Third party liability of international organizations

Journal of International Peacekeeping

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 33-51

  Schmalenbach, Kirsten ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GRAZ   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84885612998     PISSN: 18754104     EISSN: 18754112     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/187541106X00034     Document Type: Review

References (118)

1. See M. Hirsch, The Responsibility of International Organizations towards Third Parties, 1995; P. Klein, La responsabilité des organizations internationales (1998);
2. K. Ginther, Die volkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit internationaler Organizationen ( 1969);
3. M.H. Arsanjani, Claims Against International Organizations, 7 YJWPO 131 (1981);
4. A. Di Blase, Sulla Responsabilita' Intemazionale perAttivita' Dell'ONU, 1974 RDI 250;
5. C. Eagleton, International Organization and the Law of Responsibility, 76 RdC 323 (1950);
6. W. Meng, Internationale Organizationen im volkerrechtlichen Deliktsrecht, 45 ZaoRV 325 (1985);
7. P. de Visscher, Observations sur le Fondement et la Mise en Oeuvre du Principe de la Responsabilit6 de l'Organization des Nations Unies, 1963 RDIC 165;
8. Th. Giegerich, Verantwortlichkeit und Haftung fur Akte internationaler und supranationaler Organizationen, 104 ZVgIRWiss 163 (2005).
9. At its 54th session (8 May 2002), the ILC decided to appoint Giorgio Gaja as Special Rapporteur for the topic "Responsibility of international organizations" and established a Working Group, Report of the ILC, UN Doc A/57/10, para. 461-462.
10. See UN Doc A/CN.4/L.666/Rev1.
11. UN-Doc A/CN.4/L.654; for commentary to this article see GAOR 58th session (A/58/10), pp. 45-49.
12. See M. Bothe, Streitkrafte internationaler Organisationen (1968), p.37 et seq.
13. Whereas the status of the troops in Korea as UN organs is arguable [see F. Seyersted, United Nations Forces. Some Legal Problems, 37 BYIL 351 (1961) at 431], nowadays the UN explicitly designates its troops as organs of the United Nations; see for example Art.
14. of the agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Cyprus concerning the status of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, 31 March 1964, 492 UNTS 58: "The Force as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations .".
15. E.g. the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) of the OAS, etablished on May 6, 1965 in the course of the Dominican Republic crises. The IAPF was not formally characterized as an OAS organ, as illustrated by the "Act establishing the Inter-American Armed Force", UN Doc A/6381 Annex, SCOR 20th Meeting Suppl. April-June, p. 178.
16. Nevertheless, the members of the IAPF wore the OAS symbol and officially operated under the name "Force of the Organization of American States", UN-Doc A/6381 Annex p. 178.
17. For the general policy of the UN see the Third-Party Liability Report of the Secretary-General, 20 September 1996, UN Doc A/51/389, para. 17-19.
18. For details see K. Schmalenbach, Haftung Internationaler Organisationen, 2004, pp. 524-534 (OAS) and pp. 551-556 (IFOR/SFOR).
19. See e.g. Art.
20. of the agreement between Canada and the United Nations concerning the settlement of claims against members of the Canadian UNFICYP Contingent, 723 UNTS418: "Nothing in this supplementary agreement is intended to imply in any way
21. A.E. Weil (OLA), Letter to O. Hagerbrant, Proposed Claims against Governments, 12 October 1979, UN Achives N.Y., File James M. Simpson, 1979-1980, Box 10.
22. M. Kelly, Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operations (1999), p. 36.
23. Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Department of Defence and (.) concerning UNITAF (unpublished);
24. see also the unpublished letter dated 25 June 1998 of the Director of the Field Administration and Logistics Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operation of the United Nations, partially reprinted in: Report of the ILC of its 56th Session, GAOR 59th Session Suppl. No. 10 (A/59/10), p. 102 para. 5.
25. When military command and control is at issue, one has to keep in mind that the relevant terminology used by States, NATO or UN is far from uniform
26. see K. Schmalenbach supra note 9, pp. 481-487.
27. In the case of UNOSOM II, the official documents speak of "operational control" performed by the UN (see Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/25354, 3 March 1993, para.81 and 85) due to the US military terminology.
28. Anyhow, the analyses of the military powers exercised by the UN over the UNOSOM II contingents and the statements of the Secretary-General show that the term "operational control" was understood as "operational command", see B. Boutros-Ghali, United Nations and Somalia, Introduction (1996), at 43.
29. Report of the Secretary General, GA 51st Session (A/51/389), para.17 and 19.
30. E.g. Art.38 UNEF Status of Force Agreement: "(b) Any claim made by (.) an Egyptian citizen in respect of any damages alleged to result from an act or omission of a member of the Force relating to his official duties. (.) shall be settled by a Claim Commission established for that purpose." 260 UNTS 61.
