Edgework: Critical essays on knowledge and politics

Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages

  Brown, Wendy ^a  

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References (99)

1. Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 81.
2. Michel Foucault, "What Is Critique?" in The Political, ed. David Ingram (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 193.
3. Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), thesis 6, 255.
4. See, for example, "The Uproar over Nader" by Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair, in CounterPunch 11.3 (February 1-15, 2004): 1, 4; and Todd S. Purdum, "Reasons to Run? Nader Says He Has Plenty," New York Times, March 31, 2004, p. A1, with ensuing letters to the editor.
5. Temperate derives from the Latin temperare, itself deriving from tempus, meaning the proper time or season.
6. "Schopenhauer as Educator," in The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, vol. 2, Unfashionable Observations, trans. Richard T. Gray (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 193, 196.
7. The Latin cernere, to sift, derives from krinein, "criticism," which shares the Greek root kri-.
8. Reinhart Koselleck, Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 103 (with n. 15).
9. I am indebted to an unpublished dissertation chapter by Tim Walters for this and several other insights into critique's etymology. Walters in turn relies heavily upon the research of Reinhart Koselleck in Critique and Crisis, as do I.
10. Koselleck, Critique and Crisis, 103.
11. In his discussion of the original meaning of critique in What Is a Thing? Heidegger makes this point quite strongly: "Critique is so little negative that it means the most positive of the positive, a separation and lifting out of the special that is at the same time, the decisive. . . . [O]nly as a consequence is it also a rejection of the commonplace and unsuitable" (trans. W. B. Barton, Jr., and Vera Deutsch [Chicago: Regnery Press, 1967], 119-20).
12. Kosseleck, Critique and Crisis, 104 n. 14.
13. Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), 18.
14. One only need think here of George W. Bush's depiction of Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction as a wholly successful legitimating strategy for initiating a war.
15. William E. Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002). While the entire book is concerned in part with the question of reconceiving time in late modernity, see especially chapters 6 and 7.
16. Sheldon Wolin, "What Time Is It?" Theory and Event 1.1 (1997): para. 4 (http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/[restricted access]).
17. More precisely, Connolly says: "The acceleration of pace carries danger . . . but it also sets a condition of possibility for achievements that democrats and pluralists prize. The question for me, then, is not how to slow the world down, but how to work with and against a world moving faster than heretofore to promote a positive ethos of pluralism" (Neuropolitics, 143).
18. Fredric Jameson, The Seeds of Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 70-71.
19. Friedrich Nietzsche, "At Noon" and "The Night Song" in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1968), 387-90, 217-19.
20. Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," 262.
21. For more extended discussion of this point, see chapter 2 of my Politics Out of History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) and the introduction to Left Legalism/Left Critique, ed. Wendy Brown and Janet Halley (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2002).
22. Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," 263.
23. Nietzsche, "Schopenhauer as Educator," 235; Wolin, "What Time Is It?"; Norman O. Brown, "A Reply to Herbert Marcuse," commentary 43.3 (March 1967): 83-87.
24. Foucault, "What Is Critique?" 193.
25. For extended consideration of this point, see my forthcoming book, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire (Princeton University Press, forthcoming), and especially chapter 4. "The Governmentality of Tolerance."
26. Translations of the Apology and the Crito, by Hugh Tredennick, are from The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).
27. Thus, Socrates explains why he could "not venture to come forward in public and advise the state" (Apology 31c), why, even when he was a senator, he went home rather than carry out a policy he considered illegal; and why he refused to carry out the orders of the oligarchy even as he risked death for doing so.
28. Dana Villa, Socratic Citizenship (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 22-23.
29. Michel Foucault develops a notion of critique as virtue in his essay "What Is Critique?" See also the essay by Judith Butler on Foucault's essay, "What Is Critique? An Essay on Foucault's Virtue." Both are in The Political, ed. David Ingram (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).
30. Michel Foucault, "Governmentality" in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 92.
31. At times, this distinction may be so fine as to be almost unsustainable. It does not turn upon a putative difference between words and actions. Nor does it turn upon the difference between questioning the laws and disobeying them; legal authority can be more radically undermined by the former than the latter. Rather, as I will argue in what follows, I think it turns upon avowal of attachment to the object of critique and the limit this avowal poses to the destructive force of the critique.
32. Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, in the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. James Strachey, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-64), 18:111-12. The Standard Edition is hereafter cited as SE, and Group Psychology is hereafter cited parenthetically in the text as GP.
33. One of Freud's best examples here helps us understand not only political patriotic fervor but the phenomenon of thousands of screaming teenage girls clutching each other in shared delirium at a pop concert: "We have only to think of the troop of women and girls, all of them in love in an enthusiastically sentimental way, who crowd round a singer or pianist after his performance. It would certainly be easy for each of them to be jealous of the rest; but, in the face of their numbers and the consequent impossibility of their reaching the aim of their love, they renounce it, and instead of pulling out one another's hair, they act as a united group, do homage to the hero of the occasion with their common actions, and would probably be glad to have a share of his flowing locks" (GP, 120).
34. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, in SE 21:114.
35. In Future of an Illusion, Freud argues: "The narcissistic satisfaction provided by the cultural ideal is also among the forces which are successful in combating the hostility to culture within the cultural unit. This satisfaction can be shared in not only by the favoured classes, which enjoy the benefits of the culture, but also by the suppressed ones, since the right to despise the people outside it compensates them for the wrongs they suffer within their own unit. No doubt one is a wretched plebeian, harassed by debts and military service; but, to make up for it, one is a Roman citizen, one has one's share in the task of ruling other nations and dictating their laws" in SE 21:13.
36. Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, trans. James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1950), 49; hereafter cited parenthetically in the text as TT.
37. Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), 105.
38. Rey Chow, Ethics after Idealism: Theory-Culture-Ethnicity-Reading (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 42.
39. Žižek, Sublime Object of Ideology, 106.
40. Chow, Ethics after Idealism, 43.
41. Žižek's exploration of the hidden work of symbolic identification in legitimating a regime focuses on totalitarianism. However, for i ek totalitarianism is not opposed to the ordinary workings of ideology in modern Western states, but rather is its strong version, or more precisely its cartoon version.
42. Michael Ignatieff, "Nationalism and Toleration," in The Politics of Toleration: Tolerance and Intolerance in Modern Life, ed. Susan Mendus (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 81.
43. Michel Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique: Cours au Collège de France (1978-1979), ed. Michel Senellart (Paris: Gallimard, 2004), appeared too late to be consulted for this work.
44. The term liberal could not be more confused today, not only because of its different economic and political valences and its variable historical meanings, but also because at this moment in the United States, the standard electoral party opposition between liberal (as in liberalizing) and conservative (as in conserving) has collapsed. The Bush administration agenda is charged with being "radical" by liberals, an agenda that in turn positions Democrats as seeking to "conserve" welfare state policies and civil liberties against those (on the Right) who would "revolutionize" them. Moreover, as the Democratic Party struggles to recapture an American majority, some leading Democrats have joined in the right-wing practice of treating the appellation liberal as tantamount to Left, and hence "outside the mainstream."
45. Sheldon Wolin calls attention to George W. Bush's urge to citizens to "shop, fly, and spend" at the outset of the war on terrorism, a supplication that contrasts sharply with the more conventional rallying of the citizenry around a war effort-asking for civic support and individual sacrifice (Wolin, "Brave New World," Theory and Event 5.4 [2002]; http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ theory_and_event/[restricted access]).
46. I recall an episode from my graduate student years at Princeton University: In the early 1980s, a Princeton senior had already been admitted to Harvard Law School when she was caught cheating-plagiarizing, I think-in a Spanish literature class. The student was given an F in the class but Harvard Law was also informed of the event by a Princeton dean and thereupon withdrew its offer of admission. The student's family sued Princeton, on the basis that the student's career had been damaged beyond what was appropriate to the magnitude of her error. Though the suit struck many of us as astonishing in its shameless valorization of economic over moral values in a liberal arts academic setting, it is now clear that we were simply behind the times.
47. In a press conference just prior to the invasion of Afghanistan, Bush dismissed one reporter's probing with the remark "I'll let others work out the legalities," forthrightly implying that law did not represent principles that ought to frame policy but was something to be gotten around or manipulated to suit a preestablished aim. Bush responded similarly to the 2003 Supreme Court decision in Lawrence that overturned state sodomy laws, stating when questioned about the ruling that "our lawyers are currently working on the question" of how best to secure marriage as an exclusively heterosexual institution.
