A Common Framework for Thinking about Currency Crises

Handbook of Exchange Rates

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 698-716

  Flood, Robert ^a   Marion, Nancy ^b   Yepez Albornoz, Juan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   (United States)

^b DARTMOUTH COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Attack conditional monetary policy; Currency crises, a common framework for thinking; Devaluation, sterilization and interest rate defense; FX markets and policy; The KFG model

Indexed keywords

EID: 84886334997     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1002/9781118445785.ch25     Document Type: Chapter

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