Of mutant copyrights, mangled trademarks, and Barbie's beneficence: The influence of copyright on trademark law

Trademark Law and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary Research

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 481-497

  Ginsburg, Jane C ^a  

^a School for International and Public Affairs   (United States)

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EID: 84882317501     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9781848441316.00029     Document Type: Chapter

References (97)

1. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
2. Dastar, 539 US at 34
3. (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989)).
4. See Mattel, Inc. v Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003);
5. Mattel, Inc. v MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2002);
6. Mattel, Inc. v Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 315, 318-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
7. Lanham Federal Trademarks Act, § 43(a), 15 USC § 1125.
8. 17 USC § 106A.
9. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 35.
10. See, e.g., Bach v Forever Living Prods., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (W.D. Wa. 2007)
11. See also Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1472, 1527 (2004).
12. See, e.g., Williams v UMG, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
13. (rejecting "reverse passing off" claim when film writer and director's name was left off the credits of a documentary on which he collaborated; court acknowledged that Ninth Circuit precedent had recognized such claims in similar contexts, but that Dastar now "precludes plaintiff's Lanham Act claim" in still-copyrighted as well as public domain works);
14. Hustlers v Thomasson, 73 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1923 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (holding that Dastar's limitation of false designation of origin claims to the producer of physical copies bars not only claims by authors, but also by publishers; the court also follows Williams v UMG Recordings in holding Dastar not limited to works in the public domain);
15. Zyla v Wadsworth, 360 F.3d 243, 241-51 (1st Cir. 2004) (
16. Professor and collaborative author on a college textbook brought suit against a publisher for failing to attribute her authorship properly when she dropped out of the editing process; court read Dastar as foreclosing a Lanham Act claim based on the professor's contributions to a copyrighted textbook)
17. Mays & Assoc. v Euler, 370 F. Supp. 2d 362 (D. Md. 2005)
18. (after Dastar, no Lanham Act claim for non-attribution of authorship of web design portfolio);
19. JB Oxford & Co. v First Tenn. Bank Nat'l Ass'n., 427 F. Supp. 2d 784 (M.D. Tenn. 2006) (no § 43(a) claim against advertiser who allegedly copied plaintiff's advertisement and substituted its name for plaintiff's.;
20. Carroll v Kahn, 68 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1357, 1361-2 (N.D.N.Y. 2003)
21. (quoting Dastar and Williams v UMG Recordings, Inc. to support dismissal of a "failure to attribute" claim);
22. Chivalry Film Prods. v NBC Universal, Inc., 2006 WL 89944 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
23. (screenwriter claimed producer of "Meet the Parents" copied his script and misattributed screenplay to third parties; court held Dastar required dismissal of misattribution claim); A Slice of Pie Prods. v Wayans Bros. Entm't, 392 F. Supp. 2d 297 (D. Conn. 2005)
24. (same re film "White Chicks");
25. Beckwith Builders v DePietri, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67060;
26. 81 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1302 (D.N.H. 2006)
27. (dismissing claim that crediting building to another architect violated the Lanham Act, "Beckwith's complaint asserts that the Clark Road home was labeled with a designation of origin -via the signs placed near it. But, because the signs in front of that house accurately identified those who physically produced that tangible object [built the house, as opposed to designed it], the facts alleged by Beckwith fail to state a claim of false designation of origin under the Lanham Act.");
28. Sivak v Versen, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22430 (S.D. Cal. 2007)
29. ("Although the [Dastar] Court was examining the issue in the context of alleged misuse of material no longer protected under copyright monopoly because the copyright on the material had expired and the material had entered the public domain, the Court's analysis recognized the need to avoid 'over-extension' of trademark and related protections into traditional copyright and patent areas").
30. See Lanham Act § 45, 15 USC § 1127
31. (definition of "trademark").
32. For a more detailed discussion, see, e.g., F. Gregory Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171 (2005);
33. Jane C. Ginsburg, The Author's Name as a Trademark: A Perverse Perspective on the Right of "Paternity"?, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. REV. 379 (2005).
34. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 38.
35. See King v Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1992).
36. See Gilliam v ABC, 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.1976).
37. See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, § 27:77.1, at 27-149.
38. See, e.g., Croson v Eslinger, 455 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (declining to dismiss § 43(a)(1)(B) claim that film's credits wrongly credited defendant as producer).
