Oppression, moral abandonment, and the role of protest

Journal of Social Philosophy

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 156-171

  Harvey, J ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84887326146     PISSN: 00472786     EISSN: 14679833     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9833.1996.tb00232.x     Document Type: Article

References (5)

1. Cited in Hannah Arendt, "The Deputy: Guilt by Silence?,", in Amor Mundi, ed. James W. Bernauer (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 53.
2. Cheshire Calhoun, "Responsibility and Reproach," Ethics, Vol. 99, no. 2, Jan. 1989 (389-406).
3. Thomas E. Hill, "Symbolic Protest and Calculated Silence," from his Autonomy and Self-Respect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 56.
4. Bernard R. Boxill, "Self-Respect and Protest," Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 6, no. 4, Fall 1976 (58-69), p. 69.
5. Since writing this, I have read Laurence Thomas's excellent paper, "Moral Deference," The Philosophical Forum, Vol. 24, no. 1-3, Fall-Spring 1992-93 (233-50). Moral deference is "a mode of moral learning which those who have been oppressed are owed in the name of eliminating the very state of their oppression. In the absence of such learning, oppression cannot but continue to be a part of the fabric of moral life," (p.247). His argument for the crucial role of moral deference in ethical investigation is akin to the point made at the end of this paper-that work in mainline ethics still largely ignores the perspective of the victims, especially those without appropriate power (the oppressed), and that this is hindering work in ethics.