A new argument for vegetarianism

Journal of Social Philosophy

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 153-172

  Curnutt, Jordan ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84887930316     PISSN: 00472786     EISSN: 14679833     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9833.1997.tb00393.x     Document Type: Article

References (48)

1. There is another defense of vegetarianism based on the value of ecosystems, for example Peter Wenz' "An Ecological Argument for Vegetarianism," Ethics and Animals 5 (1984): 2-9.
2. This approach is rare even though the ecologically destructive effects of raising cattle and sheep have been frequently noted in the scientific literature and are not uncommon in philosophical discussions of the environment. Such ecological arguments (as Wenz acknowledges, p. 2) depend on accepting that an ecosystem itself has a moral status. Here I assume the view is mistaken, so we need not consider the argument. The best cases for the moral value of ecosystems can be found in J. Baird Callicott, In Defense of the Land Ethic, State University of New York Press, 1989
3. and Holmes Rolston, Environmental Ethics, Temple University Press, 1989. However, both Callicott and Rolston reject vegetarianism.
4. In many works, but most notably Animal Liberation, Avon, 1st ed., 1975,2nd ed., 1990; and Practica/ Ethics, Cambridge, 1st ed., 1979,2nd ed., 1993.
5. For example, Animal Liberation, chap. 3.
6. See also Animal Factories, Harmony Books, rev. ed., 1990, coauthored with Jim Mason.
7. 4 Rights, Killing, and Suffering, Basil Blackwell, 1983.
8. "Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism," International Journal of Applied Philosophy 4 (1988): 41-49.
9. See, for example, Stephen Clark's The Moral Status of Animals, Clarendon, 1977.
10. About 120 million cows, pigs, and sheep and about 5.5 billion birds (mostly chickens) are killed annually in this country alone (Jim Mason and Peter Singer, Animal Factories: 96). Global figures are unknown. There are about 10 million vegetarians in the U.S., which leaves more than 230 million animal-eaters.
11. Principally in a series of papers beginning with "The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1975): 181-214
12. and culminating in The Case for Animal Rights, University of California Press, 1983.
13. For example: Joel Feinberg, "The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations" Philosophy & Environmental Crisis, William T. Blackstone, ed., University of Georgia, 1974: 43-68
14. and "Human Duties and Animal Rights," On the Fifth Day, R. Morris and M. Fox, eds., Acropolis Books, 1978: 45-69;
15. James Rachels, "Do Animals Have A Right to Liberty?" Animai Rights and Human Obligations, T. Regan and R Singer, eds., Prentice Hall, 1976: 205-223;
16. Stephen R.L. Clark, "The Rights of Wild Things," Inquiry 22 (1979): 171-78;
17. Robert Elliot, "Moral Autonomy, Self-Determination and Animal Rights," 77k Monist 70 (1987): 83-97;
18. Bernard Rollin, Animal Rights and Human Morality, Prometheus Books, rev. ed., 1990.
19. For example: H.J. McCloskey, "Rights," Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1965): 113-27;
20. "Moral Rights and Animals," Inquiry 22 (1979): 23-54;
21. John Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature, Scribner's, 1974;
22. Jan Narveson, "Animal Rights," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1977): 161-78;
23. and "Animal Rights Revisited," Ethics and Animals, H. Miller and W. Williams, eds., Humana Press, 1983;
24. Richard A. Watson, "Self-Consciousness and the Rights of Nonhuman Animals," Environmental Ethics 1 (1979): 99-129;
25. Philip Montague, "Two Concepts of Rights," Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (1980): 372-84;
26. L.W. Sumner, 77k Moral Foundations of Rights, Oxford, 1987;
27. Tibor Machan, "Do Animals Have Rights?" Public Affairs Quarterly 5 (1991): 163-73.
28. For example: Paul Taylor, "Inherent Value and Moral Rights," and Jan Narveson, "On a Case for Animal Rights," both in 77k Monist 70 (1987): 15-49;
29. David Ost, "The Case Against Animal Rights," The Sottthern Journal of Philosophy 24 (1986): 365-73;
30. Mary Anne Warren, "Difficulties with the Strong Animal Rights Position," Between the Species 2 (1987) : 163-73;
31. and J. Baird Callicott, "Review of Tom Regan, The Case For Animal Rights " repr. in In Defense of the hand Ethic, State University of New York Press, 1989: 39-47. "Harm to Others, Oxford University Press, 1984: 33.
32. 19 Interests and Rights, Clarendon, 1980:72. Actually, Frey holds that desiring x requires that "I believe that I am deficient in respect of" x. This is too strong. I have amended the belief statement to a weaker claim, leaving it open what exactly A believes about x.
33. In his "Introduction" to The Ways of Desire, Precedent Publishing, 1986, editor Joel Marks comments (p. 13) that although the relationship between desire and belief "has long been sensed.it has seldom been the subject of scrutiny in its own right."
34. For example, Robert Stalnaker, Inquiry, MIT Press, 1984:15.
35. For example, Dennis Stampe, "Defining Desire," The Ways of Desire: 149-73. Stampe's definition makes no mention of beliefs or a linguistic requirement.
36. "Death, Misfortune, and Species Inequality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1980): 57-58. The concept of a "categorical desire" is adopted from Bernard Williams. I am taking "misfortune" and "harm" as synonymous, though Cigman herself never equates the two.
37. 27 The Animals Issue, Cambridge University Press, 1992. He agrees that at least all mammals have desires (chaps. 3 and 6); animals also have sensations, including pain, but these too are nonconscious (pp. 187-89). Since NEW does not depend on the imposition of pain, I will not discuss this aspect of Carruthers' view.
38. The problem is mentioned in his "Brute Experience," Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989): 269, but only in regard to the pain experiences of babies. NEW is not concerned with pain.
39. For a series of forceful criticisms, see Peter Wenz, "Contracts, Animals, and Ecosystems," Social Theory and Practice 19 (1993): 317-25.
40. See Tom Regan in "The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism" (repr. in All That Dwell Therein, University of California Press, 1982: 24). He says that the consumer of animal flesh is "causally implicated" in the continuance of a morally impermissible activity. As far as I know, he has not taken up this issue in any of his subsequent work on vegetarianism.
41. "Collective Responsibility and Moral Vegetarianism," Journal of Social Philosophy 24 (1993): 94.
42. A point forcefully made by means of a macabre device in the classic short story by Shirley Jackson, "The Lottery."
43. As reported by R.M. Hare in Freedom and Reason, Clarendon Press, 1963:161.
44. "So Animal a Human., or the Moral Relevance of Being An Omnivore," Journal of Agricultural Ethics 3 (1990): 172-86. Her list (pp. 175-78) includes children, pregnant and lactating women, the elderly, the poor, and the "undereducated."
45. "Who Can be Morally Obligated to be a Vegetarian?" Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 5 (1992): 189-215.
46. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 7 (1994).
47. "Unnecessary Pain, Nutrition, and Vegetarianism," Between the Species 7 (1991): 18,19.
48. In 1991, U.S. farmers produced about 154 billion pounds of milk and dairy products, but only 135.6 billion pounds were consumed. In the same year, hens laid almost 5800 million dozen eggs; 4900 million dozen were consumed and 862 million dozen were either exported or used for hatching. This still leaves a surplus of about 456 million eggs. See Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1993, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Washington DC, 1993:142,675-76.