39. 467 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
40. See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, § 27:14, at 27-25 to 27-27.
41. Lanham Act § 43(a)(2)
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2000).
43. 17 USC § 1202, defines copyright management information to include
44. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the "Digital Millennium," 23 COLUM. VLA J.L. & ARTS 137, 157 (1999).
45. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Art and the Law: Suppression and Liberty, The Line Between Work and Framework, Text and Context, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 19, 21 (2001)
46. ("the copyright management information provisions of the DMCA effectively create a right of attribution in the Internet environment").
47. 409 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2006).
48. 409 F. Supp. 2d at 592.
49. For an analysis of Dastar's broader impact on state law passing-off claims
50. see Tom W. Bell, Misunderestimating Dastar: How the Supreme Court Unwittingly Revolutionized Copyright Preemption, 65 MD. L. REV. 206 (2006).
51. See, e.g., Gucci Shops, Inc. v R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
52. ("Gucchi Goo" diaper bags held likely to be confused with Gucci handbags);
53. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987)
54. ("Mutant of Omaha" anti-nuclear protest items such as coffee mugs and posters held likely to be confused with "Mutual of Omaha" insurance services;
55. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994)
56. ("Michelob Oily" parody ad in SNICKER humor magazine held likely to confuse the public as to its approval by the producers of Michelob Dry beer);
57. Harriette K. Dorson, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U.L. REV. 923 (1985).
58. See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc. 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989)
59. ("Spy Notes" parody of Cliffs Notes, no likelihood of confusion found);
60. Yankee Publishing v News America Publishing, 809 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
61. (New York Magazine parody of cover of Old Farmer's Almanac cover, no likelihood of confusion found);
62. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007)
63. Rogers v Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
64. See Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187, 208 (2004)
65. (in Federal Anti Dilution Act Congress is saying to courts, "You have shown in your development of fair use in copyright that you know how to limit the scope of a broadly-written exclusivity statute -to keep it in line with the needs of free expression. We are relying on you to do that here. Create appropriate doctrines of 'fair use' to keep the Dilution Act within reasonable bounds.").
66. Prestonettes, Inc. v Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924).
67. See also Champion Spark Plug v Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947).
68. See New Kids on the Block v News Am. Publ'g, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992);
69. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v Welles, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002);
70. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005) (following Ninth Circuit).
71. Other circuits reach the same result through similar reasoning, albeit without applying the label "nominative fair use."
72. See, e.g., Universal Commun. Sys. v Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 424-5 (1st Cir. 2007).
73. See generally J. Thomas McCarthy, Non Confusing Nominative Fair Use, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:11 (4th ed.).
74. New Kids, 971 F.3d at 306.
75. See 17 USC § 107(1), (3), (4).
76. In narrow circumstances of "market failure," redistributive uses may be ruled "fair," but the kinds of uses at issue in the copyright/trademark overlap cases are more traditionally "transformative," such as parodies.
77. See, e.g., Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 593 (1994).
78. See, e.g., Smith v Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968) (smell-alike perfume);
79. August Storck K.G. v Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 1995) (competing candies).
80. Mattel, Inc. v Universal Music International, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
81. 296 F.3d at 900.
82. 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
83. 229 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
84. 353 F.3d at 801 ("The issue of whether a work is a parody is a question of law, not a matter of public majority opinion.").
85. F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1997).
86. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)
87. (copyright fair use factor takes commercial nature of use into account in assessing the "nature and purpose" of the use).
88. HR 683, 109th Cong., 2d sess. (2006).
89. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 USC § 1125(c).
90. On the dilution claim and its contrast with traditional trademark norms
91. see generally, Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B. U. L. REV. 547 (2006);
92. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999).
93. On federal dilution's less impressive record in the courts
94. see Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (2006).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A).
96. See also H.R. Rep. No. 109-23, 109th Cong., 1st sess. (2005) at 25 (Statement of Rep. Berman).
97. § 1115(b)(4).