Under high stakes and uncertainty the rich should lend the poor a helping hand

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 341, Issue , 2014, Pages 123-130

  Abou Chakra, Maria ^a   Traulsen, Arne ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Evolutionary dynamics; Evolutionary game theory; Heterogeneity; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; GAME THEORY; HETEROGENEITY; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS; UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS;

ARTICLE; COOPERATION; DECISION MAKING; GAME; HUMAN; INVESTMENT; POOR; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RICH; RISK; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL STATUS; UNCERTAINTY;

EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS; EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY; HETEROGENEITY; PUBLIC GOODS;

ALTRUISM; BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; DECISION MAKING; GAME THEORY; HELPING BEHAVIOR; HUMANS; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; POVERTY; RISK ASSESSMENT; SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS; UNCERTAINTY;

EID: 84887001306     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.10.004     Document Type: Article

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