Regulatory chill and the threat of arbitration: A view from political science

Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 606-628

  Tienhaara, Kyla ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84890310369     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139043809.034     Document Type: Chapter

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