Relational autonomy, normative authority and perfectionism

Journal of Social Philosophy

Volumn 39, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 512-533

  MacKenzie, Catriona ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84883541812     PISSN: 00472786     EISSN: 14679833     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9833.2008.00440.x     Document Type: Article

References (60)

1. I explain the difference between substantive and procedural theories of autonomy, and between strong and weak substantive theories, in Sections 3 and 4 below. For further discussion of the procedural/substantive distinction and of the differences between strong and weak substantive theories, see Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, "Introduction: Autonomy Refigured", in Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self, ed. Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3-31.
2. In a recent article, Paul Benson provides an illuminating analysis of the differences between strong and weak substantive relational theories. See Paul Benson, "Feminist Intuitions and the Normative Substance of Autonomy", in Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, ed. James Stacey Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 124-42.
3. For related arguments to this effect see, for example, Carolyn Ells, "Lessons about Autonomy from the Experience of Disability", Social Theory and Practice, 27, no. 4(2001):599-615;
4. Carolyn McLeod and Susan Sherwin, "Relational Autonomy, Self-Trust, and Health Care for Patients Who Are Oppressed", in Relational Autonomy, ed. Mackenzie and Stoljar, 259-79;
5. Carolyn McLeod, Self-Trust and Reproductive Autonomy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002);
6. Susan Sherwin, "A Relational Approach to Autonomy in Health Care", in The Politics of Women's Health: Exploring Agency and Autonomy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998).
7. For different variants of this view see, for example, Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), chap. 3;
8. and Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), chap. 1.
9. For identification theories, see especially Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person" and "Identification and Wholeheartedness", in Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988);
10. and Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
11. For different versions of the endorsement view, see especially Gary Watson, "Free Agency", Journal of Philosophy, 72(1975):205-20;
12. and Korsgaard, Sources.
13. Different versions of the integrated or whole self view have been proposed by Marilyn Friedman, "Autonomy and the Split-Level Self", Southern Journal of Philosophy, 24, no. 1(1986):19-35;
14. and Nomi Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder, "Praise, Blame, and the Whole Self", Philosophical Studies, 93(1999):161-88.
15. Authenticity conditions for autonomy have been proposed by John Christman and Diana Meyers. For recent versions of Christman's view, see for example, "Liberalism, Autonomy and Self-Transformation", Social Theory and Practice, 27, no. 2(2001):185-206;
16. and "Autonomy, Self-Knowledge and Liberal Legitimacy", in Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism, ed. John Christman and Joel Anderson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 330-57.
17. Meyers' most extended discussion is in her Self, Society and Personal Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).
18. See especially Paul Benson, "Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization", Social Theory and Practice, 17(1991):385-408.
19. See also Mackenzie and Stoljar, "Autonomy Refigured", in Relational Autonomy, ed. Mackenzie & Stoljar, 3-31.
20. John Christman, "Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism and the Social Constitution of Selves", Philosophical Studies, 117(2004):143-64.
21. (Benson, "Feminist Intuitions", 136).
22. The Case of Ms. B. versus an NHS Hospital Trust, UK High Court of Justice, Family Division, 22 March 2002. Dame Elisabeth Butler-Sloss' judgment can be found at: http://www.courtservice.gov. uk/judgmentsfiles/j1075/B-v-NHS. htm.
23. Kim Atkins, "Autonomy and the Subjective Character of Experience", Journal of Applied Philosophy, 17, no. 1(2000):71-79.
24. Atkins, "Subjective Character", 75.
25. See Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, chap. 7.
26. Statement from Ms. B, quoted in the judgment of Dame Elisabeth Butler-Sloss, http://www.courtservice.gov. uk/judgmentsfiles/j1075/B-v-NHS.htm, 12.
27. Internal conflict and ambivalence may not always compromise autonomy. For an agent may self-reflectively acknowledge ineradicable tensions between different aspects of her practical identity, arising for example, from different social role expectations or different, intersecting social group identities. For further discussion of this issue, see, for example, Paul Benson, "Taking Ownership: Authority and Voice in Autonomous Agency", in Challenges to Liberalism, ed. Christman and Anderson, 101-26;
28. Diana Meyers, "Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self?: Opposites Attract", in Relational Autonomy, ed. Mackenzie and Stoljar, 151-80;
29. Marina Oshana, "Autonomy and Self-Identity", in Challenges to Liberalism, ed. Christman and Anderson, 77-97.
30. See Frankfurt, "Rationality and the Unthinkable", in The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
31. For a helpful discussion of Frankfurt's notion of the unthinkable, see Gary Watson, "Volitional Necessities", in The Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, ed. Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 129-59.
32. Statement from Ms. B, quoted in the judgment of Dame Elisabeth Butler-Sloss, http://www.courtservice.gov. uk/judgmentsfiles/j1075/B-v-NHS.htm, 13.
33. For further discussion see Mackenzie and Stoljar, "Autonomy Refigured"
34. See especially Christman, "Self-Transformation";
35. "Liberal Individualism";
36. and "Liberal Legitimacy"
37. Another relational theorist who adopts a procedural approach is Friedman in Autonomy, Gender, Politics.
38. The historical constraint is first discussed in Christman, "Autonomy and Personal History", Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21(1991):1-24.
39. See especially Christman, "Self-Transformation" and "Liberal Individualism"
40. For a strong substantive theory that imposes constraints on the contents of autonomous agents' beliefs and values, see Natalie Stoljar, "Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition", in Mackenzie and Stoljar, Relational Autonomy, 94-111.
41. For a strong substantive theory that imposes constraints on autonomous agents' socio-relational status, see Marina Oshana, "Personal Autonomy and Society", Journal of Social Philosophy 29, no. 1(1998):81-102;
42. "How Much Should We Value Autonomy?", Social Philosophy and Policy 20, no. 2(2003):99-126;
43. and Personal Autonomy in Society (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006), chap. 2.
44. Oshana, "Personal Autonomy and Society" and "How Much Should We Value Autonomy?"
45. Oshana, "How Much Should We Value Autonomy?"
46. Oshana's argument draws on Robert Young's distinction between "occurrent" and "global" or "dispositional" autonomy, in Young, Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Liberty (Netherlands: Croom Helm, 1986).
47. Christman, "Liberal Individualism", 151.
48. For a related criticism of Oshana's approach, see Diana Meyers's review of Personal Autonomy in Society, Hypatia 23, no. 2(2008):202-6.
49. Meyers, Personal Choice. Joseph Raz also insists that autonomy is a matter of degree.
50. See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).
51. Paul Benson, "Free Agency and Self-Worth", Journal of Philosophy 91(1994):650-68;
52. "Taking Ownership";
53. and "Feminist Intuitions";
54. Trudy Govier, "Self-Trust, Autonomy, and Self-Esteem", Hypatia 8(1993):99-120.
55. Joel Anderson and Axel Honneth, "Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice", in Challenges to Liberalism, ed. Christman and Anderson, 127-49.
56. For further discussion, see Benson, "Taking Ownership"
57. For a helpful overview of the issues raised by both moral and political perfectionism, see Steven Wall, "Perfectionism in Moral and Political Philosophy", in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perfectionism-moral/. First published 13 Feb, 2007.
58. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, and Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
59. It is not clear whether Raz is committed to the view that autonomy is a transcendent value, that is, necessary for leading the best life one can, or to the view that autonomy is a contextual value, necessary for leading the best life one can in a modern, liberal democratic state. For a more detailed discussion, see David McCabe, "Joseph Raz and the Contextual Argument for Liberal Perfectionism", Ethics, 111, no. 3(2001):493-522.
60. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 391.