A new mechanism for the free-rider problem

Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM 2005 3rd Workshop on the Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, P2PECON 2005

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 122-127

  Sanghavi, Sujay ^a   Hajek, Bruce ^a  

^a University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign   (United States)

Author keywords

Algorithms; Economics; G.1.6 Optimization Mechansim Design; Non cooperative Games; Theory

Indexed keywords

COMMUNICATION CONSTRAINTS; COST OF PRODUCTIONS; FREE-RIDER PROBLEM; HETEROGENEOUS USERS; LIMITED COMMUNICATION; NASH EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOME; NONCOOPERATIVE GAME; THEORY;

ALGORITHMS; ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

COMMUNICATION;

EID: 84885722927     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1080192.1080200     Document Type: Conference Paper

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