Investment coordination in network industries: The case of electricity grid and electricity generation

Journal of Regulatory Economics

Volumn 44, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 287-307

  Höffler, Felix ^a,b   Wambach, Achim ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE GOODS   (Germany)

Author keywords

Capacity markets; Commitment; Regulation; Transmission system investment

Indexed keywords

EID: 84886718662     PISSN: 0922680X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-013-9227-6     Document Type: Article

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