van Dyke, Human Rights, Ethnicity, and Discrimination (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985).
256. The locus classicus of this position is F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, 2nd ed. (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1927; first published 1876), pp. 160 ff. The position can also be found in Hegel and Marx.
257. See H.L.A. Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?," Philosophical Review 64 (1955):176-77, 182
258. Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 129
259. MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 65 ff. For the denial of the concept of rights in Roman law, see Henry Sumner Maine, Dissertations on Early Lawand Custom (London:John Murray, 1891), pp. 365-66, 390
260. Michel Villey, Leçons d'histoire de la philosophie du droit (Paris: Librairie Dalloz, 1957), chaps. 11, 14
261. W. W. Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Lawfrom Augustus to Justinian (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 58.
262. See F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 85 ff.
263. See Jeremy Bentham, A Critical Examination of the Declaration of Rights, in B. Parekh, ed., Bentham's Political Thought (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1973), pp. 261, 268 ff.;
264. Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in R. C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), p. 43
265. Tom Campbell, The Left and Rights (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), pp. 14-15, 22.
266. See Richard E. Flathman, The Practice of Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 183 ff.;
267. Joseph Raz, "Right-Based Moralities," in Jeremy Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 196-97.
268. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 12, 19. 136 ff.
269. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 75-83.
270. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 13, init.
271. This question is stressed by Douglas N. Husak, "Why There Are No Human Rights," Social Theory and Practice 10 (1984): 125-42.
272. I have replied to Husak in "Why There Are Human Rights," Social Theory and Practice 11 (1985): 235-48.
273. On the Principle of Proportionality, see Reason and Morality, pp. 121 ff.
274. See Reason and Morality, pp. 98-102. See also A.W.H. Adkins, Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece (London: Chatto and Windus, 1972), p. 104 and passim;
275. Brian Tierney, "Tuck on Rights: Some Medieval Problems," History of Political Thought 4 (1983): 429-41
276. Fred D. Miller, Jr., Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's "Politics" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
277. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 3. 1-5
278. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1, 2. qu. 6-17. See Alan Donagan, "Thomas Aquinas on Human Action," in Norman Kretzmann et al., eds., The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 642-54.
279. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, sec. 2, trans. L. W. Beck (Indianapolis, Ind.: Library of Liberal Arts, 1959), p. 46; Akad. ed., p. 428.
280. For afuller discussion of this point, see Reason and Morality, pp. 166-68.
281. Kant, Foundations, secs. 1, 2, pp. 17n., 38n.; Akad. ed., pp. 400n., 421n.
282. For fuller discussion of these points, see Reason and Morality, pp. 42-47, 158-61.
283. For fuller development of this point, see my essay, "Can Any Final Ends Be Rational?," Ethics 102 (October 1991): 66-95.
284. Hume, Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, app. 1 (ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962]), p. 293.
285. Kant, Foundations, secs. 1, 2, trans. Beck, pp. 12, 21, 24, 30, 45; Akad. ed., p. 396, 405, 408, 413, 427.
286. Hume, Treatise, 2.3.3; 3.1.1, pp. 413, 457 (emphases added).
287. Compare the doctrine of Descartes (Meditations, 4) that every judgment involves a volitional as well as an intellectual component.
288. Hume, Treatise, 2.3.3, p. 416.
289. See the section "Motivation and Rationality" in Reason and Morality, pp. 190-98.