Gurwitsch's Phenomenal Holism

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Volumn 12, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 559-578

  Chudnoff, Elijah ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI   (United States)

Author keywords

Cognitive phenomenology; Gestalt theory; Phenomenal holism

Indexed keywords

EID: 84881546673     PISSN: 15687759     EISSN: 15728676     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-012-9279-6     Document Type: Article

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