Representationalism about Consciousness

The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 261-276

  Seager, William ^a   Bourget, David ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

^b AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Approaches; Consciousness; Exhaustion thesis; Representationalism; Rescue

Indexed keywords

EID: 84883564813     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1002/9780470751466.ch21     Document Type: Chapter

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