48. Michael Bleyzer, quoted in Tim Shorrock "Selling (Off) Iraq: How to 'Privatize' a Country and Make Millions," The Nation, June 23, 2003, p. 13. Bleyzer, a former Exxon executive now running a private equity firm, has briefed U.S. officials, including Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, on Iraq's political-economic future, and co-authored with Robert McFarlane a commentary in the Wall Street Journal titled "Taking Iraq Private" (January 27, 2003, p. A10).
49. The American-based corporation DynCorp International has a $50 million contract with the State Department to provide "law enforcement" in postwar Iraq (Shorrock, "Selling (Off) Iraq," 13).
50. See, for example, Thomas L. Friedman, "Winning the Real War" (op-ed), New York Times, July 16, 2003, p. A19, which dismisses Bush's "hyping of the W.M.O. issue" as relatively unimportant.
51. San Dillon "Out of Money, Some School Districts in Oregon End the Year Early," New York Times, May 24, 2003, p. A13.
52. Dean E. Murphy, "San Francisco Protest Brings Debate on Wages of Din," New York Times, June 23, 2003, p. A14.
53. In a recent Nation article, Sheldon S. Wolin proposed calling the current organization of power in the United States "inverted totalitarianism" ("Inverted Totalitarianism: How the Bush Regime Is Effecting the Transformation to a Fascist-like State, "The Nation, May 19, 2003, pp. 13-14). While the description Wolin offers is commensurate with many aspects of the neoliberal political rationality described here, I am not persuaded that Wolin's term captures the novelty of this political form as a rationality that is independent of traditional forms of rule. What strikes me as so useful about Foucault's notion of governmentality is precisely that it apprehends the extent to which rationality governs without recourse to overt rule-or, more precisely, the manner in which it governs through norms and rules rather than rule.
54. Mourning and Melancholia, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. James Strachey, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth, 1953-64), 14:252.
55. Lemke notes that for the Chicago School neoliberals, "a criminal is not a psychologically deficient person or a biological degenerate. . . . The criminal is a rational-economic individual who invests, expects a certain profit and risks making a loss. From the angle of homo oeconomicus there is no fundamental difference between a murder and a parking offence. It is the task of the penal system to respond to a supply of crimes, and punishment is one means of constraining the negative externalities of specific actions. . . . For the neoliberals, crime is no longer located outside the market model, but is instead one market among others" (199).
56. Foucault's return to Kant's question "Was Ist Aufklärung?" is a rich instance of the strategy of admixture here. See Foucault's essay by this title in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 32-50.
57. Giorgio Agamben, Means without End: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 113.
58. Here I refer to the division of political theory into distinct strains: liberal democratic thought, Arendtian-inflected democratic thought, (liberal) communitarian thought, neo-Nietzschean and poststructuralist thought, Habermassian thought, Straussian thought, Marxist thought, moral political philosophy, psychoanalytic thought, and still others harder to name. While there is crossover terrain and there are also crossover artists, for the most part each strain has its own subcanon, its own roster of stars and rising stars, its own groundbreaking and self-endorsed monographs and anthologies, its own newsletters and conferences.
59. Some of the most interesting contemporary philosophers of the political reject both of these formulations of the political. See, for example, Jacques Rancière's "Ten Theses on Politics," published in English in Theory and Event 5.3 (2001), at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/(restricted access), or consider Giorgio Agamben's recent insistence that "politics is a force field, an intensity, not a substance" and that this force field is delimited by the "friend/enemy" relation (seminar, Princeton University, October 15, 2001). I find these accounts provocative, if not fully convincing, and above all appreciate them for inciting theoretical conversation about what we mean by politics and the political today.
60. The general intellectual impoverishment of political theory on these developments is apparent in a wide range of topics. For example, in a seminar I recently taught on political theories of tolerance, an anthropology graduate student remarked that culture is more reified and less theorized in the work of most contemporary democratic theorists addressing multiculturalism than it was for anthropologists in the nineteenth century. Treated as a kind of primal, transhistorical, and subrational good, assumed to be especially cherished and valued by oppressed minorities, culture is generally counterposed to liberalism and cosmopolitanism, both of which are generally presumed to be cultureless.
