Don't be so impatient

Notre Dame Law Review

Volumn 88, Issue 5, 2013, Pages 2157-2166

  Magliocca, Gerard N ^a  

^a Indiana University School of Law Indianapolis   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84883298418     PISSN: 07453515     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (33)

1. Yes Minister: The Right to Know (BBC television broadcast Mar. 31, 1980).
2. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 25-77 (2006) (offering an extended critique of the Constitution's provisions with respect to Congress).
3. See U. S. CONST, art. I, § 3, cl. 1
4. amended by U. S. CONST, amend XVII ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state, [chosen by the Legislature thereof]⋯").
5. See generally JAMES GRANT, MR. SPEAKER!: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THOMAS B. REED (2011) (describing the range of dilatory tactics used in the House during the 1880s).
6. See U. S. CONST, amend. XVII ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years⋯").
7. See Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1025-26 (2011) (describing the so-called "Reed Rules" that streamlined House procedures).
8. See Gerard N. Magliocca, Reforming the Filibuster, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 303, 308-13 (2011).
9. see also John Copeland Nagle, Lame Duck Logic, 45 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 1177, 1218 (2012) ("Filibusters actually preserve the will of the majority of the people during lame-duck sessions because they prevent Congress from acting after the People have elected new representatives.").
10. see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 365 (2012) ("In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, routine filibustering practices have skyrocketed.").
11. See generally JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE (1955) (providing the most hyperbolic version of this story).
12. See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273, 276 (2011) ("[T]his polarization reflects a maturation of American democracy, rather than a state that should be considered temporary or aberrational.").
13. See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS 45 (2012) (presenting this conclusion with the support of extensive data).
14. See Citizens United v. Fed. Elec. Comm'n, 558 U. S. 310 (2010) (barring limits on most campaign expenditures by corporations).
15. Norimitsu Onishi, New Rules Upend House Re-Election Races in California, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2012, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 09/25/us/politics/newrules-upend-house-re-election-races-in-california.html.
16. See, e.g., William B. Jackson, Note, A Blanket Too Short and Too Narrow: California's Nonpartisan Blanket Primary, 23 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 535 (2012) (describing the operation of Proposition 14). Louisiana has used a system like this for years.
17. See Chenwei Zhang, Note, Towards a More Perfect Election: Improving the Top-Two Primary for Congressional and State Races, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 615, 625 (2012).
18. Lydia Saad, In the U. S., Blue States Outnumber Red States, 20 to 12, GALLUP (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.gallup. com/poll/160175/blue-states- outnumber-red-states.aspx (presenting polling data on die entrenchment of red and blue states).
19. Aaron Blake, Democratic House Candidates Winning the Popular Vote, Despite Big GOP Majority, WASH. POST THE FIX BLOG (Nov. 9, 2012, 11:52 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2012/11/09/democratic-house- candidates-winning-the-popular-votedespite-big-gop-majority/.
20. See generally Jeffrey W. Ladewig, One Person, One Vote, 435 Seats: Interstate Malapportionment and Constitutional Requirements, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1125 (2011) (explaining this problem).
21. U. S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK, ELECTIONS: CONGRESSIONAL, tbl.411 (2012) [hereinafter ELECTIONS: CONGRESSIONAL], http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0411.pdf.
22. See Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modem Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 968 n. 203 (2008) (noting the Jeffords switch).
23. ELECTIONS: CONGRESSIONAL, supra note 24.
24. U. S. HOUSE OF REP.: HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, PARTY DIVISIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house. gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/ Party-Divisions/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
25. For an example of a state legislature where gridlock was eliminated, see Gerard N. Magliocca, Huey P. Long and the Guarantee Clause, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2008) (describing the Louisiana legislature of the early 1930s where bills were passed "at the rate of one every few minutes").
26. See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (forthcoming 2013).
27. See U. S. CONST, art V. Moreover, Congress would have been unable to override the vetoes of President Andrew Johnson, who was a strong critic of Republican Reconstruction.
28. See John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375, 404-05 (2001).
29. See U. S. CONST, art I, § 2, cl. 3 (containing the Three-Fifths Clause)
30. amended by U. S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 2;
31. See, e.g., DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, NO ORDINARY TIME 22-23 (1994) (offering a sketch of the debate between internationalists and isolationists).
32. See U. S. CONST, art II, § 2, cl. 2.
33. See generally ROBERT MANN, THE WALLS OF JERICHO: LYNDON JOHNSON, HUBERT HUMPHREY, RICHARD RUSSELL, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1996) (describing this long march for justice).