31. O. Schachter (General Legal Division, UN Secretariat), Written reply to S. Landau, Claims arising out of common assault by ONUC serviceman, 20 March 1963
32. UN Archives N.Y., File Vickers, OLA, Personal injury and property loss and damage claims against the UN-1963, Box 106.
33. Schachter, supra note 18, p. 2.
34. E.g. the IAPF Claims Regulation did not differ between private acts and official acts; all private acts other than so called "bastardy claims" have been regulated by the OAS, Regulation No. 25-1 of 25 March 166, Sec. 111 (Claims not cognizable), Headquarters United Command Inter-American Peace Force Dominican Republic (unpublished).
35. D. Ho (UN Legal Officer), Interoffice Memorandum to B. Sloan (Director, General Legal Division) of 1 March 1971
36. E. Rosengron (Acting Commander UNEF), Memorandum of 8 October 1957, Report on fatal shooting incident in Gaza, 16 March 1957, Legal Implications, File No. S-0530-0102 (Legal), Box DAG-13/3. I 1.0.0.-102.
37. C.A. Stavropoulos (Legal Counsel); B.R. Turner (Controller), Memorandum to Secretary-General U Thant of 10 December 1964, "Settlement of outstanding United Nations and Belgian claims arising out of the Congo operation", S.
38. Ziff. 8, UN Archives N.Y, File Scott, OLA, Financing Peace-keeping Operations, ONUC, Box 25.
39. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.654, p. 8.
40. See ICJ, Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion of 29 April 1999, para. 60.
41. Art. 12 (a): "Members of the Force shall not be subject to the civil jurisdiction of Egyptian courts or to other legal process in any matter relating to their official duties." 260 UNTS 61I.
42. GA 45th Session, Agenda Idem 76, UN Doc A/45/594 of 9 October 1990.
43. See Art.6 Model status-of-force agreement: ". The United Nations peace-keeping operation and its members shall respect all local laws and regulations.", UN Doc A/45/594, p. 3.
44. See Art. 24-28, 46 Model status-of-force agreement, UN Doc A/45/594, p.8 er seq.
45. See e.g. Art.38
46. UNEF I status-of-force agreement, 260 UNTS 61; Art.10
47. ONUC status-of-force agreement. UN Doc ST/SGB/ONUC/1, 15 July 1963; Art.38
48. UNFICYP status-of-force agreement. 492 UNTS 58; status-of-force agreements reprinted in: R.C.R. Siekmann, Basic Documents of United Nations and Related Peace-keeping Forces, 1989.
49. Therefore, Art.51 Model status-of-force agreement (UN Doc A/45/594, p. 13) does not reflect legal reality;
50. see the critical report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, 14 October 1996, UN Doc. A/51/491 para. 9; for the justification of the provision see Report of the Secretary-General, 21 March 1997, UN Doc A/51/309, para.8 and 10.
51. Liability Report of the Secretary-General, 20 September 1996, UN Doc A/51/389, para 22.
52. see also J.M. Prescott, Claims, in Fleck, The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces, 2001, p. 171.
53. W.W. Cox (UN Legal Adviser), Letter to Captain Khamis El Shafay (Legal Officer, Egyptian Liaison Staff Headquarters, GAZA), dated 24 August 1957, UN Archives N.Y., File No. S-0530-0102, (Legal), Box DAG-13/3.11.0.0.-102.
54. For details see Schmalenbach supra note 9, p. 242 et seq.
55. Legal basis of IFOR/SFOR claims regulation is implemented in the Dayton Agreement Annex AI, Appendix B para. 15, 35 ILM [1996] 89; for details see M. Prescott, Operations Claims in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, The Army Lawyer 1998, p. 1.
56. The KFOR claims regulation practice is described in M.S. Johnson, Headquarters KFOR in Fleck, The Handbood of the law of Visiting Forces, 2001, pp. 339, 345.
57. The US claims regulation based on the Foreign Claims Act, I U.S.C. § 2734 [1994].
58. Schmalenbach supra note 9, p. 558
59. IFOR/SFOR and Bosnia-Heaigovina have agreed on the establishment of an Arbitration Tribunal as a second and final instance in the framwork of a technical agreement (claims annex) of 23 December 1995 (unpublished), partial reprinited in Schmalenbach supra note 9, pp. 557, 559 et seq.
