What are the perils of separating banking regulation from the central bank’s orbit in Latin America and the Caribbean?

Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 70-83

  Demaestri, Edgardo ^a   Guerrero, Federico ^b  

^a INTER AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

Author keywords

Caribbean; Central banks; Financial control; Financial markets; Latin america

Indexed keywords

EID: 84881988499     PISSN: 13581988     EISSN: 17400279     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/13581980610644770     Document Type: Article

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