Why corrupt governments may receive more foreign aid

Oxford Economic Papers

Volumn 66, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 51-66

  de la Croix, David ^a   Delavallade, Clara ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN   (South Africa)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AID FLOW; CORRUPTION; INTERNATIONAL AID;

EID: 84890375986     PISSN: 00307653     EISSN: 14643812     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpt004     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. Acemoglu, D. and Verdier, T. (2000) The choice between market failures and corruption, American Economic Review, 90, 194-211
2. Alesina, A. and Dollar, D. (2000) Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? Journal of Economic Growth, 5, 33-63
3. Alesina, A. and Weder, B. (2002) Do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid? American Economic Review, 92, 1126-37
4. Baltagi, B.H. and Wu, P.X. (1999) Unequally spaced panel data regressions with ar(1) disturbances, Econometric Theory, 15, 814-23
5. Berthelemy, J.-C. and Tichit, A. (2004) Bilateral donors' aid allocation decisions-a three-dimensional panel analysis, International Review of Economics & Finance, 13, 253-74
6. Burnside, C. and Dollar, D. (2000) Aid, policies, and growth, American Economic Review, 90, 847-68
7. Clist, P. (2011) 25 years of aid allocation practice: whither selectivity? World Development, 39, 1724-34
8. de la Croix, D. and Delavallade, C. (2009) Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions, Economics of Governance, 10, 187-219
9. de la Croix, D. and Delavallade, C. (2011) Democracy, rule of law, corruption incentives and growth, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 13, 155-187
10. Dollar, D. and Levin, V. (2006) The increasing selectivity of foreign aid, 1984-2003, World Development, 34, 2034-46
11. Easterly, W. (2007) Are aid agencies improving? Economic Policy, 22, 633-78
12. Ehrlich, I. and Lui, F.T. (1999) Bureaucratic corruption and endogenous economic growth, Journal of Political Economy, 107, S270-29
13. Hall, R.E. and Jones, C.I. (1999) Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 83-116
14. Isaksson, A. (2007) World productivity database: a technical description, RST Staff Working Paper 10/2007, UNIDO, Vienna
15. Knack, S. (2001) Aid dependence and the quality of governance: cross-country empirical tests, Southern Economic Journal, 68, 310-29
16. Mauro, P. (1997) The effects of corruption on growth, investment and government expenditure, in K. Elliot (ed.) Corruption and the Global Economy, The Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, 83-108
17. Meernik, J., Krueger, E., and Poe, S. (1998) Testing models of US foreign policy: foreign aid during and after the Cold War, The Journal of Politics, 60, 63-85
18. Nunnenkamp, P. and Thiele, R. (2006) Targeting aid to the needy and deserving: nothing but promises? The World Economy, 29, 1177-201
19. Oehlert, G.W. (1992) A note on the delta method, The American Statistician, 46, 27-29
20. Rodrik, D. (2000) What drives public employment in developing countries? Review of Development Economics, 4, 229-43
21. Staiger, D. and Stock, J.H. (1997) Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments, Econometrica, 65, 557-86
22. Svensson, J. (2000) Foreign aid and rent-seeking, Journal of International Economics, 51, 437-461
23. Tavares, J. (2003) Does foreign aid corrupt? Economics Letters, 79, 99-106