Shareholder Protection in the USA and Germany - "law and Finance" Revisited

German Law Journal

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 257-278

  Braendle, Udo C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84890656555     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20718322     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S207183220000465X     Document Type: Article

References (61)

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4. M. Siems, Legal Origins: Law & Finance v. Comparative Law?, (Duesseldorf Center for Bus. & Corp. L. Res. Paper Series No. 0023, 2006) [hereinafter Legal Origins: Law & Finance v. Comparative Law?].
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7. Law and Finance, supra note 3;
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13. D. Vagts, Comparative Company Law - The New Wave, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR JEAN NICOLAS DRUEY 596 (R. Schweizer, H. Burkert, & U. Gasser eds., 2002)
14. The sample consists of 18 Common Law countries, 21 French Civil Law, 6 German Civil Law and 4 Scandinavian Civil Law countries.
15. The 357 citations in the Social Science Citation Index through May 2005 highlight the impact of this article (compared to only 23 citations of Jean Tirole's "Corporate Governance" article in Econometrica since 2001 and 58 citations of Hart and Moore's "Foundation of Incomplete Contracts" since 1999).
16. Law and Finance, supra note 3, at 1127.
17. Law and Finance, supra note 3, at 1122.
18. Law and Finance, supra note 2, at 1140.
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22. J. Wurgler, Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital (Yale Int'l Center for Fin., Working Paper No. 99-08, 1999)
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27. J. Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law in the Separation of Ownership and Control (Center for L. & Econ. Stud., Columbia L. Sch., Working Paper No. 182, 2001).
28. Pistor, supra note 3.
29. Legal Origins: Law & Finance v. Comparative Law?, supra note 4.
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31. Law and Finance, supra note 2, at 1122.
32. Aktiengesetz 1965 [AktG] [Company Law], § 12, para. 1 AktG [hereinafter AktG].
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34. A. Shleifer & R. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461 (1986)
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36. What shareholder democracy? Europe's unfair voting rights, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 23, 2005.
37. Law and Finance, supra note 2, at 1127.
38. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 14a-8 (i) 1-13, for download at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/reg14a.pdf.
39. AktG, supra note 35, at § 135 para. 7.
40. AktG, supra note 35, at § 135 para. 4.
41. AktG, supra note 35, at § 135 para. 5.
42. H. SCHMIDT & J. DRUKARCZYK, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN GERMANY 24 (1997).
43. MUELLER, supra note 5, at 130.
44. Law and Finance, supra note 2, at 1122.
45. REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.05(d) (1984) [hereinafter RMBCA].
46. AktG, supra note 35, at § 123 para. 3.
47. J. PICHLER & E. WENINGER, AKTIENRECHT IN DER MANAGERPRAXIS 1 (2002).
48. Law and Finance, supra note 2, at 1122.
49. H. MERKT, US-AMERIKANISCHES GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 294 (1991). According to § 7.28 RMBCA it is up to the corporation to allow for cumulative voting in their articles or prohibit it specifically.
50. AktG, supra note 35, at § 101 para. 1, § 84 para. 1.
51. AktG, supra note 35, at § 101 para. 2.
52. Braendle & Noll, supra note 1.
53. U.C. Braendle, T. Gasser, & J. Noll, Corporate Governance in China - Is Economic Growth Potential Hindered by guanxi?, 110:4 BUS. & SOC'Y REV. 389 (2005).
54. Law and Finance, supra note 2, at 1122.
55. M. BECKER, VERWALTUNGSKONTROLLE DURCH GESELLSCHAFTERRECHTE: EINE VERGLEICHENDE STUDIE NACH DEUTSCHEM VERBANDSRECHT UND DEM AMERIKANISCHEN RECHT DER CORPORATION 113 (1997).
56. S. ELSING & M. VAN ALSTINE, US-AMERIKANISCHES HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 245 (1999).
57. Law and Finance, supra note 2, at 1123.
58. AktG, supra note 35, at § 122 para. 1.
59. BUNGERT, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT IN DEN USA 19 (1994).
60. What Does not Work in Comparing Securities Laws: A Critique on La Porta et al.'s Methodology, supra note 25.
61. Cools, supra note 23.