61. At the moment when the very possibility of apprehending the "real world" has been challenged by postfoundationalist analysis and by the insistence that all description is embodied in discourse, every utterance can now potentially qualify as a theoretical one.
62. These thoughts were developed in the context of a seminar on Jean Laplanche: Seduction, Translation and the Drives offered by Judith Butler at Princeton University in November 2001. Working from my notes, I am uncertain which of these thoughts are Butler's, which are her reading of Laplanche's remarks about the nature of theory, and which are my own thoughts in response to Butler and Laplanche. Nor has she been able to answer this question. So this paragraph stands as collaboratively written, if unintentionally so.
63. See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 1, An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1980); Joan Scott, "'Experience,'" in Feminists Theorize the Political, ed. Judith Butler and Joan Scott (New York: Routledge, 1992), 22-40; and Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History (New York: Routledge, 1992).
64. Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989).
65. On this point, and for an exceptionally thoughtful meditation on the feminist politics of voice that at times parallels my own, see Valerie Hazel, "Disjointed Articulations: The Politics of Voice and Jane Campion's The Piano," Women's Studies Journal 10.2 (September 1994), 27-40.
66. This potential would appear to be more visible and cautionary among African Americans and other racially marked groups in the United States than among whites. Consider, as popular examples, the "we don't talk about it in public" (that is, a white public) attitude voiced by many African American women about sexual harassment and spousal abuse following the Anita Hill and O. J. Simpson spectacles. Or consider, as an example in fiction, Alice Walker's "Advancing Luna and Ida B. Wells," a story in which an African American woman feels consigned to silence about the alleged rape of her white co-worker by an African American acquaintance. In both cases, there is deep cognizance of the racist regulatory discourses in which the "voicing of truth" would be taken up.
67. Foucault, History of Sexuality, 100-101.
68. Agnes Lugo-Ortiz, "Community at Its Limits: Orality, Law, Silence, and the Homosexual Body in Luis Rafael Sanchez's 'Jum!'" in ¿Entiendes? Queer Readings, Hispanic Writings, ed. Emilie L. Bergmann and Paul Julian Smith (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), 115-36; and M. Jacqui Alexander, "Redrafting Morality: The Postcolonial State and the Sexual Offences Bill of Trinidad and Tobago," in Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism, ed. Chandra T. Mohanty, Anna Russo, and Lourdes Torres (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 133-52.
69. Lugo-Ortiz, "Community at Its Limits," 131.
70. On Foucault's formulation of freedom as a "practice," see Paul Rabinow's interview with Foucault, "Space, Knowledge and Power," in The Foucault Reader, ed. Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 245.
71. Michel Foucault, "The Minimalist Self," in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1988), 4.
72. Toni Morrison, Lecture and Speech of Acceptance, Upon the Award of the Nobel Prize for Literature, Delivered in Stockholm on the Seventh of December, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Three (New York: Knopf, 1994), 13-14, 16.
73. Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 86.
74. For a general discussion of premenstrual syndrome and the law, see Lee Solomon, "Premenstrual Syndrome: The Debate Surrounding Criminal Defense," Maryland Law Review 54 (1995): 571-93; for battered women's syndrome, see Lenore Walker, The Battered Women's Syndrome (New York: Springer, 1984), and State v. Kelly, 97 NJ 178, 478 A2d 364 (1984), holding that battered women's syndrome has sufficient scientific basis that expert testimony on it must be admissible); and for the Meese Commission's conclusions, see U.S. Department of Justice, Attorney General's Commission on Pornography (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1986), 322-52.
75. This analysis is more fully pursued in my States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), chapter 5.
76. Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (New York: Summit, 1988), 93-94.
77. Adrienne Rich, "Twenty-One Love Poems," in The Dream of a Common Language: Poems, 1974-1977 (New York: Norton, 1978), 29.
78. Note that the verb to drown is not only both passive and active-"she drowned in the river," "he drowned her in the bathtub"-but can also connote a condition from which one can return as well as a final state, one that terminates in death. There is a life-and-death difference between drowning and drowned. There is a vanishing at work in both; but Levi, it would seem, wants to capture this vanishing without giving it final say, without allowing it to turn into vanquishing. Thus, the drowning may become the saved . . . or the drowned.
79. Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, 76.
80. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 51.
81. Patricia Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 236 (emphasis added).
82. This paper was the keynote lecture for the United Kingdom Women's Studies Network Conference, "Beyond Sex and Gender: The Future of Women's Studies?" September 19-21, 2002 in Belfast, Ireland.
83. "The dead seize the living!" Karl Marx, preface to the First German Edition, Capital, vol. 1, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, ed. Frederick Engels (1887; reprint, New York: International Publishers, 1967), 9.
84. Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Viking Press, 1965), 29, 34.
85. See Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert Tucker, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), 26-52.
86. "What from [the French Revolution onward] has been irrevocable, and what the agents and spectators of revolution immediately recognized as such, was that the public realm-reserved, as far as memory could reach, to those who were free, namely carefree of all the worries that are connected with life's necessity, with bodily needs-should offer its space and its light to this immense majority who are not free because they are driven by daily needs. . . . The notion of an irresistible movement, which the nineteenth century soon was to conceptualize into the idea of historical necessity, echoes from beginning to end through the pages of the French Revolution" (Arendt, On Revolution, 48).
87. Gillian Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 125-29.
88. Karl Marx, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in The Marx-Engels Reader, 477.
89. See Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).
90. See Miglena Nikolchina, "The Seminar: Mode d'emploi. Impure Spaces in the Light of Late Totalitarianism," Differences: A Journal of Cultural Feminist Studies 13.1 (Spring 2002): 96-127.
91. While it is true that debates about "fundamentals" pervade many disciplines, I think that in most it is possible both to acknowledge the fictional character of the field and to venture arguments about what constitutes a good undergraduate education in those fields. For example, I would argue that any undergraduate obtaining a bachelor of arts in politics or political science in this country should have a basic grasp of (1) international relations in the era of nation-states and globalization, (2) U.S. political institutions, (3) one or two other political systems, (4) political economy, (5) social movements as sources of modern political upheaval and change, and (6) the history of political theory. This is a contestable list, and it also does not specify how this basic grasp is to be procured. However, what concerns me here is the disconcerting fact of my inability, and my colleagues' inability, to conjure a similar list for women's studies about which to begin arguing.
92. Two recent anecdotes from feminist colleagues at other universities sharpen this point. (1) A feminist scholar at a public university was asked to remove her course, "Introduction to Sexualities," from the women's studies curriculum on the grounds that its subject matter was sex, not gender. (2) The director of women's studies at a research university was seeking to convert her steadily declining program into one on gender and sexuality, for which there was abundant student demand and faculty interest. But in the process, she met with intense resistance from colleagues who feared a loss of focus on women, and especially women of color, in the revamped program.
93. Thus, to consider the making of gender through sexuality without reference to the more general regime of sexuality Foucault depicts in The History of Sexuality (MacKinnon's mistake) is just as myopic as formulating the terms of that regime with little or no reference to gender (Foucault's mistake). See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 1, An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1980); Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
94. Judith Butler, "Regulation," in Critical Terms in Gender Studies, ed. Gilbert Herdt and Catharine R. Stimpson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming).
95. "The individual is an effect of power, and at the same time . . . it is the element of its articulation. The individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle" (Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon [New York: Pantheon, 1980], 98).
96. It should be underscored that not all who travel under the sign of "critical race theory" subscribe to the view of rights most notably articulated by Patricia Williams in The Alchemy of Race and Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), and Robert A. Williams, Jr., in an earlier article, "Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal Theory for Peoples of Color," Law and Inequality 5.1 (1987): 103-34.
97. For a more complete development of this point, see my "Rights and Losses" in States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 96-134, and "Suffering Rights as Paradoxes," Constellations 7.2 (June 2000): 208-29.
98. Some might argue that miscegenation laws functioned in this way. However, miscegenation laws did not criminalize the racially marked subject as such in the way that sodomy laws do, but rather regulated the sexuality of such subjects.
99. Janet Halley and Kendall Thomas, in, for example, their respective readings of Bowers v. Hardwick, are notable exceptions in the field of queer jurisprudence. See Halley, "Reasoning about Sodomy: Act and Identity in and after Bowers v. Hardwick," Virginia Law Review 79 (1993): 1721-80; Thomas, "The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick," Virginia Law Review 79 (1993): 1805-51.