60. See Art.51 Model status-of-force agreement, UN Doc A/45/594.
61. Generally speaking, the claimant is obliged to sign a "release of claim form" in order to receive the UN payments, see UN-Doc. A/51/389, Report of the Secretary-General, 20 September 1996, para. 23;
62. UNEF-Claims Review Board, File No. AD 442/A-5-476/2007, 10. Juni 1966
63. UN Archives N.Y., File Cuenca, Vehicle Accidents 1964-1966, Box 4. By signing the waiver, a compromise agreement was reached between the UN and the injured party, see Schmalenbach, supra note 9, p. 240.
64. For the competence of the Secretary-General to make provisions for the settlement of claims arising with respect to peacekeeping forces see Art.15
65. UNEF status-of-force agreement, 271 UNTS 168;
66. see also the statement of Secretary-General U Thant, UN Doc S/6597, SCOR 20th year Suppl. July-Sept 1965, p. 158; for the aim of the Secretary-General to create inalienable rights based on legally binding liability law see the statement of Secretary-General U Thant, ibid. p. 157.
67. For the terminology see C.S. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations, 1996, p. 194.
68. Generally speaking, the internal correspondence and statements of the UN departments and bodies do not reveal the legal sources used when creating the UN liability rules.
69. UN Doc A/3943, Summary Study of the experience derived from the establishment and operation of the Force: Report of the Secretary-General, GAOR 13th Sess, Annexes, Agenda item 65, para. 141 (UNEF n);
70. for UNEF I see UNEF-Claims Review Board, Death Claims: Accidental Shootings involving Egyptian and Palestinian Fatalities, UN Archives N.Y., File Sloan, Traffic Accidents, Fatal Injuries, Property Damages, Box 66.
71. See W. Downey, The Law of War and Military Necessity, 47 AJIL 256 (1953)
72. N.C.H. Dunbar, Military Necessity in War Crime Trials, 29 BYIL 443 (1952).
73. For UNFICYO and UNIFIL see G. d'Angelo (OLA), Memorandum to J.M. Simpson (Principal Legal Officer, General Legal Division) 4 December 1980, "UNFICYP Claims Review Board", UN Archives N.Y., File Simpson, OLA, 1973-1981, Box 10.
74. UNTS 418.
75. GA Res 52/247, 17 July 1998, GA 52nd Session, Agenda idem 142 (a), para. 6.
76. For OAS see J.H. Rouse, Assistant Chief U.S. Army Claims Service, Paper presented to the Inter-American Bar Association, meeting at San Jose 9-15 April 1967, p. 10 (unpublished). For NATO
77. J.P. Prescott, Operational Claims in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, 1998 The Army Lawyer 7.
78. UN-Doc. A/3943, Summary Study of the experience derived from the establishment and operation of the Force: Report of the Secretary-General, GAOR 13th Sess, Annexes, para. 134; see also Report of the Secretary-General, 20 September 1996, GA 51st Session, UN Doc A/51/389 para. 12.
79. For details see Schmalenbach, supra note 9, p. 277 et seq.
80. L. Atack (Chief Logistic Officer UNEF) Memorandum to the Indian Batallion [AD 632 (2)(Logs)], 25 February 1966, UN Archives N.Y, File No. S-0530-0106, Box DAG-13/3.1l.O.O.-103;
81. see also W.W. Cox, Memorandum to R.B. Stedman (Chief Administrative Officer, UNEF), 15 October 1957, UN Archives N.Y, File No. S-0530-0107 (Legal), Box DAG-13/3.11.0.0-107.
82. League of Nations, Archives Geneva, Commission du Gouvernement de la Sarre, Justice 1920-note 9, p. 128 et seq.
83. See the case of a UNTEA driver held responsible for an on-duty accident by the local Landschapsrechtbank (criminal court): M.A. Marin (UNTEA, Director of Social Affairs and Justice), Memorandum to G.J. Janecek (Chief Administrative Officer), 6 February 1963, "Accident involving UNTEA vehicle, which occurred on 20 October 1962", UN Archives N.Y., File No. S-0491-0021
84. UN Temp. Executive Authority in West Irian (UNTEA) 1962-1969, Box 13/2.1.0.1-18. In contrast to UNTEA officials, members of the UNSF enjoyed full immunity before local courts, see Art.7 lit. e status-of-force agreement, 503 UNTS 32.
85. But see § 7 UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/47: "Third party claims for property loss or damage and for personal injury, illness or death arising from or directly attributed to KFOR, UNMIK or their respective personnel and which do not arise from ,operational necessity' of either intemational presence, shall be settled by Claims Commissions established by KFOR and UNMIK, in the manner to be provided for."
86. See the critical analyses of M.A. Nowicki (Ombudsperson in Kosovo), Special Report No. 1, UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/47 on the Status and Privileges and Immunities of KFOR and UNMIK and Their Personnel on Kosovo, 26 April 2001, para. 68 (www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/).
87. UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24, § 3.
88. UNMIK News No. 98, 26 June 2001.
89. For UNTEA see GA Res. 1752 (XVII), 21 September 1962, GAOR 17th Sess Suppl, No. 17, p. 70, in conjunction with the agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia, 437 UNTS 273.
90. For UNTEA see Art. IX of agreement concluded between the Netherlands and Indonesia, 437 UNTS 273; for UNMIK see UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1, § 1.
91. See UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24, § 1.
92. League of Nations, Archives Geneva, Commission du Gouvemement de la Sarre, Justice 1920-1935, Box C 493 (cases of public and private liability).
93. For one of the rare significant UNTEA statements in this regard see L. J. Goedhart (Chief of the Netherlands Liaison Mission to UNTEA), Letter to Marin (UNTEA, Director of the Department of Justice) of 16 April 1963, UN Archives N.Y., File No. S-0491-0021
94. see Schmalenbach supra note 9 p. 440 et seq.
95. Whereas § 7 UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/47 does not codify the law applicable by the envisaged Standing Claims Commission, it mentions the "operations necessity rule".
96. UNTS 198 (Belgium); 564 UNTS 193 (Switzerland); 565 UNTS 3 (Greece); 585 UNTS 147 (Luxembourg); 588 UNTS 198 (Italy).
97. B. Vickers (Legal Officer), Draft Directive for the Guidance of the Proposed Claims Office in Leopoldville, 9 July 1962, UN Archives, N.Y. File Stavropoulos, OLA, Congo-Claims, Box 26.
98. See also UN document (internal) "Terms of Reference of the Legal claims Office at Elisabethville", UN Archives, N.Y., Akte Stavropoulos, OLA, Congo-Claims, Box 26.
99. But see the recommendation of the Secretary-General concerning the claims-settling in the course of future peace enforcement operation, Report of the Secretary-General, 20 September 1996, UN Doc A751/389 para. 34.
100. For the academic dispute see G.LAD. Draper, The Legal Limitations upon the Employment of Weapons by the United Nations Force in the Congo, 12 ICLQ 387 (1963);
101. F. Seyersted, United Nations Forces, 1966, p. 178 et seq.
102. C. Emanuelle, Les forces des Nations Unies et le droit international humanitaire, in The United Nations and International Humanitarian Law, Universite de Geneve (ed.), 1996, p. 345;
103. R.D. Glick, Lip service to the law of war, 17 MJIL 53 (1995).;
104. Ch. Greenwood, International humanitarian law and united nations military operations, 1 YIHL 3 (1998);
105. G.J. van Hegelsom, The law of armed conflict and united nations peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations, 6 HYIL 45 (1993);
106. D. Schindler, United Nations and International Humanitarian Law, in: Swinarski (ed.), Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en I'honneur de Jean Pictet, 1984, p 521 et seq;
107. D. Shraga, The united nations as an actor bound by international humanitarian law, 5 Peacekeeping 64 (1998).
108. See Art.43 ONUC regulations of 15 July 1963: "The Force shall observe the principles and spirit of the general international Conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel."
109. UN Doc ST/SGB/ONUC/1; see also Secretary-General's Bulletin, Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, 6 August 1999, UN-Doc. ST/SBG/1999/13, reprinted in: 38 ILM 1656 (1999).
110. In contrast to combatants, mercenaries and other persons involved in the hostilities against ONUC, see D.B.H. Vickers, Memorandum of 19 Juny 1962, "Protection of the Organization on Congo against outside claims", UN Archives N.Y., File Vickers, Mr. Teslenko's file on Congo Claims 1962-1967, Box 5.
111. See the global settlement agreement between the UN and Italy, 588 UNTS 198.
112. See Art. 14, 15 of the Lieber Code, reprinted in L Friedman, The Law of War Vol. 1, 1972, p.158.
113. Lorenzo (Claims Officer, ONUC), Written statement to O. Schachter (Director of the General Legal Division), 8 July 1963, "Claims arising out of death and injury", UN Archives N.Y., Akte Vickers, OLA, Personal injury and property loss on damage claims against the UN-1963, Box 106.
114. F.M. Lorenz, The U.S. Perspective of Operation Restore Hope, in R.B. Oakley/M.J. Dziedzic/E.M. Goldberg (ed.), Policing the New World Disorder, 1998, p. 433;
115. P. Rowe, Maintaining discipline in united nations peace support operations, 5 JCSL 54 (2000);
116. M.J. KellylT.LH. McCormack, Military Intervention in States Fragmented by Multicultural Conflict, 89 Foreign Policy 20 (1992/93).
117. GA Res 52/247, 17 July 1998, GA 52nd sess. Agenda item 142 (a), UN Doc A/RES/52/247.
118. For details see Schmalenbach, supra note, p. 496 et seq.